

The Origins of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology as Recorded in *Coll.[atio]* and *Corr.[igenda]* Included in the Notes for his Habilitation Thesis

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Abstract

The article presents excerpts from new and rich archival material on Karol Wojtyła's habilitation thesis. In addition, its purpose is to present the first strictly philosophical point from which a systematic reconstruction of the evolution of Wojtyła's philosophical views on the question of the person or more broadly on anthropological issues can be made. The thesis of the analysis is that from the beginning of his philosophical inquiries, Wojtyła was critical of phenomenology and read it from a Thomistic point of view. The analysis presented undermines the thesis that Wojtyła, from the beginning of his philosophical inquiries, was fascinated by phenomenology.

Key words

Karol Wojtyła, Thomism, phenomenology, archival materials, anthropology, person

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Introduction

This article aims to present new research material in the studies of Karol Wojtyła, to place it in the appropriate source context and indicate how the analyzes made on the basis of this material fits into the discussion on issues related to the beginnings of Karol Wojtyła's philosophical path, especially certain foundations of his philosophical anthropology. This material is a collection of Wojtyła's comments made "in the margin" of his notes and the working translation of Max Scheler's work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und in die materiale Wertethik*,² which was the basis for reference in the future pope's habilitation thesis.³

Method and research material

The research method used as the basis for this study is Gilson's historical and philosophical method, which is limited to the processing of archival material, analysis of the content of sources and partial contextual analysis. I have written elsewhere about the benefits of Gilson's historical and philosophical method in working on Wojtyła's works, as well as about the method itself.⁴

Let's move on to present the research material.

² M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in Der Ethik Und Die Materiale Wertethik* (Freiburg: Halle a.d.S. Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1921). The entire archival material will be presented in the first volume of the critical edition of Karol Wojtyła's philosophical works, published by the John Paul II Institute for Intercultural Dialogue in cooperation with the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow.

³ K. Wojtyła, *Próba opracowania etyki chrześcijańskiej według systemu Maksa Schelera*, (Kraków, 1953) – the typescript is located in the resources of the Archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow (hereinafter referred to as the Archive) with the reference number AKKW CII-9/110. The notation AKKW stands for: Archiwum Kardynała Karola Wojtyły (Archives of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła). The notation "CII" is the designation of the collection of philosophical materials written by Wojtyła and is part of AKKW. K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Kraków, 1954), typescript with reference number AKKW CII-9/110a; K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Kraków, 1954), typescript with reference number AKKW CII-9/110b; K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1959); K. Wojtyła, "Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera," in: *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, by K. Wojtyła, ed. T. Styczeń et al., *Źródła i Monografie*, nr. 119 (Człowiek i moralność II) (Lublin: TN KUL, 1991), 11–128.

⁴ K. Petryszak, "The Perspective of Archival Discoveries in the Study of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," *The Person and the Challenges. The Journal of Theology, Education, Canon Law and Social Studies Inspired by Pope John Paul II* Vol. 13, No. 2 (2023), 117-132.

The titles *Coll.[atio]* and *Corr.[igenda]* that interest us are part of a complete archival set discovered by myself and Martha Burghardt.⁵ They consist of 639 handwritten “fiches” by Wojtyła, which are translations of Max Scheler's work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*,⁶ and enriched with comments and corrections, namely the title *Collatio and Corrigenda*.

All *Coll.* in the study material are 9, while *Corr.* are 12. In addition, one paragraph is unclear due to Wojtyła's deletion and amendments. It is probably *Corr.*, as indicated by the striking out of the letters *ll* probably in the earlier *Coll.* and the content of this fragment itself, but there is no certainty here. These are paragraphs of varying length and varying thematic content. Additional research material used for the comparative and contextual analysis is the above-mentioned *Der Formalismus...*, or rather its translation by Wojtyła. Due to the possibility of reference specific *Coll.* and *Corr.* to specific places in Scheler's text, it will be marked for the sake of order to which fragments of Scheler's work Wojtyła referred. Such precision is possible thanks to the fact that in the presented research material, Wojtyła marked parts of his own translation, down to the paragraph and line.

The final research material that we will use in the contextual analysis itself is the typescript of Wojtyła's habilitation thesis, located in the Archive resources under the reference number AKKW CII-9/110. As I discovered, the version of the work that Wojtyła submitted to reviewers in 1953 differs from the widely known first edition from 1959. The most important change is a different ten-page ending to the entire work.⁷ However, for the sake of a certain clarity of analysis, I will refer to the typescript (reference number AKKW CII-9/110a) from 1954 - which is essentially identical to the first edition - due to the most extensive presentation of Wojtyła's thought in it (it contains a version of before and after amendments).⁸

⁵ AKKW CII-24/232.

⁶ Specifically, its 1921 edition: M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*. The original copy from which Wojtyła translated is in the Archives' holdings under the reference: BKKW 84 (BKKW means Biblioteka Kardynała Karola Wojtyły – Library of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła).

⁷ K. Petryszak, “Evidence of Karol Wojtyła's Thought Formation as Preserved in Archival Materials,” *Logos i Ethos* Vol. 61, No. 1 (2023).

⁸ For the sake of clarity, let us note that this version already contains the second (changed) ending and Wojtyła's handwritten corrections, which were already included and typed in AKKW CII-9/110b.

The beginnings of Karol Wojtyła's anthropological path in the light of archival sources

Anthropological threads in Wojtyła's thinking can already be found in his early works on theology.⁹ It seems, however, that the most extensive comments and studies on this part of Wojtyła's work were his late philosophical works, especially *Person and Act*.¹⁰ However, there is no doubt that this mature, though certainly unfinished, is an anthropological¹¹ project developed in Wojtyła's thought for at least two decades (from the late 1940s until the publication of *Person and Act*).

In fact, the first positive anthropological theses had already appeared in the mid-1950s¹² and took on a broader dimension with the publication of *Love and Responsibility*.¹³ In the 1950s, however, the dominant approach in Wojtyła's philosophical writings is a negative one, which, by pointing out certain errors in anthropological approaches (such as those of Scheler or Immanuel Kant), makes it possible to discover the positive, and not always explicitly expressed, early and still developing anthropological thought of Wojtyła. Its roots in Thomistic philosophy are beyond doubt. However, did Wojtyła follow the anthropological path as indicated by Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy from the very beginning of his philosophical path?¹⁴ On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that St. John was also educated in Salamanca in the spirit of Thomism,

⁹ See: K. Wojtyła, *Dzieła teologiczne. Tom I. Początki drogi naukowej. Święty Jan od Krzyża*, ed. J. Machniak (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Papieskiego Jana Pawła II w Krakowie, 2022).

¹⁰ K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne pisma antropologiczne*, ed. T. Styczeń and et. al. (Lublin: Wydawnictwo TN KUL, 2000); English translation: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, trans. by G. Ignatik (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021). On the issue of Wojtyła's personalism itself and the attempt to place it in a broader context, see: J.M. Burgos, "Wojtyła's Personalism Ad Integral Personalism. The Future of an Intellectual Project," *Quaestiones Disputatae* Vol. 9, No. 2 (2019), 91–111. See also: M. Acosta, A.J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy. Understanding Person & Act* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2016). A.J. Reimers, "Karol Wojtyła's Aims and Methodology," in: *Christian Wisdom Meets Modernity*, ed. K. Oakes (New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2016), 129–147.

¹¹ See: J. Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 80.

¹² Primarily in the *Elementarz etyczny* and partly in the *Lublin Lectures*. See: K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures / Wykłady lubelskie*, trans. by H. McDonald (Lublin – Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu – Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2020). K. Wojtyła, "Elementarz etyczny," in: *Aby Chrystus Sie Nami Posługiwał* (Kraków: Znak, 1979), 129–182.

¹³ K. Wojtyła, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo TN KUL, 1960); English translation: K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1981).

¹⁴ Some also want to see some glimpse of phenomenology in it, see: R. Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. by P. Guietti and F. Murphy (Grand Rapids: William B. Edwards Publishing Company, 1997), ch. 3. Regarding the borrowing of certain themes in Wojtyła's philosophy from St. Augustine, see: G. Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła* (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2021), 20.

although practiced in an essentialist rather than existentialist manner. It is the important indication due to the fact that Wojtyła was connected with the thought of St. John of the Cross from a young age. Moreover, Wojtyła learned the basics of metaphysics from a textbook by Fr. Kazmierz Wais,¹⁵ in which, already in the introduction, the author outlined a lecture on metaphysics proper as Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics.¹⁶

We are therefore faced with a situation where a wealth of ideas influenced Wojtyła during his philosophical work. While, as we have mentioned, Wojtyła already clearly outlined his anthropological position in the 1960s, the beginnings of the maturation process of his views on this matter have not yet been explored. This article serves to partially fill this gap.

For those familiar with Wojtyła's philosophy, the emphasis that the "later" Wojtyła¹⁷ placed on the issue of the person and the act is clear. We also find similar issues in Wojtyła's initial remarks to Scheler's text. The author of *Person and Act* indicates here:

Coll.

Scheler, understanding a person as a concrete unity of acts, assuming that he exists in the

¹⁵ See: K. Wais, *Ontologia czyli metafizyka ogólna* (Lwów: Towarzystwo „Biblioteka Religijna”, 1926).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-6. The very terrain of inquiry into Wojtyła's affiliation with Thomism or phenomenology is not uncharted. Already in 1981, Jerzy Gałkowski pointed out that there was a problem how to classify Wojtyła: as a Thomist, a phenomenologist or as a philosopher combining Thomism with phenomenology. However, he immediately pointed out that Wojtyła was clearly a Thomist in the foundations of his thought - as an important point, let us note that in this judgment Gałkowski referred to Wojtyła's correspondence (J. Gałkowski, "Pozycja filozoficzna Kard. Karola Wojtyły," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (1981), 75. As a kind of counter-example, one can cite the thesis of Magdalena Mruszczyk, where the author points out that Wojtyła leaned towards Lowian Thomism - more open to additions and the theory of cognition - than towards existential Thomism. However, despite this fascination with the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: *since his studies of the mystical thought of St. John of the Cross, he [Wojtyła] was no longer able to ignore the phenomenological research attitude that had matured in him* (see: M. Mruszczyk, *Człowiek w „antropologii adekwatnej” Karola Wojtyły* (Katowice, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2010), 53.) Jan Galarowicz puts forward even stronger arguments, claiming that Wojtyła was a phenomenologist by nature, but only trained in Thomism (See: J. Galarowicz, *Człowiek jest osobą. Podstawy antropologii filozoficznej Karola Wojtyły* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, 1994), 60.) There has also been discussion on this topic in English-language literature. See: P. Guietti, "Translator's Afterword," in: *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (Grand Rapids, 1997), 307-351; A.J. Reimers, *The Truth about the Good: Moral Norms in the Thought of John Paul II* (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2011); J.M. Burgos, "The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism and Metaphysics," *Analecta Husserliana* 104 (n.d.), 107-129; Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, ch. 3. In both cases (discussions in Polish and English), the Wojtyłological community has not reached a clear consensus.

¹⁷ That is, the one from the 1950s and early 1960s until his election to the See of Peter.

execution of his act (*im Vollzug ihrer Akte*), and firmly renouncing any substantive way in understanding his essence, outlines a dynamic and axiological concept¹⁸ [s. 24/24-].¹⁹

The context for this remark is Wojtyła's indication that: "The person is understood by Sch[eler] as a concrete unity of all possible acts... if then it is itself a concrete unity of actions and acts, it stands, as it were, in front of various kinds of objects... The entire sphere of objects lies outside it in the sphere of objects as acts, its action."²⁰ Wojtyła seems to understand the German phenomenologist's idea of the person as something that is not a thing, does not have an essence (understood within the framework of the philosophy of being), but arises as (possibly from) the union of all acts. One would have to ask here: whose? From Scheler's text, it is clear only that the person exists in the execution of his acts. However, it is not clear whether we can even talk about acts without a person or about a person without the acts having actually been performed. It is also not yet clear to Wojtyła how Scheler's execution of acts should be understood, or more precisely: what is the role of the person in performing these acts? Wojtyła does not consider this yet but adds the remark that a person actually exists in the execution of acts. As we can see, this expression is ambiguous, and Scheler's text is not helpful in clarifying it.²¹ Wojtyła also adds that the person exists in action. One should not make simple parallels or a simple corollary between this view of the person and Wojtyła's mature thesis that the act reveals the person, there is insufficient data for this. It cannot be immediately assumed at this point that this action creates a person. The existence of a person in action is not, nor must not necessarily mean, that it is the person who acts. Why does Wojtyła neither in this fragment nor in the context of the preceding fragment clarify these issues? And why doesn't he draw conclusions from the presented characterization that actually result from it?

Taking into account the broader context preceding the commented *Coll.* it is reasonable to point out that Scheler is building an axiological concept. However, this dynamism that Wojtyła

¹⁸ AKKW CII-24/232, k. 31x – these are the card numbers (cards) according to Wojtyła's numbering.

¹⁹ The entry given after the quotations in square brackets is Wojtyła's indication (originally placed in the margins of the "cards") regarding the pages and lines of Scheler's work.

²⁰ AKKW CII-24/232, k. 31x.

²¹ See: Scheler, *Der Formalismus in Der Ethik Und Die Materiale Wertethik*, 24. Another relevant context is also: *Ibid.*, 109-110.

points to, placed in the context of the person, seems unjustified.²² The fact of some (undefined at this moment) connection of a person (not fully defined) with acts (whose?) and with action (whose?) does not yet result in a dynamic image of both the person and the certain situation in which he is presented.

Considering the above, we can say that in the source material we encounter for the first time in Wojtyła's thought a strictly philosophical reflection on the person.²³ Considering the number of questions that should be asked regarding the ambiguities and shortcomings left for us here by Wojtyła, it can be concluded that we are touching the starting point in the evolution of Wojtyła's anthropological views.²⁴ They are shaped in the prism that will also accompany the thought of the "later" Wojtyła, i.e. at the junction of the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness, or more broadly, as Grzegorz Hołub aptly pointed out, a post-Cartesian philosophy.²⁵

It is important to clearly indicate the context in which Wojtyła reads Scheler's views. A broader analysis of all *Coll.* and *Corr.* clearly indicates that Wojtyła, when dealing with the difficult thought contained in *Der Formalismus...*, tried to read it from the perspective of the Thomistic philosophy of being. His numerous remarks indicate a certain surprise and disappointment at the almost complete lack of not only rooting Scheler's philosophy in the philosophy of being (of any kind), but basically the impossibility for Wojtyła of introducing this fundamental context into it.²⁶ Thus, it can be said that in trying to fully understand Scheler's philosophy, Wojtyła ended up with phenomena, suspended, as it were, in a metaphysical vacuum, which he tried to fill with his well-known Thomistic philosophy. However, as evidenced by his habilitation thesis, as well as a significant part of his philosophical writings from the 1950s,²⁷ this supplementation turned out to

²² The explanation for Wojtyła's remark framed in this way is the fact of his strict reliance on Thomistic anthropology, in which dynamism, both on existential and moral grounds, is a fundamentally important element. See: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I. q. 75-77.

²³ Due to their strictly or definitely theological rather than philosophical nature, Wojtyła's earlier texts on the thought of Saint John of the Cross and the record of the retreat known as *Considerations on the Essence of Man* are omitted. (See: K. Wojtyła, *Rozważania o istocie człowieka* (Kraków: WAM, 1999)).

²⁴ Grzegorz Hołub drew attention to this evolution seen in a longer perspective, i.e. from Wojtyła's doctoral thesis: Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, 13.

²⁵ G. Hołub, "Karol Wojtyła and René Descartes. A Comparison of the Anthropological Positions," *Anuario Filosófico* Vol. 48, No. 2 (2015), 341-358.

²⁶ See especially: AKKW CII-24/232, k. 20x, 24x, 26x, 29, 38x, 43-44, 47, 49, 51, 52«b», 89, 111.

²⁷ See: K. Wojtyła, "Ewangeliczna zasada naśladowania. Nauka źródeł objawienia a system filozoficzny Maxa Schelera," *Ateneum Kapłańskie*, Vol. 55 (1957), 57-67; K. Wojtyła, "O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej (w oparciu o koncepcję św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz Maksza Schelera)," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (1959), 99-124 (English trans.: K. Wojtyła, "On the metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral

be impossible, which ultimately confirmed Wojtyła in the belief that his intuitions expressed in the cited research material and partially presented in the conclusions of his habilitation thesis were justified.²⁸ Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Wojtyła, reading more and more into Scheler's works, increasingly noticed discrepancies between Thomism and phenomenology, which he initially tried to resolve by trying to internalize Scheler's philosophy into Thomism.²⁹ The well-known conclusion of his habilitation thesis makes it clear that, over the course of probably 1951-1953, Wojtyła lost his conviction that the two philosophies could be combined.³⁰

To complete the picture, let us point out that the definition of a person in Scheler's philosophy presented by Wojtyła in his habilitation thesis is limited primarily to three summaries: a. the person is understood actualistically, b. a person is the subject of moral values because he experiences these values, but he is not a efficacious³¹ being – however, he has an axiological character, c. a person is a dynamic being not in the sense of agency, but in the sense of experience, i.e. being a passive recipient of values. It can therefore be concluded that the content contained in the archival material, as well as the analyzes presented so far, agree with the material contained in Wojtyła's habilitation thesis.³²

A strong commitment to both Thomistic metaphysics and the Thomistic anthropology that follows from it is evidenced by Wojtyła's next remark:

Coll.

Note: Scheler is apparently against overestimating the cognitive moment, esp.[ecially] the intellectual moment, in the structure of our experiences. It proclaims not only separateness, but a certain distant and [xxx]³³ self-sufficiency of the sphere of aspirations and desires. It is

Norm," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, trans. by Th. Sandok (New York - San Francisco - Bern - Baltimore - Frankfurt am Main - Berlin - Wien - Paris: Peter Lang, 2008), 73-94; K. Wojtyła, "Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* Vol. 5, No. 1 (1957), 111-35 (English trans.: K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 3-22).

²⁸ See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 152-162.

²⁹ See: AKKW CII-24/232, cards 20x, 24x, 26x, 29, 38x, 43-44, 47, 49, 51, 52«b», 89, 111.

³⁰ See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 152-162.

³¹ We translate *sprawcza* as "efficacious" (cf. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures / Wykłady lubelskie*, 47). But another possibility is to translate *sprawcza* as "causative".

³² See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 13, 21, 39, 77-78, 89, 153-155.

³³ This word is not legible.

the proper objective reference (factor of objectification) of these experiences [p. 28/35-29/8].³⁴

This note, in itself, is very clear. However, it is worth relating it to the previous remark and asking: whose aspirations and desires are we talking about? Scheler's text does not indicate that these are the aspirations and desires of a person. Additionally, if a person cannot be understood from the perspective of the philosophy of being, it is difficult to say unambiguously that these would be his or her aspirations and desires. Should these aspirations and desires be understood as belonging to consciousness (following the spirit of phenomenology)? Wojtyła does not raise this problem, which proves that in the early 1950s he most likely did not have any well-thought-out or ready answers to such issues. If we would like to trace the evolution of Wojtyła's views on the person, the issues discussed here seem crucial, as they indicate from which philosophical issues Wojtyła began his anthropological reflection.

In the context of Thomistic philosophy of being, Wojtyła's strong emphasis on what he would later call emotionalism is noteworthy. This emotionalism is not only against overestimating the intellectual moment in the cognitive structure of experiences and in the axiological sphere, but almost completely rejects it. Therefore, this position is radically opposed to the Thomistic approach, which strongly emphasizes the value of intellectual cognition (*animal rationale*).³⁵ Importantly, and as we have already noted in his comments on Scheler's text, Wojtyła insists on a Thomistic³⁶ approach and the criticism of Scheler's emotionalism, already at the beginning of the 1950s, takes on the same framework that Wojtyła consistently presented throughout the 1950s.³⁷

Wojtyła does not raise the issue of epistemology and the primacy of reason or emotions separately in his habilitation thesis. Nevertheless - apart from the context of emotionalism - it is possible to point out several places in the habilitation where the author of *Person and Act*, at least

³⁴ AKKW CII-24/232, card 35X

It is worth juxtaposing this remark with Wojtyła's clear declaration of belonging on the grounds of anthropology to Thomism: K. Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 168.

³⁵ See: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 79 and Hofub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, 15.

³⁶ See: AKKW CII-24/232, card 89.

³⁷ See for example: Wojtyła, "Ewangeliczna zasada naśladowania. Nauka źródeł objawienia a system filozoficzny Maxa Schelera"; Wojtyła, "O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej (w oparciu o koncepcję św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz Maksa Schelera)"; Wojtyła, "Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego."

implicitly, points to the fact that Scheler does not want to overestimate the role of rational cognition and remains grounded in broadly understood feelings.³⁸

From the above analyses, Wojtyła drew a conclusion precisely expressed later in the Lublin Lectures: “The purely emotionalistic intuitionism [Scheler’s – KP] precludes the person’s rational, efficacious and creative role in the formation of the morality of his acts.”³⁹ This is related to the conclusion, repeated many times by Wojtyła, also as an objection, that Scheler’s axiology – which translates into his ethics and related anthropology – is, in principle, completely receptive.⁴⁰ These reservations are already visible in Wojtyła’s comments quoted from the manuscript, as well as in their broader context, which cannot be presented in full here.

In discussing the issue of the earliest established record of the formation of Wojtyła’s strictly philosophical anthropological thought, it is still necessary to mention an issue strongly emphasized by the “later” Wojtyła. It is about recognizing that man as a person finds his individuality and uniqueness in his acts, which are often directed towards what the person himself is not.⁴¹ While with regard to the writings of the author of *Person and Act* it is possible to inquire whether or to what extent phenomenology was useful to him in this type of study with regard to the present, earliest period of his philosophical work, it is certain that he presented the issue to himself on the basis of Thomism. In this context, the following *Corr.* deserves attention:

Sole clarius: The cognition of values [according to Scheler - KP] is not only independent of the cognition of things, but often (perhaps even in principle) precedes it [pp. 29/26-30/20].⁴²

³⁸ See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 6-7, 9-10, 81.

³⁹ Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures / Wykłady lubelskie*, 368.

⁴⁰ Whereby receptive is meant the passive attitude and devoid of acts of the will of the subject on moral grounds. As Wojtyła points out very clearly in an unpublished text from 1954 in relation to the foundation of Scheler’s ethical views, i.e. in relation to love: “That also is why Scheler, in his conception, completely separates love from the entire sphere of human aspirations and desires, and states that it is purely and emotional act. However, there is a clear conflict with St. Thomas, whose teaching on love is based on the assumptions of ancient thinkers: love comes down to an act of will. The voluntaristic solution is opposed to the emotionalistic solution.” (K. Wojtyła, “Nauka św. Tomasza z Akwinu o miłości,” 1954. A copy can be found in the Archives under reference no. AKKW CII 3/59.) It should be added that the fact that Scheler calls something an act does not mean that it is an act understood in terms of classical philosophy, i.e. as an action in which the will of the acting entity is involved - or any other sphere of active human activity. The act in Scheler’s case is the passive reception of values and their also passive experiencing.

⁴¹ An interesting – albeit much later (1st edition in 1990) - interpretation of this issue was presented by Paul Ricoeur in his famous work *Oneself as Another*, in which he devoted particular attention to the main problem indicated in the text to “study” III and IV.

⁴² AKKW CII-24/232, card 37x.

It is not *sole clarius* what intention Wojtyła is hiding behind the writing: *Sole clarius*. Is this an emphasis on the obviousness of the conclusion drawn from Schelerian philosophy or is it a position with which Wojtyła identifies himself and, therefore, with this emphasis marks the confirmation of the conclusion drawn.

There is a clear indication in the context regarding this remark: “Thus, it happens, for example, that we experience the readiness of the sacrifice, but do not yet completely see the object “quod” nor “cui” of this sacrifice.”⁴³ It deserves attention because Wojtyła gives a descriptive presentation of for whom we want to, for example, sacrifice (in the original: *ohne noch die Objekte im Auge zu haben, an denen wir dies tun wollen*)⁴⁴ by means of Latin terminology. It seems that a thesis can be put forward here that Wojtyła is still looking for connections between classical philosophy and Scheler’s phenomenology.⁴⁵ Indeed, there is no reason to explain such a change in translation relative to the original as simply a linguistic mannerism.

With Scheler’s metaphysical thesis posed in this way, Wojtyła remains essentially helpless in his attempt to read, in a Thomistic prism, the phenomenology of the author of *Der Formalismus*. If the knowledge of values precedes the knowledge of things, then I can know (receptively) the entire world of values without knowing any particular thing. This results in a rather important difficulty related to the issue of the person. For if the cognition of values is purely emotional and receptive and precedes the cognition of things, and additionally, for Scheler, the person is understood as an actualistic stream of experiences (again, receptive), then a metaphysically grounded problem arises: who experiences and who has cognition? To ask, using Scheler’s example: who experiences the readiness to sacrifice? Of course, “I”. But is the “I” a person or is it personal? Or is it some kind of phenomenological “I”, the “I” that is the core of consciousness? We find neither in Scheler nor, for the time being, in Wojtyła an answer to the question posed in this way.⁴⁶ From this, we notice that Wojtyła somehow sensed a certain problem resulting from the

⁴³ AKKW CII-24/232, card 37x.

⁴⁴ BKKW 84, 30.

⁴⁵ The validity of such a basic thesis is evidenced by other paragraphs from the manuscript in question, not referenced in this article. See for example: AKKW CII-24/232, card 20x, 24x, 26x, 29, 38x, 43-44, 47, 49, 51, 52«b», 89, 111. Note, however, that these are the opening paragraphs from a multi-hundred-page translation. Later parts of the text, as well as the final conclusion of the habilitation thesis, confirm what we have already indicated, that Wojtyła did not find any possibility of combining Scheler’s phenomenology with Thomism and remained with Thomism.

⁴⁶ Let us note that this is not a problem that concerns only Scheler’s phenomenology. In his famous work on responsibility, in which Roman Ingarden presented the foundations of his phenomenological anthropology, we also encounter the ambiguity of the terms “I”, “person”, etc., and also the difficulty of determining what relations connect

lack of a clear metaphysics in Scheler's philosophy, and in particular from the lack of a metaphysics of the person and values. He noted this shortcoming from Thomistic positions, but its solution did not come until many years later. Did Wojtyła have even then, in the early 1950s, an outline of the answer to the indicated difficulty? Analysis of archival material does not allow to answer this question in the affirmative. Moreover, a detailed study of the development of Wojtyła's anthropological thought in the 1950s shows that in the manuscript in question he only posed a problem that later found a specific solution in the "later" Wojtyła. In this context, it should also be noted that this issue was clearly indicated by Wojtyła in his habilitation thesis, although it is not of central importance in it.⁴⁷

Conclusion

Of necessity limited and narrowed to anthropological issues, the presentation of a few excerpts from the rich research material of Wojtyła's newly discovered manuscript allows us to grasp the beginning of his strictly philosophical anthropological reflection, which does not coincide with what we know from the "later" Wojtyła. What is visible here is a basically uniform insistence on Thomistic philosophy as a reference point for phenomenological theses, which in the context of works from the 1960s could already be a controversial statement.⁴⁸ Next, the way Wojtyła presented the problem of the person in the research material shows that, apart from intuitions and Thomistic anthropology, the later author of *Love and Responsibility* was only just entering into issues developed over the next two decades in his philosophical work. Although many of the themes found a concrete dimension rather quickly, and already in the writings of the 1950s one can see Wojtyła's significant, more mature assertions about the person, certainly in the case of the manuscript in question we are dealing with the capture of the first steps that Wojtyła took on the road to his personalism.

It is also worth noting that thanks to the discovery and the analysis carried out above, it can be concluded that Wojtyła's thought evolved strongly in the 1950s - at least in anthropological

these spheres of human interiority. See: R. Ingarden, "O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych," in: R. Ingarden, *Księżeczka o człowieku* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972), 77–184.

⁴⁷ See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 5, 9-10, 11, 47.

⁴⁸ See for example: Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, 19–20, 23, 27; Burgos, "The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism and Metaphysics," 19–51.

terms. A separate analysis is required to determine whether the origins of Wojtyła's metaphysics and ethics are similarly shaped, i.e. whether there is any evolution in them, or whether there is only a deepening of what Wojtyła assumed to be valid as early as the early 1950s.⁴⁹

The above analysis, in addition to presenting excerpts from the new and rich archival material, was intended to present the first strictly philosophical point from which a systematic reconstruction of the evolution of Wojtyła's philosophical views on the question of the person or more broadly on anthropological issues can be carried out. It should also be added that showing this evolution through the prism of further archival materials from the 1950s that have been discovered and not yet published will allow this evolution to be traced much more closely in the near future.

⁴⁹ Such an analysis is especially necessary to verify the theses put forward by some researchers that Wojtyła never developed his own concept of the metaphysics of the person, which, of course, can be extrapolated to the entire metaphysics present in his thought (see: Reimers, "Karol Wojtyła's Aims and Methodology," 133).

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