

## Introductory Remarks on Wojtyła's References to the Thought of Roman S. Ingarden

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### Abstract

Karol Wojtyła often referred to the achievements of phenomenologists, especially Max Scheler. Wojtyła became acquainted with the works of Roman S. Ingarden relatively late and therefore did not have time to confront them thoroughly with his own ideas. In his main work *Person and Act* and in other anthropological works, Wojtyła repeatedly pointed to the convergence of his own research results with those of Ingarden. But it was not a deep comparison. The presented article recalls all these points of substantive contact between the two philosophers.

### Keywords

personalism, efficacy, conscious action, responsibility, intentionality

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## Introduction

The subject of this article is a review of Karol Wojtyła's anthropological texts<sup>2</sup> in terms of their references to Roman S. Ingarden's philosophical works.<sup>3</sup> The article is more informative than analytical, because K. Wojtyła did not discuss Ingarden's theses, but pointed to the convergence of the personalism he developed with the theses on man articulated by Ingarden.<sup>4</sup> There were two reasons for this: first, K. Wojtyła had become acquainted with Ingarden's investigations after writing his fundamental work *Osoba i czyn* (*Person and Act*)<sup>5</sup>, despite the fact that he had already studied phenomenology in the work of Max Scheler<sup>6</sup> in the early 1950s. Second, when he was summoned to the Holy See, his strictly philosophical studies were interrupted.

Despite the fact that Wojtyła's philosophy had already reached the stage of maturity when he encountered Ingarden's work, it can be assumed that if Wojtyła had the opportunity to continue

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<sup>2</sup> These are texts included in the Polish edition of Karol Wojtyła's most important anthropological writings, i.e., K. Wojtyła, „*Osoba i czyn*” oraz inne studia antropologiczne, ed. T. Styczeń et al., (Lublin: Wydawnictwo TN KUL, 2000); English translation: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, trans. G. Ignatik (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021).

<sup>3</sup> To the works of R. Ingarden K. Wojtyła referred most often in footnotes.

<sup>4</sup> K. Wojtyła, “The Afterword to the Discussion on *Person and Act*,” in: *Person and Act and Related Essays*, trans. G. Ignatik (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021), 434-435. Some participants of the discussion, to which K. Wojtyła responded in the cited text, pointed out the convergence of some of the theses and arguments of K. Wojtyła and R. Ingarden.

K. Wojtyła recalled that shortly after the publication of the work *Osoba i czyn* in 1969, R. Ingarden and others met at Wojtyła's apartment where Ingarden read his work in German: *Ueber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente* (Stuttgart: Philip Reclam, 1970). In 1972 it was soon published in Polish: „O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych,” trans. A. Węgrzecki, in: R. Ingarden, *Księżeczka o człowieku* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1987), 71-169. Eleven years after the German edition the English translation was published: R. Ingarden, “On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations,” in: *Man and Values*, trans. A. Szylewicz (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983). R. Ingarden's realistic original ontology (from the mid 1950's) was recently made available in English in: R. Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 1, trans. A. Szylewicz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013), and R. Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 2, trans. A. Szylewicz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 1-416.

<sup>6</sup> M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913-1916). The Scheler's work became the basis for K. Wojtyła's research contained in his habilitation thesis from 1953; English translation: K. Wojtyła, “An Assessment of the Possibility for Building a Christian Ethics on the Presuppositions of Max Scheler's System,” in: *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, trans. G. Ignatik (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2023), Ch. III.; see also: K. Petryszak, “The Origins of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology as Recorded in *Coll.[atio]* and *Corr.[igenda]* Included in the Notes for his Habilitation Thesis,” *Wojtyła Studies* Vol. I, No. 1 (2024), 110-125.

his philosophical considerations, he could have gone in the direction of a comparative analysis with Ingarden's ideas. Tadeusz Styczeń does not rule out such a possibility.<sup>7</sup>

The aim of the presented article is primarily to encourage younger philosophers to explore more deeply the bridges between Wojtyła's and Ingarden's philosophy<sup>8</sup> and to make a synthesis of them, e.g. in showing the enrichment of the image of the human person in the light of the comparison of both concepts. The composition of this text presents a general outline of problems that should be the subject of further creative interest. Their precise development would require separate extensive and comparative studies of the contents of the main works of K. Wojtyła and R. Ingarden. For example, the last part of the article by T. Styczeń is one of the proper leads to this goal.<sup>9</sup>

A number of quotes from R. Ingarden's works are intended to at least partially acquaint the reader with the little-known matter and language of R. Ingarden's philosophy, which is undoubtedly worth getting to know and confront with the anthropology of K. Wojtyła.

### **Human reality and consciousness**

The human reality in Wojtyła's anthropology links inseparably the ontologically understood personality with man's conscious action (deed). Recognizing this reality requires both a precise view of human experience ("man acts") and insight into it. Since every action is marked by moral value or anti-value, this type of analysis simultaneously determines the necessary relationship between philosophical anthropology and ethics.

The experience of morality<sup>10</sup> became the subject of considerations of phenomenology. According to it, man in each of his actions individually experiences the world around him, but

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<sup>7</sup> T. Styczeń, „Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w *Osobie i czynie*,” *Analecta Cracoviensia* Vol. 5-6 (1973-1974), 113.

<sup>8</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 282-283, cited the earliest papers confronting his work with Ingarden's achievements, i.e., M. Jaworski, „Koncepcja antropologii filozoficznej w ujęciu Kardynała Karola Wojtyły,” *Analecta Cracoviensia* Vol. 5-6 (1973-1974), 91-106, and Styczeń, „Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w *Osobie i czynie*,” 107-115.

<sup>9</sup> Styczeń, „Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w *Osobie i czynie*,” 113-115.

<sup>10</sup> It is worth paying attention to the concept of the experience of morality in human action, which is the process of human self-fulfillment (and thus the revelation of the reality of the person). This is presented by Jacques Maritain in: J. Maritain, *Neuf leçons sur les notions premières de la philosophie morale*, (Paris: Pierre Tequi, 1949), lecture five; see also: T. Grabińska, “An outline of the concept of duty in the ethics of Karol Wojtyła and Max Scheler,” *Logos I Ethos* Vol. 61, No. 1 (2023), 99-120.

above all experiences himself. The phenomenological method is to provide an objective understanding of this process.<sup>11</sup>

The human experience results in knowing oneself and one's environment, increasing or decreasing one's moral condition, as well as efficacy. Efficacy, however, is always at the same time creativity,<sup>12</sup> in regards to the choice of the purpose of the act, of means of its implementation, and in its effect. Through action, a person not only leaves a specific tangible or intangible trace in the environment, but also a trace of one's own individual creativity even when the act is performed as a standard according to a given procedure. Moreover, man is, above all, the creator of himself: with each of his actions, he shapes himself not only in practical skills, but above all in ethical and dianoetic ones.<sup>13</sup> Such an understanding of "man-maker" and "man-material" is part of the confrontation of two oppositions: *agere* and *pati*.

Wojtyła pointed to Ingarden who thought similarly and wrote:

In the realm of its possible transformations, the subject is the creator of its own self. There would not be that Gestalt of its essence which is ultimately realized in its living were it not for its deeds and modes of conduct in the relations to the world surrounding it.<sup>14</sup>

K. Wojtyła developed the concept of a dynamic correlation between a consciously performed act and the awareness of oneself as a person – the agent of the act. This individual awareness accompanies the act before it is taken, during it, and after. This fact of accompaniment primarily indicates that the person is a conscious agent of the act, and not only that the person acts consciously.<sup>15</sup> Wojtyła considered the reality of man as a person to be the same as the continuity

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<sup>11</sup> At the end of the "Introduction" in *Person and Act*, K. Wojtyła pointed to the need for insight into humanity (into the "human reality") determined by human experience, similarly to the achievements of phenomenologists. He referred to his own analysis of Max Scheler's work, which he conducted in his habilitation thesis. He also noted R. Ingarden's contribution to the philosophy of man; see: Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*; Wojtyła, *An Assessment of the Possibility for Building a Christian Ethics on the Presuppositions of Max Scheler's System*; Ingarden, *On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations*.

<sup>12</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 171-173.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 172. This is a more general topic in the philosophy of man, i.e., auto-creationism. Here K. Wojtyła cited the following papers: A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Beyond Ingarden's Idealismus/Realismus Controversy with Husserl – the Contextual Phase of Phenomenology," *Annalecta Husserliana* Vol. 4 (1976), 241-418, and *idem*, "Initial Spontaneity and the Modalities for Human Life," *Annalecta Husserliana* Vol. 5, 1976, 15-37.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 2, 677 n 99.

<sup>15</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 127-128.

and identity of consciousness and derived the problem of identity and continuity of consciousness from Plato, through René Descartes and Immanuel Kant to R. Ingarden.<sup>16</sup>

Consciousness goes beyond a passive (purely mirror-like) reflection in the minds of the object of perception and cognition. According to Wojtyła, this over passive function of mirroring (reflection) is responsible for the growth of self-understanding and self-knowledge. Consciousness is an active factor in accepting this reflection in the process of so-called transillumination.<sup>17</sup>

Wojtyła referred to the considerations on the stream of consciousness by Henry James and Henri Bergson,<sup>18</sup> as well as to the Ingarden's investigation<sup>19</sup> who assigned the feature of "I" to the stream of consciousness. It finds its existential foundation (*Seinesfundament*) in the psychophysical structure,<sup>20</sup> but

[a]s a pure occurrence it has the form of a process and is therefore not a "system." As such, the stream of consciousness needs an ontic foundation, and finds it in fact in the body and the psyche of man.<sup>21</sup>

Wojtyła extended the study of the vivacity of consciousness<sup>22</sup> revealed in the stream of consciousness, but he tried to penetrate "the sources of the stream."<sup>23</sup>

Consciousness allows a person to transform (create) itself as well as to experience itself as the subject of conscious action, i.e., act. In this way, the human being is distinguished as a person who is for itself both subject and object. In addition to this conscious dynamism, somatic-vegetative processes are constantly taking place in man. They arise spontaneously outside of consciousness and in man's live-experience they do not affect the internal profile of his subjectivity.<sup>24</sup> One can then speak of so-called unconscious dynamism.

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 128 n 5.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>18</sup> K. Wojtyła did not mention John Locke's psychological concept of man and personal identity, developed in: J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Ch. XXVII.

<sup>19</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 139 n 9.

<sup>20</sup> Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 1, 109-110 n 249.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *idem*, *On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations*, 97.

<sup>22</sup> K. Wojtyła, in his *Person and Act*, 139-140 n 9, cited Andrzej Półtawski's study which confronted Wojtyła's concept of consciousness with the concept of psychiatrist Henri Ey in: A. Półtawski, "Ethical Action and Consciousness," *Annalecta Husserliana* Vol. 7 (1978), 115-150.

<sup>23</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 139-140 n 9.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

In addition to the conscious and unconscious dynamisms, the subconsciousness “works” in man. K. Wojtyła defined it as an indicator of the potentiality of the human subject, without which it is impossible to ultimately explain or interpret his conscious actions and even manifest its subjective trait. It has not, however, any influence on the internal structure of human dynamism itself.<sup>25</sup>

The operation of the subconscious indicates the complex internal history of a given person. Since it is history, then it indicates the temporal dimension of humanity, and not only in the temporality of human life, but this temporality is expressed in the dynamics of the structure of man.<sup>26</sup> Wojtyła linked the problem of the relationship between man and time with the inquiries of phenomenology and existentialism.<sup>27</sup> In relation to man, philosophy has traditionally dealt with time insofar as it considered the problem of the contingency of being (*contingentia entis*) which is derivative. The historicity of man therefore requires – according to Wojtyła – further studies.<sup>28</sup>

### **Efficacy, responsibility, and intentionality**

When man in action uses his body to express his self-determination,<sup>29</sup> then he externalizes himself through the body. In this process he becomes the object of his own action as “an integral component of the objectification of the personal subject,” the subjective “I.” In this case has his own body, but he is not in it.<sup>30</sup>

R. Ingarden emphasized particularly the sense of psychophysical unity of the human “I” and the body. Like Wojtyła, he accentuated the superiority of the “I” over the body. The predominance consists in the fact that although the body is the basis of life activity, the spiritual self grows above the level of the body. At the same time, however, the “I” remains in contact with the body, which is the field of impressions of one’s corporeality (*Leiblichkeit*). With these impressions are connected emotionally coloured conscious acts which have been expressed

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 196-197.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 198.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, n 11. K. Wojtyła referred to the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Emmanuel Lévinas, and also R. Ingarden specifically: “Man and Time,” cf., *Man and Values*.

<sup>28</sup> Wojtyła, *Persona and Act*, 198 n 11.

<sup>29</sup> Wojtyła related his understanding of personal structure and self-determination also to the tradition of Polish thought which refers to European inquiries. Here, he pointed to the Lvov-Warsaw School and R. Ingarden’s phenomenology; see K. Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in: *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 458.

<sup>30</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 313-314.

externally, but are a function of the soul. Ingarden continued his considerations by comprehensively analysing the relationship of bodily phenomena to mental facts. Finally, he concluded that although all cases of externalized reactions and behaviours of the body are the result of the soul's activity, the soul is also subject to signals coming from the body.<sup>31</sup>

Human *operari* is an act, i.e., a conscious action. The act is not only an *actus humanus* but an *actus personae* because of the feature of a person, which is his efficacy. Every act performed by a person bears the mark of a specific "I" of an acting conscious subject. This originality of every act is clearly different from a certain specificity of what "happens" in a person.<sup>32</sup> Free will participates in efficacy, and therefore this freedom of action entails the agent's responsibility for the act, which all the more – following Ingarden – opens up insight into the essence of the subjectivity of a human person.<sup>33</sup>

According to the custom of the Polish language, an act of will is not a simple appetite (*appetitus*) or desire, because these are associated with the sensuality of the body. It is therefore more about "striving" or volition (wanting), but in what sense and in reference to what object, i.e., wanting what? Hence, an act of the will would be closer to *appetitus rationalis*.<sup>34</sup>

Wojtyła had clearly distinguished the intentionality of will from the intentionality of cognition. This distinction comes from Thomas Aquinas, because in cognition the object is as if introduced into the subject, in order to exist in it intentionally again. In an act of will, it is the subject that directs itself towards the object, intentionally as if to exist in the object. *Intentio* for Thomas is the moment of actualization of will. *Intentionalis*, on the other hand, is an adjective in the expression "intentional act." In connection with this dual understanding of intentionality, Wojtyła referred<sup>35</sup> to Ingarden's distinction between what is "intentional" and what is "intensive."<sup>36</sup>

In the confrontation of the ethics of Scheler and Kant, K. Wojtyła noticed a starting point for his own concept of human efficacy. Scheler's critique of Kantian ethics led Wojtyła to draw attention to the latter's "ethical" personalism<sup>37</sup> in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 2, 704-710.

<sup>32</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 479.

<sup>33</sup> Ingarden, "On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations."

<sup>34</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 227-228.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 228 n 7.

<sup>36</sup> R. Ingarden, *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną* (Warszawa: PWN, 1963); *idem*, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 2, 599.

<sup>37</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 116-117 n 8.

<sup>38</sup> English translation: I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

At the base of both of them there is the concept of man as a person. Wojtyła sought the signs of personalism all the more in the philosophy of man outlined by Ingarden and devoted mainly to the responsibility of human action.<sup>39</sup>

Responsibility is proper only to man. If responsibility is too small, then the personality (in the ontological sense) of man is diminished. One is responsible for one's own act, not for what happens to man without the participation of his will (what happens in man), unless it happens as a result of non-action (but in accordance with will). First, responsibility appears before the person as itself ("from within"), so that then his participation in the environment in the form of coexistence and cooperation is transformed into responsibility "to somebody."<sup>40</sup> Wojtyła, however, did not undertake theological considerations on responsibility before God.<sup>41</sup>

In an extensive footnote Wojtyła referred to the considerations on responsibility of R. Ingarden, quoting relevant fragments.<sup>42</sup>

On the necessity of adopting a holistic concept of the person in consideration of responsibility Ingarden wrote that:

All theories which reduce the person to manifolds of pure experiences are insufficient for the clarification of the ontic foundations. Fulfilment of the requisites of responsibility is possible only insofar as a human being, in particular his mind and his person, is regarded as a real object persisting in time, an object which has a special, characteristic form.<sup>43</sup>

For R. Ingarden, freedom is a condition for fulfilling responsibility. And it is defined – according to him – only by assuming a specific form of a person acting in the real world.<sup>44</sup>

The relation of responsibility and duty occurs for Ingarden when values – on the one hand – are the basis of responsibility, and on the other – they predispose one to undertake a duty:

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<sup>39</sup> Ingarden, "On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations."

<sup>40</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 275-276. In footnote 7 Wojtyła cited the fragment on responsibility from Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. E.V. Kohák (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 57.

<sup>41</sup> K. Wojtyła, "Texts marked by the critical apparatus," ed. G. Ignatik, in: Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 606 n 46a, 46b.

<sup>42</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 282-283 n 9.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Ingarden, "On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations," 84 – in the German edition.

<sup>44</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 282 n 9/2.



The existence of values and of the interconnections obtaining among them is the first condition for the possibility of both the idea of responsibility and the meaning of fullness of the requirement directed at the agent that he assume the responsibility for his deed and fulfil its requisites.<sup>45</sup>

The similarity of Wojtyła's and Ingarden's considerations on responsibility was noted by T. Styczeń,<sup>46</sup> but he expressed it very generally in relation to their anthropological resemblance. So, the human being is a responsible subject if and only if the following conditions are met.

First, the man is free and endowed with consciousness. According to Wojtyła, self-determination precedes, however, any act of will, because every act is expressed by intentionality which, despite a certain indeterminacy, is not indifferent to values.<sup>47</sup>

Secondly, man maintains his identity in the sense of "being himself"<sup>48</sup> among changing people, things and ideas, i.e., his own unique substantiality and reality simultaneously.<sup>49</sup>

One should, however, approach the thesis formulated by T. Styczeń about the similarity of Wojtyła's and Ingarden's methodology more carefully and insightfully. T. Styczeń stated that

[t]he methodological programme of anthropology implemented by Ingarden is the programme of the philosophy of man in the classical understanding of this discipline, a programme identical in its essence to the methodological model of the *Person and Act*.<sup>50</sup>

Generally speaking, the programmes of anthropology are similar, but the methods of their implementation are different: Wojtyła's method is much more Thomistic, although clearly tinged

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. Ingarden, "On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations," 70. Wojtyła drew attention to the affinity of his own considerations on responsibility with those of R. Ingarden, as indicated by: Jaworski, „Koncepcja antropologii filozoficznej w ujęciu Kardynała Karola Wojtyły” and Styczeń, „Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w *Osobie i czynie*.”

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 243.

<sup>48</sup> T. Styczeń, „Być sobą to przekraczać siebie – O antropologii Karola Wojtyły,” in: K. Wojtyła, „*Osoba i czyn*” oraz inne studia antropologiczne (Lublin: Wydawnictwo TN KUL, 2000), 491-526.

<sup>49</sup> *Idem*, „Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w *Osobie i czynie*,” 113.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 115.

with phenomenology, while Ingarden's method is an interesting transgression of phenomenology towards realism. At first glance, this is visible in an otherness in the languages used. A recommended precise comparative study of the methods of both philosophers should become an important cognitive contribution not only to the content of their works, but also to methods of philosophizing.

## Conclusion

Wojtyła's work *Person and Act* is an extensive treatise that establishes a personalistic anthropology of man – the agent of the act. Ingarden's work "On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations" only seemingly contains much less content and may give the impression of only being a more extensive essay. However, behind it stands Ingarden's extensive and fundamental work *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, while this more modest treatise focuses on one of the phenomena – as Ingarden called it, i.e., responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*). The most important situation in which this phenomenon occurs is the action of the subject: here there appears the agent of the act. This phenomenon Wojtyła considers as an experience of morality. At this point, both in Wojtyła's and Ingarden's works, the anthropological problem is combined with the ethical one. Both philosophers were aware of this and they clearly emphasized it.<sup>51</sup>

The human being, as an acting subject, when he achieves the recognition of truth in the purpose and manner of his own action, reaches – as K. Wojtyła called it – the "terminus" of the personal structure of self-determination. This state can be identified with the self-fulfilment of a person in the process of reaching the autoteleology experience<sup>52</sup> of man in vertical transcendence, because he outgrows himself and at the same time achieves harmony with himself and in relation to transcendental truth. This process is guided by right conscience.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 100-107; Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Vol. 1, Ch. I-II.

<sup>52</sup> Wojtyła, "The Transcendence of the Person in the Act and the Auto-teleology of Man," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 560-566; see also: T. Biesaga, "Autoteleologia osoby a teoleologia natury w antropologii Karola Wojtyły," *Logos i Ethos* Vol. 53, No. 1 (2020), 77-95.

<sup>53</sup> Wojtyła, "The Transcendence of the Person in the Act and the Auto-teleology of Man," 562-563. Here Wojtyła refers to the works of Władysław Tatarkiewicz, e.g. W. Tatarkiewicz, *O bezwzględności dobra* (Warszawa: Gebethner & Wolff, 1919). The title of this book, i.e., *Absoluteness of good* is an important notion of Christian ethics, especially the material ethics of value

The vertical transcendence is “the most essential content of *the experience ‘man acts,’*”<sup>54</sup> which expresses itself in self-possession and self-governance, and reveals itself in the act; at the same time the act reveals the person.<sup>55</sup> This revealing is an operation of phenomenological reduction which makes it possible to have insight into the conscious act.<sup>56</sup>

Above all, man reveals himself in every act. Therefore, regardless of theoretical investigations of the structure of the person, such as in phenomenology or in Wojtyła’s personalism, it is the analysis of practice (*praxis*) that provides insight into the ontological and psychological personality of a specific human person.<sup>57</sup> This task is performed by psychologists, psychiatrists and priests.

At the end of “The Afterword to the Discussion on *Person and Act*,” K. Wojtyła devoted attention<sup>58</sup> to the speech of Wanda Póltawska who, as a psychiatrist, included Wojtyła’s concept in *Person and Act* among a “sound-reason” approach to human nature from the point of view of psychotherapeutic practice, in opposition to the limitations of psychoanalysts’ proposals. Following the suggestion of Jerzy Stroba, Wojtyła also pointed to pastoral experience in approaching the true nature of man. Both types of practice (*praxis*) provide a kind of verification of various theoretical approaches, such as those in the philosophy of R. Ingarden, Edmund Husserl, or P. Ricoeur and the Platonic-Aristotelian-Thomas tradition.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 282.

<sup>55</sup> Wojtyła, in “The Transcendence of the Person in the Act and the Auto-teleology of Man,” 556-557, explains that his understanding of transcendence is only indirectly related to I. Kant’s concept of it. He points to the work of M. Scheler on the basis of certain achievements of Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche, continued by himself, and, among others, by Nicolai Hartmann and Dietrich von Hildebrand, T. Styczeń, Józef Tischner, Jerzy Trębicki, and Maria Gołaszewska. Wojtyła paid particular attention to the Polish branch of phenomenological research in: Ingarden, “On Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations,” as well as in: R. Ingarden, *Przeżycie, dzieło, wartość*, (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1966).

<sup>56</sup> Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 283.

<sup>57</sup> K. Wojtyła, “Theoria and Praxis,” in: Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 581-583.

<sup>58</sup> *Idem*, “The Afterword to the Discussion on *Person and Act*,” 454.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 455.

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