

The Anatomy of Efficacy

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Abstract

In Karol Wojtyła's anthropology, efficacy is an exclusively human property which is both the objective cause of every free act for an individually chosen purpose and, at the same time, the human experience of the act performed. By undertaking an act, the agent feels responsible for its consequences, which not only changes his environment but also himself. Every act enhances human action, but above all it morally perfects or destroys the agent. In Karol Wojtyła's work, human efficacy is compared with four types of agency, which are the cause of dynamisms: biological, psycho-emotive, skillful, and intellectual–mental. Efficacy is considered a derivative of self-determination and is related to freedom. The essence of complementing transcendence through the integration of all dynamisms in action is also analyzed.

Keywords

human person, action, happening, will, subjectivity

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Introduction: anatomy and physiology of the whole

The primary meaning of the word anatomy refers to a biological organism, more generally – to the whole of an acting structure. It consists of individual parts which are appropriately composed and cooperate with each other. The components of the biological organism die together with it. Only some of them remain, like the skeleton, which leaves a permanent trace of the existence of this organism.

Descriptive anatomy, also called classical anatomy, deals with the description of organs whose inherent feature is a specialized function. Since the whole organism is a dynamic functioning entity, it is necessary to consider the structure and function of organs in parallel, which is what functional anatomy deals with.

Man is a biological organism, but he possesses the unique ability to transcend his biological nature through his own act.² At the same time, this act is caused by and reveals the efficacy of the human person. Human existence leaves a lasting, extra-biological trace which is revealed in his cultural products.

In its most general sense, agency is “the power or force behind a certain phenomenon or effect,” while efficacy means “the power to produce a desired effect.”³ A psychologically tinged definition of efficacy emphasizes that it also encompasses a belief in the effectiveness of action taken. This psychologically understood efficiency resembles Wojtyła’s understanding of efficacy, due to its ability to reveal a person’s identity within the natural environment. The term “efficacy” will be reserved for Wojtyła’s *P*-agency (*P* – from person), meaning “that which essentially determines the dynamism proper to the human act.”⁴

In Karol Wojtyła’s anthropology,⁵ efficacy is a unique human feature that distinguishes man from all other organisms. On the one hand, it is the objective cause of every free conscious action

² An act is a conscious human action, but in the phenomenological study of the person’s action, carried out by Karol Wojtyła, it is “*a particular moment of the vision – that is, the experience – of the person.*” The purpose of his study has been dictated by the fact that the act “*reveals the person*”; cf. K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, in: “*Person and Act*” and *Related Essays*, trans. by G. Ignatik (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021), 102-103.

³ *The New Penguin English Dictionary*, ed. by R. Allen (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 24, 445.

⁴ Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 114.

⁵ In this text, elements of Wojtyła’s anthropology are reconstructed mainly on the basis of an analysis of Wojtyła’s *Person and Act*. Other essays by Wojtyła are included in the collection: Wojtyła, “*Person and Act*” and *other anthropological studies* are also helpful.

for an individually chosen purpose and on the other hand, it is the individual's lived-experience of that action. In the context of purpose, efficacy entails responsibility for the performance of the act. As a result of action, the agent changes not only the environment in which the act occurs, but himself as well, not only in strengthening his efficiency in performing acts of a given type of action, but above all by changing his moral constitution.

In a certain aspect Wojtyła contrasted efficacy that is structurally related to action, and human subjectivity that is structurally related to "what happens in man,"⁶ i.e., with the act of happening (actuation). He linked efficacy with human objectivity: it "manifests the concrete 'I' as a self-conscious cause of action."⁷ In action, the "I" is the cause of dynamism and becomes aware of itself as the object of its own experience through the act; one's own "I" is the object of self-knowledge, while when something happens the dynamism of the "I" takes place, somehow independent of human will, caused by a biological process.⁸ On the other hand, consciousness allows a human to experience his own subjectivity,⁹ that is, "*to experience these acts [i.e., our acts] as acts and as our own,*"¹⁰ that is, to subjectivize what is objective.

Reflections on efficacy are situated in the analysis of human dynamism, and therefore thematically within functional anatomy, to drawing on analogies of biological terminology. Wojtyła thoroughly analyzed this "functional" nature of efficacy, both from the perspective of its connection with personality development and its experience "in the lived-experience of 'I act'."¹¹ This text addresses some of Wojtyła's research themes: efficacy as a factor conditioning action, as a manifestation of self-determination, as a derivative of freedom, and as the basis for the person's transcendence¹² in the act.

The characteristics of efficacy discussed in this text are intertwined in important and complex ways with other aspects of the dynamic structure of the human person. These are

⁶ Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 163.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 180.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 112-113, 137-139.

⁹ According to Wojtyła, different understandings of human subjectivity depend on the type of becoming aware of one's own subjectivity by the human agent of an act (man as the agent of an act): either a human is "*being a subject,*" or is "*being known (objectivized) as a subject,*" or is "*experiencing oneself as the subject of one's actions and lived-experiences.*" In traditional ontology the human subject, understood as *suppositum*, is abstracted from his lived-experience of subjectivity; cf. *ibid.*, 143.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 161.

¹² Transcendence is understood here as surpassing the acting subject (*a*-subject, *a* – from *agere*), i.e., the acting "I" of the dynamized subject (*p*-subject, *p* – from *pati*). *Ibid.*, 163, 180-181.

comprehensively and deeply analyzed in the Wojtyła's work *Person and Act* and are discussed in detail in his other essays.¹³

Processes: happening in man *versus* human action

Human dynamism is expressed as, on the one hand, biological and, on the other, efficacious, expressing itself, respectively, as *pati* and *agere*.¹⁴ The first, the happening in man ("something happens in man"), is not the result of efficacy; man is not its agent. The second, man's action ("man acts"), evokes in him the lived-experience of himself as the agent of this form of his own dynamized subject.¹⁵ In the happening there exists a passive (vegetative and reactive) subjectivity of the agent's body (*p*-subjectivity, *p* – from *pati*). In action experienced as the efficacy of the act, and not only the lived-experience of himself in "I act," there exists a subjectivity of the man-agent¹⁶ (*a*-subjectivity, *a* – from *agere*).¹⁷ Although in the first case there is no involvement of the efficacious "I," there is an objective cause of this internal action, that is, the happening, which is primarily biological in nature, other than the cause of the act. Man experiences, however, his own *p*-subjectivity, his own "I" as a result of becoming aware of the processes of enactment (actuation).

The actuation (the moment of actuation), not the efficacy (the moment of action), is responsible for the emergence of biological processes in the human, which Wojtyła calls natural (originating from nature).¹⁸ Nature is characterized by an innate, immanent dynamism, consistent with the species characteristics, but also with an individual specificity of the human. Nature endows the human with spontaneous activity, thus prepared in his *p*-subjective, dynamic structure. This *B*-agency (*B* – of biological origin) is not the efficacy (*P*-agency) that transcends this natural, active endowment.¹⁹

¹³ K. Wojtyła, "The Person and the Act" and Related Essays.

¹⁴ Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 163.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 168, 174.

¹⁶ The distinguished *a*-subject corresponds to some extent to the ontological subject of existence and action, i.e., the *suppositum*. It is, however, broader in meaning than the *suppositum humanum*, as it refers to the awareness of the "I" in the live-experience of one's own subjectivity; the *a*-subject "joins the moment of experienced subjectivity with ontic subjectivity." *Ibid.*, 143.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 163-164.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 178-180.

¹⁹ The adoption of the term *B*-agency as a term for biological functions may seem controversial. It refers to the efficiency of the organism. To some extent, this term may be justified by the psychosomatic unity of the person who is the agent of the act, in Wojtyła's concept of the integration of the person in act. "Man experiences himself as the agent of his act, and consequently he is its subject. He also experiences himself as a subject, although the lived-

This division into the world of nature and the person is blurred. It therefore requires unification in the form of integration, which Wojtyła reconstructed in Chapter III of the *Person and Act*. If it were not present in human subjectivity, both person and nature would be linked solely with their sharply outlined dual mode of action, consistent with the oppositional relation between enactment and act, while “[t]he efficacious I’ and ‘the acting I’ form a dynamic synthesis and a dynamic unity every time in every act.”²⁰

The acting subject, the dynamic subject (*a*-subject), the acting “I,” is, as if “superior,” that is, above this naturally dynamized subject (*p*-subject). “Nature is made manifest exclusively in actuations of the subject ‘man,’ whereas acts reveal this man as a person.”²¹ The agent is “the cause conscious of his causation.”²² Selected elements of the structure of the efficacious “I” will be the matter of this consideration. The decisive factor between “man acts” and “something acts in man” is the grasping of the lived-experience of “I am an agent.”²³

The somatic-vegetative dynamism (reactivity of the human body and physical reaction, *B*-agency) and its physical response does not demonstrate a dependence on a person’s self-determination, and therefore does not manifest itself in the experience of “a person acts,” but in the experience of “(something) happens in a person.” It is responsible for the body’s own *B*-agency (biological dynamism), not for the efficacy of the person (as a result of self-determination). The difference between the *B*-agency and the efficacy testify to the complexity of human being, going beyond his psycho-physicality (psycho-somaticity).

A human is not the cause of the body’s reactivity and reactions, i.e., he has no influence on *B*-agency unless, following the example of Far Eastern practices, he is able to control them to some extent. The integrality of the person requires, however, the most perfect possible harmonization of *p*-subjectivity with *a*-subjectivity in the act, which is efficacious (in the sense of the efficacy) and transcendent.²⁴ The integration of the person in the act, as it were, unites (on its own level) the dynamisms of the somatic and the psyche (which “happen”).

experience of subjectivity differs from the lived-experience of efficacy. Furthermore, man experiences himself as the subject of all that merely ‘happens’ in him. The lived-experience of subjectivity also contains a certain passivity, whereas the lived-experience of efficacy is active to its core and therefore determines the human act.” *Ibid.*, 297.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 170.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 180.

²² *Ibid.*, 168.

²³ *Ibid.*, 168-169.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 321.

B-agency is inscribed within the pool of general personal dynamism, resulting from the integration of the person in the act, and within it, from the integration of psycho-somatic dynamisms in all their complexity. It is the act that triggers their active participation in the agent's *a*-subjectivity, distinct from the enactment of the *p*-subject.²⁵ Efficacy, though not sensorially identifiable, is the object of human experience.²⁶

Other shades of agency

B-agency and efficacy distinguish the somatic-vegetative dynamism from the dynamism of the person, respectively. The relationship of psycho-emotive dynamism and these two dynamisms is more complex. To some extent, the psycho-emotive dynamism derives from the somatic-vegetative one, but differs from it in that the latter places the person in a position of a passivity resulting from the dynamism of nature itself. Psycho-emotive dynamism, on the other hand, is susceptible to the person's influence (though not with the same kind of effects as the efficacy). It actually becomes the material for the person's development, shaped by him.

The integration of human psycho-emotiveness is expressed in human action in a conscious response to values, which through its impact on the human "I," creates morality, which, according to Wojtyła, is "the strictest existential reality connected with the person as its proper subject."²⁷ Sensitivity to values defines the emotiveness. Psycho-emotiveness pertains not only to psyche, but also to sensuality.²⁸ Fundamentally a person is not the agent of psycho-emotive processes, but in this layer of the dynamism of happenings he experiences himself as a *p*-subject. He is then "the cause conscious of his causation," distinct from "the causation of nature" in the somatic-vegetative (biological) layer.²⁹

The influence of psycho-emotive dynamism is expressed by the emotionalization of consciousness,³⁰ which in turn influences efficacy. This influence is therefore achieved through a specific, albeit spontaneous, psycho-emotive agency (*P-E*-agency, *P-E* – from psycho-emotive origin). This process is independent of the person's efficacy, which is a derivative of self-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 306.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 288.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 202.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 336-337.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 168, 201.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 150-152.

governance.³¹ Emotive facts occur in a person as happening (thus, they are therefore a derivative of *B*-agency) but their awareness allows for the “conscious” control over them. However, this control is limited due to the lack of self-knowledge³² in objectifying the emotive situation. This process is different from mastering emotions (controlling one’s own emotions by oneself), which is achieved through the will. Therefore, its effectiveness depends on the will in its efficiency, for example, on Aristotle’s ethical virtue of moderation.

Despite the separation of happening from action, Wojtyła raised the issue of habits of action,³³ which, once formed, influence psycho-somatic dynamism in a manner similar to biological factors. They are the result of conscious, intellectually reinforced action aimed at increasing the body’s response to stimuli. This type of *H*-agency (*H* – from habit origin) is revealed in the acquisition of skills.³⁴ Learned skills have a reciprocal impact on the functioning of the entire organism, and thus on the processes of happening. In this way, the individual contributes to their regulation to some extent.

Due to the dynamic unity and identity of man, it is ultimately impossible to separate efficacy from *p*-subjectivity, respectively “structurally contained in action and in what happens in man... Action together with man’s efficacy, which constitutes it experimentally, and all that happens in man meet, so to speak, in one common root,”³⁵ i.e., in a dynamic subject (*a*-subject). Man is, after all, a *p*-subject, but also an *a*-subject, although in the act he is primarily the object of action.

The following considerations will concern efficacy. Personality will be understood not in the psychological sense, but as being a person, i.e., a conscious agent (perpetrator) of an act.³⁶

³¹ *Ibid.*, 190-191.

³² Wojtyła defined self-knowledge as “understanding oneself... a kind of cognitive permeation of the object that I am for myself.” *Ibid.*, 133.

³³ *Ibid.*, 322-323.

³⁴ Aristotle’s ethical virtues (prowesses) are situated semantically between the psychological understanding of skill (as a specific, flexible habit) and the personalistic understanding of efficacy (as a person’s ability to shape himself through his actions). Thus, Aristotle’s virtue “will be the state of character which makes a man good [the efficacy, morally perfecting a person – T.G.] and which makes him do his own work well [*H*-agency – T.G.]”; cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by W.D. Ross (eBooks@Adelaide), book II.6.

³⁵ Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 174.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

Self-determination and efficacy

The unity of *p*-subjectivity and the efficacy in the human subject of existence and action is ultimately a derivative of self-determination.

In relation to human subjectivity and objectivity, self-determination is the relationship between the *a*-subjectivity of a person and the objectivity that a person is for himself.³⁷ Wojtyła defined self-determination in the most general terms as an attitude in which “the person that is made manifest through will, and not merely the will through and in the person... in which the will is revealed as a property of the person; the person is revealed as the reality constituted properly by the will with respect to his dynamism”,³⁸ while the will appears “only secondarily as a power.”³⁹

The essence of human freedom lies in the self-determination, whose conceptual scope is broader than that of the efficacy. A person who performs an act, in addition to changing his environment, also changes something within himself (constitutes himself), becomes an object for himself, is a creator of himself: “self-determination, and not only the very efficacy of the personal ‘I,’ explains the *realness and the personal character of moral values*; it explains the realness of the fact that through his acts, *man becomes ‘good’ or ‘evil’* – and since he became, he also is ‘good’ or ‘evil’ *precisely as man.*”⁴⁰

Self-determination is a moment that clearly distinguishes a person’s action from what happens within him; it is an understanding of the efficacy of the personal “I,” closely related to the understanding of the person’s responsibility for the act, for its axiological and ethical content.⁴¹

In the analysis of will (“I want”), intentionality alone is not enough. It is self-determination that determines the act, the *actus humanum (voluntarium)*.⁴² In the act of self-determination (thanks to the dynamics of efficacy), the “I” is revealed, but in each case it is also constituted (not only as self-awareness, but as two types of relationships, i.e., self-possession and self-governance),

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 217.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 207.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁴⁰ Cf. K. Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, in: Wojtyła, “*Person and Act*” and Related Essays, 462.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 458-461; K. Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, in: Wojtyła, “*Person and Act*” and Related Essays, 479.

⁴² Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure*, 458-461.

as a person.⁴³ Self-possession determines self-determination (the specific “I want,” the will to something), because one cannot decide about something one is not consciously aware of possessing. Similarly, one cannot decide about something (that one wants) that one does not consciously control, but not in the sense of the ability to control oneself (in the sense of self-mastery or *H*-agency). It is “mastery over oneself” in the sense that a person “himself is the one whom he governs.”⁴⁴ Of course, self-governance presupposes self-possession.

The person, being an object of self-determination conditioned by self-possession and self-governance, does not address his own “I” but rather the objectivity of the “I” determined at the moment of the act of will, through the relation of self-governance and self-possession. The realization of this objectivity “has a fundamental significance for morality. The entire realness of morality, of moral value, is rooted here.”⁴⁵ This objectification through self-determination (in the integral dynamics of will) corresponds to subjectification. This happens in conscious life-experience, when a person—“experiences the fact that he determines himself and that, as a result of self-determination, he becomes somebody... ultimately, he experiences the very fact that he is somebody.”⁴⁶

Efficacy and self-determination are revealed in the transcendence of the person in action and they reveal dependence on the structure of self-possession and self-governance. “[E]very human act is fulfilled not only by the transcendence of self-determination and efficacy but also *through the dynamization of the subjective ‘I,’ the dynamization subordinated to self-determination and efficacy.*”⁴⁷

Efficacy derived from the will

Wojtyła attributed a double role to the will, visible in every act: the revelation of a person’s will (desire) and, above all, the constitution of a person in the process of dynamism through the will,

⁴³ Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, 482-483.

⁴⁴ Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 208.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 215.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 330.

that is, deciding about himself.⁴⁸ Self-determination is therefore the freedom of a person through the will, freedom which is an attribute of the will.⁴⁹

Freedom in relation to efficacy is expressed in the alternative: “*I can but do not have to.*” This alternative is not only the content of consciousness but also “the manifestation and concretization of the dynamism proper to man” in the potentiality of the human subject, i.e., in the will. The will allows for the choice between “I can” and “I have to.” The will is “that which allows man to want.”⁵⁰ It makes a person the actual subject of his own dynamism (the efficacy). It, therefore, makes the person an agent, a dynamic subject (*a*-subject). The will clearly separates actions from enactments (actuations).

The experience of “man acts” reveals the efficacy stemming from freedom, that is, a specific drive of the dynamic reality of the person. The lived-experience of “I am the agent” means the dynamism of the person in the act, that is, it is marked by the moment of conscious efficacy of the personal “I,” liberated by freedom.⁵¹

The act is performed by a person (subject and agent), so the act is a result of the efficacy: internal (immanent,⁵² permeating self-determination in the “I”) in relation to the person, and external to the person (consciously directed beyond the person). In relation to the person, it is simultaneously the result of the efficacy: transitive (because it passes over time) and intransitive (because it is objectified in man as a result of self-determination and efficacy). For will is both self-determination and intentionality. The former is basic to freedom, while the latter (secondary to self-determination) is an extension of the meaning of freedom.⁵³

A witness to the above objectification is man in his morality: through a morally good or morally bad act, as a person, he “*becomes* morally good or morally bad.”⁵⁴ It is freedom that allows human action to transcend all dynamisms and gives the efficacy not only the function of

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁴⁹ In this identification, Wojtyła referred to Immanuel Kant’s practical imperative, which expresses the objective principle of the will to human actions; a personal subject is simultaneously an object for itself. *Ibid.*, 217. *So, act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*, (cf. I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by M. Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37.

⁵⁰ Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 203.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 295.

⁵² Immanence here means the presence of the effect of an action within the person, within the “I.”

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 252.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 253.

transforming the agent's external reality, but also his internal – moral – reality, that is, becoming a good or bad person.⁵⁵

Human action “is actually the only full experience of efficient causality.” This efficacy of causation of man is revealed in the act. To be a cause is to bring about something (*feri*, becoming something) and the existence of an effect (*esse*). The act is the effect of the person's efficacy, and therefore it is his property. Given the moral qualification of the act, it is the subject of his responsibility.⁵⁶ Freedom is the condition of the efficacy, which, because of its effect in action, entails responsibility, the form of which is expressed by the attribution and at the same time subordination of freedom to truth. And these relationships determine the transcendence of the person in their action.

Efficacy as a condition of transcendence

Self-determination is a moment of freedom. It is so not only in the sense of person's self-dependence but also in the indication of the object of desire as an expression of will. Before will is concretized, a certain indeterminacy occurs with respect to its possible objects. The participation of motivation, or the influence of motives on the will, expressed through intentionality,⁵⁷ is necessary to determine the object of desire, for self-determination to occur. This individual process is always individually specific and is revealed as a result of self-governance and self-possession. It leads directly to the performance of an act. Then a person exceeds (transcends) his own *p*-subjectivity. Thus, self-determination, and therefore efficacy, influences the person's transcendence in the act.⁵⁸ Transcendence “is realized through self-determination and efficacy.”⁵⁹

Self-determination is not merely about arousing desire. In this basis of efficacy, a person no longer treats his own “I” solely as an object (in the sense of internal objectivity), but his own subjectivity (already present in self-governance and self-possession) is, as it were, -actualized.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 202-203.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 169-170.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 231-232.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 242-243.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 336.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 211-213.

When an acting person exceeds his own *p*-subjectivity towards an object as a goal because of its value, i.e., shows intentionality,⁶¹ then, in Wojtyła's understanding, this is horizontal transcendence. However, it does not come from self-determination, which conditions a person's transcendence in free action (if the person is free). Only then, by transcending himself (as if upwards, due to the superiority of the "I" over his own dynamism), does the person visualize and affirm himself as a person. Wojtyła called this process vertical transcendence.⁶²

Vertical transcendence is possible only when the will to act (freedom) depends solely on truth, and not on the objects of the will in all their diverse representations. In this way, a person rises (not only through consciousness but through truthfulness) above his own dynamism, and the truth about good becomes the basis for the moral qualification of an act.⁶³

The reference to truth (especially axiological truth) highlights yet another intuitive-mental feature⁶⁴ of human agency, as it were, internal (*I-M*-agency, *I-M* – from intuitive-mental origin), revealed in what Wojtyła called a cognitive transcendence. Truth is here the subject of intuitive and mental cognition thanks to *I-M*-agency. Cognition "happens" both within a person and a person acts cognitively (in order to cognize). In the latter case, he is an indirect agent of an act based on judgment about the goal. In the former case, a person is rather a *p*-subject, as he non-discursively arrives at the truth about the value of an object, although the result of this process may be preceded by attempts to achieve it through discourse. Vertical transcendence happens thanks to a specific intertwining of intuition and discourse in establishing the truth and subordinating to it. This dependence on the truth about the good "constitutes the person in his transcendence; the transcendence of freedom passes into the transcendence of morality,"⁶⁵ which remains in a constant connection with the transcendence of the person in the act.⁶⁶

Wojtyła devoted separate considerations to cognitive transcendence, which concerns duty, and he identified it with "a particular degree of dynamization of the will through truth."⁶⁷ Through

⁶¹ This type of volition can be compared to the Hobbesian mechanism of appetites and aversions, cf. Th. Hobbes, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil* (1651) (Globe Grey, e-book, 2019), 36.

⁶² Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 221, 226-227, 229-30, 281-282.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 241-242, 260-261.

⁶⁴ The mind is a property and power of man, expressed by the ability to think and understand, and to distinguish truth from falsehood. Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 261.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 257.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 248-250, 256-258, 273-274.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 268.

it, a person shows his structure of self-governance and self-possession. Wojtyła pointed out to duty as “a particular modification of self-determination and intentionality.”⁶⁸ (PaA, 270)

The person’s transcendence⁶⁹ is spiritual in nature,⁷⁰ but it is expressed in bodily activity, which can be translated into so-called visual actions that reveal a person’s efficacy (e.g., in assessing effectiveness). Transcendence alone, if only in its light the human act is to be considered, would not allow to discover the whole complexity of the human personality. It is an integration that, in its complementarity to transcendence, gives various psycho-somatic dynamisms a personal dimension and inscribes them within the efficacy that determines the person’s transcendence in the act.⁷¹

The integration of truthfulness must complement the integration of the so-called consciousness-based feelings, which give rise to the lived-experience of values along with transcendence, because the latter requires reference to truth. Only then is transcendence based on the “authentic freedom of self-determination.” The lived-experience of values must be grounded in the truth about the good.⁷²

The total dynamism of the person actualized in action remains transcendent in relation to the somatic-vegetative (reactive) and psycho-emotive dynamisms.⁷³ Both originate in the bodily (biological) structure. To be integrated in action, they must share a common source with transcendence.⁷⁴ The self-disclosure of the person occurs not only through his transcendence but also through his “integration proper to the act,” and therefore also in relation to the subjective functioning of the psycho-somatic structure (*P-S* – agency).⁷⁵

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 270.

⁶⁹ In a broader sense, the transcendence of the person can be related to the transcendentals of being: truth, good and beauty. And not only in the abstract sense, but also based on the experience of transcendentals, “which goes hand in hand with the experience of personal transcendence.” *Ibid.*, 258.

⁷⁰ Wojtyła defined spirituality as a manifestation “in consciousness, thanks to which it forms in “lived-experience the experiential inwardness” of human existence and action. *Ibid.*, 147. The center of human spirituality (and also of a person’s transcendence in action) is the uniquely personal “self-dependence, which constitutes the fundamental structure of the freedom of the human will, and which contains and manifests an ability to submit man and his acts to truth.” *Ibid.*, 260. In lived-experience, one can discern the spiritual nature of subject-person. “The realm of truth is identified with the realm of spirit proper only to it. Truth constitutes the essential reason for the essence of human cognition and it is the basis of the transcendence of the person in action.” *Ibid.*, 248.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 267-273.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 344-345.

⁷³ Wojtyła studied “two distinct variants of dynamism and potentiality... as two structural layers” of human subjectivity: somatic-vegetative and psycho-emotive. “I experiences itself in them as subject and not merely as agent, the latter being the case in conscious actions, that is, in acts.” *Ibid.*, 190.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 371-373.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 416.

Summary: efficacy and *p*-subjectivity

The earlier comparison between efficacy, resulting from self-determination, and spontaneous *P-E*-agency can be replaced by a comparison of volitional and, respectively, emotional factors that influence action. This translates into the relationship between efficacy and *p*-subjectivity, if psycho-emotive dynamics has been qualified as a type of happening. The first feature of this relationship is the function of its parts in action: the efficacy is its condition, while *p*-subjectivity does not participate in it. And this is the case when considering *p*-subjectivity of the somatic-vegetative processes. In the case of psycho-emotive processes, however, when a specific type of feeling is established in the psyche (in an emotional attitude,⁷⁶ and not just a fleeting state of feeling), it begins to shape the will, i.e., this type of happening influences the action. Then, “[*e*]fficacy and the transcendence of the personal ‘I’ connected with it are, in a sense, pulled into the subject.”⁷⁷ In such “subjectivized” human action, psychic immanence begins to dominate transcendence.

The emotionalization of consciousness causes action which “is performed in passion.” It is then characterized by reduced responsibility, but it does necessarily mean the disintegration or suspension of the capacity for conscious-action, that is, the efficacy. On the contrary, it can become a seed of creative integration⁷⁸ when it releases a special energy flowing from the lived-experience of values. “This factor directs *the person to fulfill himself in the act not by way of emotional spontaneity alone but by way of a transcendent relation to truth and to the duty and responsibility connected with it.*”⁷⁹ This integration is the result of the emerging tension between emotiveness and efficacy. It stems from the human need for the rational pursuit of truth, for the engagement of *I-M*-agency. In a normal state of rational decisions *versus* spontaneous emotional urges, these decisions focus on choosing the goal of action – the true good. This is not about negating values of

⁷⁶ An emotional attitude is an internal attitude of a person, resulting from the consolidation of a certain state caused by a (psychic) feeling and constituting “a particularly important fruit of man’s emotive potentiality and dynamism... This attitude is typically ‘subjective’.” *Ibid.*, 357.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 357.

⁷⁸ The efficacy, by arousing dynamism, causes the person to be the agent of the act (in the immanence of the person in action, consisting in the dynamism of the action) and at the same time the person-agent places himself above the act, i.e., transcends it in the experience of “I am the agent of the action.” However, due to the dynamism of his own “I”; this “efficacious I” passes into the “acting I.” Hence, “[m]an is not only the agent of his action but *also its creator*.” The task of evoking the coming to existence and the existence of the effect belongs to the essence of efficacy.” *Ibid.*, 171-172.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 361-362. See also: 357-358.

lived-experiencing, but about developing the ability to connect “*transcendence with integration in the sphere of emotions,*” which complement and mutually influence each other: they are complementary.⁸⁰

Integration of a person into action based on the emotional nature of the human psyche is accomplished through skills (similar to the ethical virtues of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.)⁸¹ In the process of integration, the tension between emotionality and efficacy is resolved: in the realization of a personal structure of self-mastery and self-possession on the basis of psychic *p*-subjectivity. “[*T*]hanks to skills in various areas, the will can safely appropriate and make its own spontaneity proper to affections and, in general, to all of emotivity.”⁸²

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 357-358, 361-362.

⁸¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, books II-III; St. Thomas Aquinas, Treatises: *On Habits* and *On Habits in Particular – Good Habits*, in: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (1-2, qu. 49-70), <https://www.ccel.org/aquinas/summa/> [access: 29.12.25].

⁸² Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 365.

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