Wojtyła's Critical Engagement with Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler in the *Lublin Lectures* and *Love and Responsibility*

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Abstract

My paper analyzes Karol Wojtyła's critical engagement with Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler in the *Lublin Lectures* and *Love and Responsibility* through a systematic comparison that distinguishes three levels of connection: explicit textual appropriation, strong conceptual continuity and interpretive resonance. Wojtyła accepts Kant's prohibition of treating persons merely as means, but questions whether Kant's approach sufficiently grounds ethical normativity in the good and being of the acting agent. Scheler provides resources to consider objective values as well as their lived disclosure. However, Wojtyła challenges the adequacy of Scheler's account of efficacious moral agency. The foregoing comparison tracks the continuity between the *Lublin Lectures'* treatment of rational norming, duty and efficacy and *Love and Responsibility's* account of love, responsibility and the person. It also acknowledges the inclusion of positive obligations toward others in Kant's ethics, and the foundational role Wojtyła's metaphysical commitments play in his engagement with both these thinkers. Spousal self-gift is a distinctive realization of the positive personalistic norm, which identifies love as the adequate attitude toward the person. Wojtyła's distinct contribution emerges in his personalistic articulation of these issues in engagement with Kant and Scheler within a realist account of the good and agency.

Keywords

Karol Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, *Love and Responsibility*, Kant, Scheler, personalistic norm, moral agency

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Introduction

Karol Wojtyła's *Love and Responsibility* (LR) is widely and rightly understood to be a philosophical discourse on conjugal ethics. It may also be examined alongside his *Lublin Lectures* (LL), a philosophical project that engages Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler, and analyzes the acting person as an efficacious moral agent. LR, in the context of use, pleasure, love, responsibility and marriage, develops an account of interpersonal human action. My paper argues that Wojtyła, through metaphysical realism already permeating his work, creatively and critically retrieves Kant's and Scheler's insights in articulating his personalistic norm. My thesis neither assumes that the lectures directly informed the composition of LR nor identifies the personalistic norm with spousal self-gift as such. It concerns conceptual relationships a close reading may reasonably establish.

First, I clarify the comparison's chronology, method and scholarly context. Next, I analyze Wojtyła's assessment of Kant's and Scheler's treatment of normativity, value and efficacy. Finally, I examine how LR appropriates Kant and incorporates relevant issues into its account of the person, the personalistic norm, responsibility and marriage. I adopt this approach to distinguish what Wojtyła evidently borrows from what my comparison proposes to be points of systematic continuity.

Chronology and Method

"LL" refers specifically to the three lecture cycles Wojtyła delivered at the Catholic University of Lublin: "Ethical Act and Lived-Experience" in 1954-1955, "Good and Value" in 1955-1956, and "The Problem of the Norm and Happiness" in 1956-1957. These occupy pages 3-272 of the 2023 critical edition, which also contains the habilitation on Scheler from 1953 and related writings from different dates. "The Intentional Act and Actus Humanus," in particular, is from 1974, and therefore cannot document the genesis of LR.[2]

[2] G. Ignatik, preface to *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, by K. Wojtyła, trans. G. Ignatik (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2023), vii-viii. For the habilitation's presentation in 1953, see 383. For the date of "The Intentional Act and Actus Humanus, That Is, the Act and Lived-Experience," see 594, editorial note xxxviii; the essay appears at 357-366.

The Willetts translation's editorial introduction points out that LR first took shape during the 1958-1959 lectures. This is understood as an editorial statement about the author rather than an identification of LR with the earlier lecture cycles. Kupczak dates a course titled "*Love and Responsibility*" to 1957-1958. These differences do not admit a silent and speedy resolution. In any case, both date the relevant teaching later than the three cycles (LL). Therefore, it is fitting that the works be placed in a related intellectual setting without asserting textual identity or genetic dependence.[3]

Three levels of connection govern my comparison: a) direct textual appropriation where Wojtyła identifies an interlocutor and adopts, alters or critiques a traceable argument or formulation; b) strong conceptual continuity where the works demonstrate sustained correspondence, even without explicit cross-reference, in addressing an issue, employing a distinction or presenting an argument; and c) interpretive resonance where similarity is suggested without sufficient evidence of appropriation or sustained conceptual continuity. Thus, 'mediation' designates a demonstrable conceptual contribution without necessarily implying a documented path of transmission, and 'development' designates a more determinate articulation of an issue in the comparison.

My inquiry's principal object is Wojtyła's interpretation and appropriation of Kant and Scheler, but direct references to Kant and Scheler serve to clarify the scope of Wojtyła's critiques. The LR quotes generally follow Willetts. But where terminology may matter, there are comparisons to Ignatik's 2013 translation. Moreover, 'efficacy' refers to one's causal agency in acting (rather than successful performance or efficiency). 'Objectivization' is the practical recognition of the true order of values, particularly the value of the person (rather than reducing a person to an instrument).[4]

[3] "Introduction to the Present Edition," in: K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. H.T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 9. Compare "Editors' Introduction to the Polish Edition (1979)," in: K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. G. Ignatik (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2013). Jarosław Kupczak gives 1957-1958 in: *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 44. The difference between these dates is not resolved here; neither source identifies the LR course with the three 1954-1957 cycles.

[4] For the terminology of agency, see Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, 17-18. Compare Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 25-33, 41-42, 96-100, 197-198, with *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. I, pt. 1, "The first meaning of the verb 'to use,'" "The second meaning of the verb 'to use,'" and "The commandment to love and the personalistic norm"; chap. II, pt. 1, "Spousal love"; and chap. III, pt. 3, "Self-mastery and objectivization." Subsequent LR references identify the translator.

The Context of Scholarship

The relationship between Wojtyła's early ethical writings and LR has a significant interpretive history. Kupczak analyzes the habilitation and the Lublin lectures. This includes Wojtyła's critiques of Scheler's treatment of conscience and account of causal efficacy. Kupczak characterizes LR as an anthropological application of the method developed during the habilitation and the lectures, and links its analysis of love to an Aristotelian-Thomistic account of the person. My inquiry, hence, seeks, not to purportedly discover a hitherto unrecognized relationship, but to specify the character and evidentiary strength of distinct links, particularly between explicit Kantian formulations and the positive personalistic norm.[5]

Crosby's complementary philosophical perspective in *The Selfhood of the Human Person* explains how one may selectively appropriate Kant's insights while preserving the perennial philosophical account of the person's substantial and objective being. His later discussion of Wojtyła relates self-possession to the possibility of self-donation, and distinguishes spousal self-surrender from other kinds of love. Likewise, Acosta's methodological survey in his volume with Reimers distinguishes Thomistic, phenomenological and personalist interpretations without substituting philosophical classification for understanding the person.[6]

Buttiglione interprets LR as integrating phenomenological analysis with an ontological account of the person, and locates Wojtyła's engagement with Kant and Scheler within Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics, while considering the return to Aquinas as creative instead of merely repetitive. This reading of the personalistic norm identifies distinguishable roles for Thomistic categories, Schelerian apprehension of personal values, and the Kantian categorical imperative,

[5] Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 15-21, 30-38, 63-65.
[6] J.F. Crosby, *The Selfhood of the Human Person* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 2-5; Crosby, *Personalist Papers* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 245-247, 254-255; M. Acosta and A.J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 33-38. The methodological survey in Acosta's chapter "Wojtyła's Method" draws on Guerra López's taxonomy and Reimers's account of Wojtyła's philosophical aims.

thereby establishing a substantial precedent for my present comparison. My paper's contribution thus lies in distinguishing evident textual appropriations from broader conceptual continuities.[7]

Ignatik systematically connects value with anthropology, ethics and love. Phenomenological disclosure and metaphysical explanation bear a mutual relevance. This reading of the personalistic norm deepens natural-law reasoning by clarifying the distinctive worth, responsibility and freedom of the person. Such a reading constitutes a clear alternative to interpreting Wojtyła's personalism as a modern ethical project that subsequently incorporates Thomistic foundations. Instead of tracing the historical evolution of these texts from different periods, Ignatik combines them to illuminate Wojtyła's mature approach. Thus, Ignatik strengthens this paper's systematic comparison without claiming a genetic dependence of LR on the three lecture cycles.[8]

Schmitz's treatment of Wojtyła's early works is also germane to this project's scholarly context. Sayre's review specifically identifies his discussion of LL and Wojtyła's responses to Kant and Scheler. While this establishes that the relationship was observed in the book's reception, it does not authorize a comprehensive judgment concerning the monograph's thesis or omissions.[9]

Waldstein provides an important alternative to a Kantian-foundation thesis. While acknowledging a genuine appropriation of Scheler, he locates Wojtyła's foundational orientation within Christian and Thomistic thought. Since his interpretation chiefly concerns the later theology of the body, an application to earlier works needs independent textual support. Bulzacchelli, however, underscores the rectifying force of personal irreducibility against reductive interpretations of human nature, while still acknowledging Wojtyła's continued use of Aristotelian-Thomistic resources. While my comparison can test the connection of those resources to the

[7] R. Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. P. Guietti and F. Murphy (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), chap. 3, "Scheler and St. Thomas," concluding paragraphs; chap. 4, "The Method," opening paragraph and paragraphs beginning "It is evident how much this approach owes to St. Thomas" and "The same personalistic norm."

[8] G. Ignatik, *Person and Value: Karol Wojtyła's Personalistic and Normative Theory of Man, Morality, and Love* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021), x-xii, 95-97.

[9] P. Sayre, "Review of *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, by Kenneth L. Schmitz," *Faith and Philosophy* 14, no. 1 (1997), 121-122.

personalistic norm, it cannot, on its own, settle the stronger claims of doctrinal discontinuity which Bulzacchelli's thesis develops.[10]

More recent scholarship sharpens the methodological inquiry. For instance, Petryszak's analysis of habilitation material characterizes Wojtyła's early engagement with phenomenology as both Thomistically oriented and critical, while still permitting subsequent anthropological development. Biesaga describes an original method wherein experience and metaphysical realism illuminate each other. The foregoing studies challenge a linear narrative wherein a Kantian initiation encounters a Schelerian enrichment and, lastly, the addition of metaphysical foundations. On the contrary, they inspire inquiry into the function of distinct modern insights within Wojtyła's realist framework, as well as the extent of such appropriation based on textual examination.[11]

Kant and Scheler in the *Lublin Lectures*

A query running through these three distinct but interrelated lecture cycles is how to understand the adequate philosophical object of ethics. LL's opening describes ethics as a distinctly philosophical understanding of lived experience. Wojtyła understands this ethical experience as constituting the experiential foundation of a study of human action rather than a simple datum of psychology. He seeks "to demonstrate that this experiential whole of ethical lived-experience does in fact have the structure of an act."[12] The fundamental query is whether moral experience can be understood as the act of a person efficaciously realizing either good or evil. This concerns more than whether the moral subject acknowledges laws or feels values. Already, even here, Wojtyła sees in Aquinas a resource for understanding the whole that he finds inadequately explained in both Kant and Scheler.

Wojtyła's initial inquiry establishes mutual opposition between Kant and Scheler. Scheler proposes value as decisive for "the very essence of ethics and ethical life." However, Kant proposes

[10] M. Waldstein, "Three Kinds of Personalism: Kant, Scheler and John Paul II," *Forum Teologiczne* 10 (2009), 166-170; R.H. Bulzacchelli, "Irreducibility and the Personalistic Norm as a Departure from Thomism: A Critique from the Thought of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II," *Wojtyła Studies* Vol. 2, no. 2 (2025), 86-90; for the stronger theological argument, see 109-111.

[11] K. Petryszak, "The Origins of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology as Recorded in Coll.[atio] and Corr.[igenda] Included in the Notes for his Habilitation Thesis," *Wojtyła Studies* Vol. 1, no. 1 (2024), 111-112, 120-122; T. Biesaga, "Originality of Karol Wojtyła's Method of Philosophy," *Wojtyła Studies* Vol. 3, no. 1 (2026), 11-14, 17-19.

[12] Wojtyła, "The Lublin Lectures," in: *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, 3-4. Subsequent citations to *Lublin Lectures* refer only to the three cycles on pages 3-272, not to every work collected in the volume.

"duty as determining this character."[13] Wojtyła's reconstruction acknowledges that Kant's emphasis on practical reason and law and Scheler's emphasis on intentional feeling and value each recognize a partial reality. He points out, however, that neither adequately accounts for the whole ethical act. This does not mean that Kant does not account for experience or Scheler for acts or norms. Wojtyła critiques the sufficiency of these accounts of the relation between the person's efficacious action and moral value.

The methodological criterion governing Wojtyła's project is whether a philosophical account can maintain contact with lived experience while grasping the content of its ethical dimensions. He critiques Kant's formalism and apriorism but preserves Kant's concern for normativity and duty. He critiques what he considers to be the limitations of Scheler's emotionalism but preserves his phenomenological appreciation of value. Wojtyła's already realist inquiry into action illuminates the intelligibility of these engagements. The claim is not that two partial systems are mechanically merged into a third but that their insights are appropriated and evaluated through the unity of being, agency and ethical experience.[14]

Kant's Anti-utilitarianism and the Ground of the Norm

Wojtyła, in "The Problem of the Norm and Happiness," understands Kant's principal endeavor as a defense of the moral norm against reduction to pleasure. Kant's position "defends the will as the proper subject of the moral good against the unavoidable slide toward 'feeling,' one introduced by Humean utilitarianism."[15] Wojtyła understands this strategy as a refusal to view pleasure or the satisfaction of desire as the determining ground of moral obligation. The term "anti-utilitarianism" will refer principally to this argument within Wojtyła's discussion. A comparable rejection of pleasure as the measure of interpersonal action is explicit in LR.[16]

Wojtyła agrees with this resistance to hedonism, but still judges that Kant's "norming" bears "no connection with being."[17] Conversely, in Wojtyła's account of Aquinas, "the ultimate foundation of any norm is located in the being, in its nature."[18] The criticism concerns the moral

[13] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 3-8, 32-34.
[14] *Ibid*., 3-4, 32-34, 252-254.
[15] *Ibid*., 236.
[16] *Ibid.*, 233-236; compare *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 36-38.
[17] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 235.
[18] *Ibid.*, 237.

measure's ground in the acting person's reality and good. It bears clarifying that this is Wojtyła's philosophical objection to Kant rather than a neutral claim that Kant provides no such grounding at all. Kant does appeal to autonomy and rational nature as an end in itself. However, Wojtyła finds the Kantian account inadequate for a realist account of agency and perfection.[19]

The Formula of Humanity and the Limits of Wojtyła's Critique

The Formula of Humanity demands that humanity be treated "always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."[20] The qualification "merely" is decisive. Cooperation can allow another person's activity to serve my purposes while respecting that person's own ends; what is forbidden, therefore, is the reduction of humanity to an instrument. Furthermore, a negative prohibition cannot exhaust Kant's principle. Kant, in the *Groundwork*, calls for the positive furtherance of others' ends. Moreover, his subsequent account of practical love links benevolence with beneficence.[21] Hence, LR's positive personalistic norm cannot be distinguished from Kant merely by claiming that Kant identifies only non-use, whereas Wojtyła introduces the affirmative concern for the good of the other.

Wojtyła further argues that Kant's criticism of utilitarian eudaimonism does not sufficiently engage the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of happiness as the perfection of human nature. However, this argument does not suggest that Kant commands the repression of happiness. Kant clearly distinguishes making happiness the determining ground of duty from pursuing it under moral law. Wojtyła is concerned with how fulfillment and normativity both belong together in the acting person's good. This concern remains relevant to LR's account of love as personal fulfillment. However, it does not identify every ilk of fulfillment with spousal self-gift.[22]

The distinction between pathological inclination and moral motivation matters as well. Kant tries to safeguard freedom from empirical determination. He distinguishes between sensible and intelligible standpoints within the same agent; this does not involve the purported existence of

[19] *Ibid.*, 235-239; I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in: *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. by M.J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79-80 (Ak 4:428-429); Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in: *Practical Philosophy*, 210 (Ak 5:87). "Ak" refers to the volume and page of the Akademie edition; ordinary page numbers refer to Gregor's 1996 volume.
[20] Kant, *Groundwork*, 80-81 (Ak 4:429-430).
[21] Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in: *Practical Philosophy*, 569-570 (Ak 6:449-451).
[22] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 233, 239-240; Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 214-215 (Ak 5:93-94).

two independent wills. Wojtyła objects that this Kantian account does not adequately capture the experienced efficacy of willing. This is a serious philosophical dispute over the interpretation of agency, not a claim that Kant denies that humans act or experience their actions.[23]

The Kantian account also distinguishes between feeling proposed as an antecedent ground of moral determination and feeling produced by the law in a sensibly affected rational being. Kant is not, here, accidentally reintroducing respect as an empirical foundation after having excluded it. Wojtyła, however, inquires whether this account integrates law, affectivity and agency adequately within the concrete ethical act. Thereby, Wojtyła critiques the sufficiency of this integration, not the inconsistency of permitting feeling a place in ethics.[24]

The highest good unveils another difference in the order of grounding. Kant distinguishes virtue as the supreme good from the complete highest good that includes happiness proportionate to virtue. He postulates God as the condition of the possibility of this correspondence; God is not simply identical with the projected combination of virtue and happiness. Wojtyła's criticism may be more precisely understood as a preference for grounding moral normativity in the order of being and the objective good rather than approaching the ultimate condition of the highest good through practical reason's requirements. This limited contrast is relevant to LR's discussion of justice toward the Creator.[25]

Scheler's Contribution and Limits

Scheler's role may be more precisely specified than a generalized appeal to phenomenological richness. Wojtyła, in LL, points out that Scheler retains Kant's anti-utilitarianism while resisting Kant's formalism. On this account, objective value provides ethical content without, however, making morality dependent on pleasure. Scheler's distinction between values and their contingent bearers and his ordering of values afford argumentative resources for this position. This

[23] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 23-25, 35-37; Kant, *Groundwork*, 98-101 (Ak 4:451-455).
[24] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 24-30, 35-37; Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 198-201 (Ak 5:72-76).
[25] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 228-230 (Ak 5:110-113), 239-241 (Ak 5:124-126); compare Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 130-133, 239-240.

documented conceptual mediation in Wojtyła's engagement with Kant and Scheler, however, does not prove that every corresponding analysis in LR derives from Scheler.[26]

Scheler's distinctions between intentional value-feeling and mere feeling-states, between preferring and choosing, and between love as a spontaneous disclosure of value and merely reactive affect militate against the reduction of his account to passive feelings or subjective pleasures. The foregoing distinctions provide a more precise basis for comparison with LR's treatment of attraction, affectivity, and the integration of sexual values into personal value. However, where LR does not explicitly mention Scheler, the connection remains a conceptual comparison whose explanatory power needs to be tested against Wojtyła's argument.[27]

Wojtyła's criticism concerns whether Scheler accounts for the efficacious willing whereby a person becomes morally good or evil. Scheler describes the person as a concrete unity of acts and repudiates any reduction of the person to a mere network of experiences; however, he still rejects a substance-causal explanation of personal acts. The disagreement should, thus, be located in the adequacy of such an account of personal being and moral efficacy, not a supposed claim that Scheler recognizes neither person nor activity at all. Wojtyła, for his part, seeks an account wherein the acting person is the efficient cause of acts and, thereby, of acquired moral qualification.[28]

The dispute over duty demands caution as well. Scheler distinguishes between ideal oughtness and imperative duty, and grounds oughtness in value, without simply abolishing norms as such. Wojtyła's precise objection is that the whole ethical experience cannot be reconstructed by permitting duty to become secondary to a value-experience whose relation to efficacious action remains insufficiently explained. In LL, both value and duty are necessary elements of the ethical act. The question is how the good is to be realized by the agent, not whether experience is governed by an external pressure unrelated to its content.[29]

Wojtyła's habilitation strongly suggests a selective reception. Its concluding theses argue that Scheler's system is an inadequate interpretation of Christian ethics while still acknowledging the usefulness of the phenomenological method in examining the axiological content of lived

[26] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 240-242; M. Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, trans. M.S. Frings and R.L. Funk (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 9-15, 86-89.
[27] Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics*, 86-89, 253-261; compare Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 75-78, 122-124.
[28] Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics*, 382-386; Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 7-8, 17-20.
[29] Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics*, 203-212; Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 32-34, 242-244.

experience. The experiential advantages of that method do not dispense with philosophical substantiation of moral goodness and evil. This distinction between valuable method and an inadequate system provides a more accurate and precise grammar to clarify Wojtyła's critical appropriation of phenomenology.[30]

Efficacy and Conscience

To restore efficacy as an experiential fact, instead of a mere metaphysical postulate, Wojtyła analyzes the phenomenology and psychology of the will. In LL, he argues that a person can experience willing as the cause of action. The acting person does not merely feel value, but causes action, thereby becoming morally qualified: "The person is the efficient cause of his acts, and, through these acts, the efficient cause of his ethical value, positive or negative."[31] This ethical value must be distinguished from the person's inherent worth. The claim is that acts make acting agents morally better or worse, not that such agents earn the dignity that forbids instrumentalization.

Conscience belongs to this account of agency. LL considers antecedent, concomitant and consequent experience. It situates conscience within practical reason's cognition of the good. Its concluding synthesis states that this rational norming culminates "in a command, in conscience, in the act of the virtue of prudence."[32] The lectures do not provide a comprehensive treatment of conscience. However, an early essay associated with the habilitation calls conscience "the direct subjective norm of the morality of human acts,"[33] linking its normative role to the person's efficacious acts. This is a complementary text clarifying Wojtyła's early project, not a text within the lecture cycles.

Duty and value are now connected via the act of a person who knows and wills the good. In the habilitation, Wojtyła argues that Christian ethics must consider how love shapes the actions for which a person is morally responsible. This statement belongs to Christian ethics and should

[30] K. Wojtyła, "An Assessment of the Possibility for Building a Christian Ethics Based on the Presuppositions of Max Scheler's System," in: *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, 491-497. This work is referred to below as the habilitation, rather than as one of the Lublin lecture cycles.
[31] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 17-18, especially the Polish editors' note 20 at 18, on pre-ethical personal value and ethical perfection.
[32] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 20, 184, 252-254, quotation at 253.
[33] Wojtyła, "Max Scheler's Ethical System as a Means of Developing Christian Ethics," in: *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, 507. For its original publication in 1953-1954, see 596-597.

not be used to import undeveloped theological premises into LR's philosophical argument. Its relevance is the early association of love with personal action instead of a merely affective occurrence. Ignatik's reconstruction sharpens this connection: love can be commanded insofar as its moral character involves the person's efficacious realization of values, joining experienced value with duty rather than reducing love to either alone. LR may then be compared with LL as a sustained analysis of how persons affirm or misuse one another in acting. LL already has a personal agent; LR makes the interpersonal object and context of such agency especially explicit.[34]

The Person and the Meanings of Use in *Love and Responsibility*

Wojtyła commences LR by discussing realism and objectivism. While the world comprises subjects and objects, "every subject also exists as an object, an objective 'something' or 'somebody.'"[35] Being an object of knowledge or action is not by itself a degradation. The person is a real being capable of acting and being acted upon, and possessing an interior life ordered toward truth and goodness. The term "person" expresses "a particular richness and perfection in the manner of his being"[36] that cannot be exhausted by identifying an individual member of a species. This account constitutes the anthropological setting for the norm governing interpersonal action.

LR's discussion of "use" distinguishes two senses. The first concerns employing something as a means to an end. In interpersonal cooperation the relevant prohibition concerns treating the other solely as an instrument, without regard for his or her capacity to deliberate, choose, and pursue personal ends. The second sense concerns the experience of pleasure; this is about whether pleasure is subordinated to the person's good or turns the person into an instrument for enjoyment. This distinction plays a significant role in LR's critique of the utilitarian position.[37]

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[34] Wojtyła, habilitation, 492-493; compare *Lublin Lectures*, 32-34, and *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 119-123, 130. For the systematic reconstruction of duty, value, and efficacious love, see Ignatik, *Person and Value*, 86-87, 128-30.
[35] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 21.
[36] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 21-24, quotation at 22.
[37] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 25-33; compare *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. I, pt. 1, "The first meaning of the verb 'to use'" and "The second meaning of the verb 'to use.'" The editorial clarification in Willetts, 291 n. 6(ii), also distinguishes a means-role from merely instrumental treatment.

Wojtyła mentions Kant and reformulates the imperative in terms of the other's ends: "whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends."[38] This is direct textual appropriation. Wojtyła does not introduce ends, freedom or personhood into an otherwise personless Kantian law; Kant, for his part, already connects rational nature with self-legislation and ends.[39] LR's distinct context is the real person whose inwardness and freedom require an adequate interpersonal response.

The Personalistic Norm and the Common Good

Wojtyła's critique of utilitarianism in LR, too, explicitly invokes Kant. If pleasure is viewed as the sole or highest good, interpersonal relations risk becoming merely means to it. Wojtyła then directs attention "beyond any purely subjective good, i.e. beyond pleasure,"[40] toward an objective good wherein persons can participate together. This "objective common good is the foundation of love,"[41] understood here as a unification of persons. This gives a specific interpersonal articulation to LL's concern with objective good. This is a strong conceptual continuity supported by both works' explicit engagement with Kant. However, this does not mean that the later passage was composed from the former one.[42]

The personalistic norm has both negative and positive formulations. Negatively, the person must not be reduced to an object of use. Positively, "the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love."[43] Ignatik renders the latter relation as one for which only love is "proper and fully-mature."[44] The difference in wording draws attention to the relation to the person, but neither translation defines the norm as spousal self-gift. LR also distinguishes the norm, which identifies the good and the adequate response, from the commandment to love that it justifies. Their intimate connection does not erase that distinction. On Ignatik's reading, this

[38] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 27-28, quotation at 28; compare *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. I, pt. 1, "The first meaning of the verb 'to use.'"
[39] For Kant's own formulation and grounding, see *Groundwork*, 79-81 (Ak 4:428-430).
[40] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 38.
[41] *Ibid.*, 38.
[42] *Ibid.*, 36-38; compare *Lublin Lectures*, 233-237.
[43] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 41.
[44] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. I, pt. 1, "The commandment to love and the personalistic norm."

personalistic justification deepens the natural-law reasoning by making the person's distinctive value, freedom and responsibility explicit.[45]

This personalistic norm governs Wojtyła's assessment of desire, attraction, affectivity and sentiment. Love includes these dimensions but remains irreducible to them. Therefore, love as desire remains directed toward the person and must not become a utilitarian attitude. Wojtyła's account of goodwill is especially important: "I long for your good."[46] Here, he explicitly draws upon the Thomistic distinction of benevolent love, rather than presenting concern for the other's good as a discovery arising exclusively from Kant. Love is an activity whereby the person realizes capacities for the good. The personalistic norm links such action with the worth of the person loved.

LR's distinctive contribution, therefore, is not the initial recognition that others' ends merit affirmative support—an obligation Kant already identifies—but the integration of this demand with an account of the person as an objective good, the lived dimensions of sexual attraction and the common good of interpersonal love. The prohibition of merely instrumental treatment, while indispensable, does not exhaust the positive norm or the moral conclusions of marital ethics. Their justification is to be sought in the broader anthropology and account of love LR develops.[47]

Spousal Love: A Distinctive Realization of the Norm

Translating *miłość oblubieńcza*, Willetts calls this distinctive realization of love "betrothed love" and Ignatik calls it "spousal love";[48] it consists in a personal gift of self. Willetts states: "The essence of betrothed love is self-giving, the surrender of one's 'I'."[49] Ignatik similarly speaks of giving oneself as giving one's "I."[50] The person who cannot be possessed as a thing in the physical order of ownership can freely give himself or herself in the moral order of love.

[45] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 40-42; *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. I, pt. 1, "The commandment to love and the personalistic norm." For the relation to natural law and the distinction from the commandment, see Ignatik, *Person and Value*, 95-97.
[46] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 81-84, especially 83 on goodwill and *amor benevolentiae*.
[47] Kant, *Groundwork*, 81 (Ak 4:430); Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 28-30, 38-42, 82-84.
[48] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 96-97; *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. II, pt. 1, "Spousal love."
[49] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 96.
[50] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. II, pt. 1, "Spousal love."

The distinction between the person's natural incommunicability and moral self-giving is, hence, intrinsic to the account; it is not a contradiction Kantian respect alone must resolve.

The foregoing concerns the marital realization of spousal love wherein reciprocal self-giving orders the shared life of the spouses. LR also recognizes self-giving to God; thus, 'spousal' is not an exclusively civil or marital designation.[51] More generally, relations of goodwill, friendship and other personal love may satisfy the positive norm without taking the form of spousal surrender. The hierarchy of claims is therefore clear: the person is a good; love is the adequate attitude; spousal self-gift is a distinctive and radical way of realizing love. Crosby's distinction between spousal and other forms of self-donation helps articulate this specificity.[52] Ignatik likewise treats spousal love as a distinctive giving of the person,[53] while Buttiglione distinguishes love's general applicability from the reciprocal belonging of spousal love.[54]

Responsibility and the Integration of Value

Wojtyła argues: "it is a man's duty to choose the true good."[55] Love understood psychologically is subordinate to love in the ethical sense, lest love collapse into "vulgar psychologism."[56] There is "no possibility of psychological completeness in love unless ethical completeness is attained."[57] These claims can be read alongside LL's insistence that value and duty belong to the act of an efficacious person. The relation is conceptual rather than an explicit local appeal to Kant: the passages in LR develop their own account of love as a virtue and of the truth of the good.[58]

The objective good at stake is the person, not merely the sexual value that a person may bear for another. Hence, "in every situation in which we experience the 'sexual' value of a person, love demands integration." Love is "an affirmation of the person or else it is not love at all."[59] Integration does not suppress every sensual or affective response. It orders those responses within

[51] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 96-100.
[52] Crosby, *Personalist Papers*, 254-255.
[53] Ignatik, *Person and Value*, 133134, 148 n. 93.
[54] Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła*, chap. 4, "The Method," paragraph beginning "How is it therefore possible," and "The Person and Love," paragraph beginning "Spousal love is properly the gift of oneself."
[55] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 119.
[56] *Ibid.*, 120.
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Ibid.*, 119-120; compare *Lublin Lectures*, 32-34.
[59] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 122-124, both quotations at 123.

an adequate relation to the whole person. The correspondence with LL lies in the refusal to isolate one element of experience and treat it as the whole ethical reality.

Responsibility affords this affirmation its practical gravity. In LR, this concerns the moral demands of sharing one's life with another person: "Responsibility for love clearly comes down to responsibility for the person, originates in it and returns to it."[60] The acting person must answer for the character of that relationship and for the good entrusted to his or her action. Here LL's account of efficacy illuminates a condition of responsibility: one can be responsible for how one loves because one acts, chooses, and forms oneself through action. Yet efficacy and responsibility are not synonyms. The former concerns causal agency; the latter concerns what that agency owes to a person and to the good.[61]

LR's statement that "Freedom exists for the sake of love"[62] similarly gives freedom a positive orientation toward the good. The person's self-determination makes possible responsible affirmation and self-giving. This is contrastable with the account of autonomy Wojtyła critiques. But this does not mean a rejection of Kantian concern for freedom as such; Kant's autonomy remains distinguishable from arbitrary preference.[63] The germane continuity within Wojtyła's works is the connection between free agency and a good that the agent recognizes rather than invents.

Scheler, Chastity, and Objectivization

LR provides an evident instance of Schelerian appropriation in "Chastity and Resentment." Wojtyła expressly borrows the rehabilitative heading from Scheler's "On the Rehabilitation of Virtue"[64] and then attributes to Scheler an analysis of resentment: one may devalue a demanding good rather than acknowledge the requisite exertion to realize it. Wojtyła applies this diagnosis to the rejection of chastity. Direct comparison with the named essay makes the extent of the borrowing more precise. Scheler challenges the reduction of virtue to proficiency or burdensome

[60] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 130.
[61] Compare Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 17-20. The later editorial discussion of efficacy should be distinguished from the authorial text: see the editors' note 6(i) in *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 290-291, and the corresponding editorial note in *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. I, pt. 1, "The first meaning of the verb 'to use'."
[62] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 134-135, quotation at 135.
[63] Kant, *Groundwork*, 89 (Ak 4:440-441).
[64] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 143-145; *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. III, pt. 1, "Chastity and resentment."

conformity to rules and presents it as a joyful personal capacity for the good. This supplies an identifiable rehabilitative project, which LR gives a specific application in sexual ethics. It does not establish that every element of LR's account of resentment occurs in that essay.[65]

The reception is selective. Scheler resists the explanation of virtue through duty-bound willing; it is the lack of virtue that invites the moral law and duty to play a substitute role. LR, conversely, joins its rehabilitation of chastity to the effort of will, integration and self-mastery necessary to affirm the person. Read alongside LL's account of efficacy, this difference shows why appropriating Scheler's positive defense of virtue need not entail accepting his account of its relation to willing and obligation. The comparison identifies a shared problem while preserving the distinct explanations offered by the two thinkers.[66]

Wojtyła points out that chastity "can only be thought of in association with the virtue of love" and that its function is "to free love from the utilitarian attitude."[67] Chastity integrates sexual value into the value of the person rather than annihilating it. It is not "one long 'no,'" but "above all the 'yes' of which certain 'no's' are the consequence."[68] Its point is the readiness to affirm the person amid desire and emotion. This is a practical realization of the positive and negative dimensions of the personalistic norm, without requiring the claim that chastity is uniquely derived from a Kantian premise.

Objectivization plays a precise role in this formation by practically recognizing the true order of values, particularly the value of the person in relation to sexual values, so that this truth shapes desire and action. Willetts's "Self Control and Objectivization"[69] and Ignatik's "Self-mastery and objectivization"[70] both connect correct valuation with actual self-command. This differs from objectification which reduces a person to a usable thing. "Objectification" here is an explanatory term for that reduction, not a technical antonym the translations themselves establish. Recognizing someone objectively as a person makes possible affirmation without depriving that person of subjectivity.

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[65] Compare M. Scheler, "On the Rehabilitation of Virtue," trans. E. Kelly, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 79, no. 1 (2005), 21-23. LR supplies the explicit attribution of the resentment analysis and its application to chastity; Scheler's essay supplies the directly compared account of virtue's rehabilitation.

[66] Scheler, "On the Rehabilitation of Virtue," 22-23; compare Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 143-145, 169-171, 194-199, and *Lublin Lectures*, 17-20, 32-34. The contrast is systematic, not a claim that each passage in LR is a direct response to the named essay.

[67] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 169.

[68] *Ibid.*, 169-171, final quotations at 170.

[69] *Ibid.*, 194-199, especially 197-198; section heading at 194.

[70] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. III, pt. 3, "Self-mastery and objectivization."

This fuller account has implications for marriage. LR connects monogamy and indissolubility with the personalistic norm and the enduring relation wherein a man and a woman can become co-subjects of love. The argument invokes reciprocal commitment and the good of the persons and their shared life. These conclusions should not be presented as following from Kant's prohibition of merely instrumental treatment alone. Their justification belongs to LR's mature account of love, self-giving, and marriage, which the negative prohibition constrains but does not exhaust.[71]

Justice toward the Creator and the Ground of Personal Obligation

Justice toward the Creator clarifies the metaphysical limit of Wojtyła's reception of Kant. LR expresses the person's rational participation in the created order as becoming *particeps Creatoris*; conscience must conform to the objective good and natural law.[72] Wojtyła's criticism of "autonomism" concerns the source of moral order, not a denial that persons act freely. Kantian autonomy is rational and universal lawgiving, not an arbitrary and individualistic invention of obligations.[73] Thus, the relevant contrast concerns their accounts of ultimate grounding. LR explicitly clarifies the connection to interpersonal ethics: "Man can only be just to God the Creator if he loves his fellows."[74] The section thus returns to the personalistic norm rather than adding an unrelated natural theology.

Conclusion

LL asks whether ethical lived experience is understandable as the act of a person whose agency and moral formation are grounded in being. Wojtyła recognizes Kant's defense of normativity and Scheler's attention to objective values, while judging that each isolates an element that must be understood within the whole ethical act. LR's anthropology and account of love can be read in

[71] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 211.
[72] *Ibid.*, 245-247; compare *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Ignatik, chap. IV, pt. 2, "The concept of justice with respect to the Creator."
[73] For Kantian autonomy, see Kant, *Groundwork*, 89 (Ak 4:440-441).
[74] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Willetts, 247.

strong conceptual continuity with that project. They neither simply add persons to an impersonal ethic nor demonstrate that the three lecture cycles somehow birthed LR.[75]

The strongest instances of appropriation are explicit: LR names Kant when reformulating the prohibition of merely instrumental treatment and it borrows Scheler's rehabilitative heading while invoking his analysis of resentment in its account of chastity. Other relations, including the connections among efficacy, conscience, responsibility, and integration, are best defended as conceptual continuities. Still other similarities need the more modest language of interpretive resonance. The foregoing differentiation, rather than enfeebling comparison, identifies precisely what each type of evidence countenances as an argumentative claim.

The personalistic norm holds love to be the adequate attitude toward the person. Spousal self-gift is a distinctive realization of this demand, not its exhaustive definition. Kantian non-instrumentalization remains an acknowledged constraint, but Kant's positive obligations merit recognition as well. Neither Kant's formula nor Scheler's value-ethics alone supplies LR's anthropology. Wojtyła's contribution is a sustained account of how objective personal worth, lived experience, efficacious action and shared good belong together. This affords a distinctive personalistic development within Thomistic and Christian commitments without reducing that development to merely a verbal restatement of the tradition or a personalism principally derived from Kant and Scheler.

[75] Wojtyła, *Lublin Lectures*, 32-34.

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