Table of contents:

Wojtyła Studies

Presentation and Invitation

Dear Readers,

We would like to invite you to read the new philosophical journal *Wojtyła Studies*. As the title conveys, it is dedicated to studies on the thought of Karol Wojtyła, later Pope John Paul II. This periodical strives to better understand the ideas and projects worked out by Wojtyła, as well as how he developed these ideas and projects in his pre-papal time, namely when he was a professor of philosophy at the Catholic University in Lublin (Poland), and as a pastor and Archbishop of Krakow. He left a massive body of literature including philosophical works, works of theology and homiletics, works on social and culture issues as well as works on other topics. The primary aim of this journal is to stimulate scholarly interest and create a space for the analyses of Wojtyła's achievements. This means that Karol Wojtyła's philosophical, theological, cultural, and social ideas are to play a central role in the journal. This also means that the focus is on Karol Wojtyła and not on John Paul II; in other words, even if studies on John Paul II are presented, they must be done through the lens of Karol Wojtyła, namely with a proper inclusion of his pre-papal notions and projects. Thus, we want to emphasize what is less obvious and underappreciated, namely that Karol Wojtyła prepared the ground for the teaching of John Paul II and worked out many interesting and useful ideas, which later inspired many of his papal activities.

Wojtyła Studies is a peer-reviewed journal published twice a year (semiannual). It is published by scholars from two universities: The University of St. Thomas in Houston (USA) and The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow (Poland). It is divided into five parts: philosophical issues, theological issues, cultural issues, miscellanea, and reviews. Thus, the editorial board accepts various original studies on Karol Wojtyła's thought only if they can be classified into one of these categories or are clearly related to them; additionally, only original articles and review articles in English are accepted. The periodical is accessible from the websites of both the Pontifical University of John Paul II and the University of St. Thomas; all articles are open access.

The scientific board is made up of world renown Wojtylian scholars both from the USA and Europe. This being so, one of the aims of the journal is to invite other scholars, including scholars from other continents, who are interested in the thought of Karol Wojtyła to take part in a critical exchange of analyses and opinions. In this way, the editors would like to revive,

consolidate, and strengthen the conversation on Karol Wojtyła's legacy worldwide and show that his multifaced message is relevant regarding contemporary issues.

Contact us at: https://wojtylastudies.org/index.php/wojst

Sincerely,

Editors
John Hittinger – University of St. Thomas, Houston, USA
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On the Cognition of God according to Karol Wojtyła

Grzegorz Hołub[1]

Abstract

The article concerns Karol Wojtyła's approach to the cognition of God. In one of his minor works, written in 1950s, he presents his position, which is typical for the Thomistic philosophy but also contains some other elements, related to Augustinian philosophy and Catholic theology. Of particular interest is Wojtyła's description of the formation of the act of faith. It reveals a kind of interplay between God's grace and human reason and will. Although God primarily takes an initiative in this respect, the role of the human being is important and indispensable; without his active participation there is no possibility of a living faith. Wojtyła's presentation of the topic predates his papal works, particularly the encyclical letter "Fides et ratio," but some similarities are striking. It may mean that the content of the encyclical was maturing in Karol Wojtyła's mind for decades and hence his book sheds some important light on early Wojtyła's achievements, which were later developed by John Paul II.

Keywords

God, human person, cognition of God, act of faith, human reason

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Introduction

Karol Wojtyła as a philosopher was primarily interested in ethics and philosophical anthropology. His main works (*Love and Responsibility* and *Person and Act*) are accompanied by further articles on the subject and serve as a confirmation of his philosophical specialization.[2] However, he also undertook other philosophical problems that went well beyond these two realms and this fact is less known. As a pastor and university chaplain in Krakow, he was interested in topics pertaining to God and religion. Additionally, his theological formation culminated in his Ph. D. on the problem of faith in the thought of St John of the Cross, which naturally disposed him to become involved in issues of a religious nature.[3] Of course, these tasks were primarily accomplished in the field of theology where he was quite active. Furthermore, Wojtyła did undertake these issues as a philosopher and this gives the reader an interesting insight into his activity as a philosopher of religion or philosopher and theologian both at the same time. However, having said this, we should also notice that setting precise methodological boundaries between theology and philosophy is not always easy, particularly in his early works.

Therefore, it is the task of this article to concentrate on a small treatise called "On the Knowability and Cognition of God"[4] published in Poland several years ago, which, as yet, has not been translated into English. This booklet contains a number of talks delivered by Karol Wojtyła to a group of university students in Krakow in the early 1950s. Although its aim was issues regarding the existence of God to bring to the broader public, it contains some interesting points for professional philosophers and theologians as well.

From the Word "God" to God's Existence and Nature

Karol Wojtyła starts his investigations from the concept of "God" as we find it in our minds, but he is far from the approach taken by Anslem of Canterbury; the former moves clearly within a framework of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. Although we possess such a concept, it

[2] See G. Hołub, "Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła," *Studia Gilsoniana* Vol. 11, No.1 (2022), 145-161.
[3] His research in this area culminated in a publication of the following book, K. Wojtyła, *Faith According to Saint John of the Cross*, trans. by J. Aumann (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981).
[4] K. Wojtyła, *O poznawalności i poznaniu Boga. Zarys zagadnień* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo św. Stanisława BM, 2000). In further references: OKCG.

is not a kind of innate notion, that is, an idea which we discover in our minds and gradually shed light upon through our intellectual attempts. Rather our notion of God is acquired by us and is a result of our complex activities. Which activities, we can ask. Sensual experience does not play a major role here, although sensual experience is at the outset of our every experiencing. However, Wojtyła says that the senses do not arrive at the reality corresponding to the notion of God, but instead assist the human person to arrive to the notion of God which can only be possessed by reason itself.

Wojtyła assumes a realist epistemology by distancing himself from an idealist position. What we know on the level of our reason must be given first on the level of the senses. The notion of God and the accompanying understanding are typical for reason and stem from a certain abstraction and generalization. Thus, the Polish thinker considers three kinds of abstraction: physical, mathematical and metaphysical. The first is typical for the exact sciences and result in a body of general concepts indispensable for communication and cultivation of science. The last, namely metaphysical, goes further and tends to capture being itself, being as being, which constitutes something beyond the essence of physical things. Wojtyła claims directly that, "in the inherent endowment of rational nature lies a readiness to go beyond a framework of the physical shape of the world. This readiness is accompanied by an ability to abstraction of the metaphysical nature" (OKCG, p. 28). Wojtyła is fully aware that the concept of being is an analogical one and being itself can either actually or potentially exist. Therefore, being itself, namely, God, cannot be proved by physical proofs because physical abstraction does not lead us to the problem of the First Cause. Only metaphysical abstraction allows the philosopher to speak of the issue of being (*ens*) and the First Cause, being itself.

Wojtyła in turn speaks of proofs concerning the existence of God. He points to these strategies of thinking which are well known from St. Thomas Aquinas' investigations, namely from motion (*ex motu*), from contingency (*ex contingentia rerum*), from causal causation (*ex casualitate*), from the degrees of perfection (*ex garadibus perfectionis*), and from finality (*ex finalitate*). The Polish thinker stresses that these ways of reasoning (some scholars claim that they are not proofs but ways directing us to discover the existence of God only) help us not only to ascertain the existence of the cause but they also give us some insight into its essence. Thus, for example we confirm a certain excellence of beings in this world and then we realize that such excellence must be contained in the First Cause but in higher degree. Of course, such a reasoning must be conducted with an analogy of proportion (or Wojtyła adds: an analogy of disproportion) (OKCG, p. 34-41). The Polish thinker does not present a new version of these proofs and their interpretations are typical for the Thomistic philosophy of the late 1940s. As

we mentioned, his aim was to introduce university students studying various majors to more rigorous thinking about God.

Generally, Wojtyła claims that investigations concerning the essence of God were conducted in threefold manner: *via affirmationis, negationis et eminentiae*. They are understood in a following way: all perceived excellence in the world is attributed to God, the First Cause; all imperfections in relation to him are rejected; all excellence in this world is limited and relative – to attribute it to God, we must conceive of it in the superlative. In this way, we can accumulate some positive knowledge on God but it is very limited. Human concepts and strategies cannot encompass the richness and complexity of the reality of God, as he is always beyond our capacity of knowledge and therefore, what we know will always be partial and imperfect. Wojtyła is fully aware of these cognitive limitations and his remarks lead us to, of necessity, recognize the boundaries of the philosophical approach to God. The Polish thinker offers an interesting summary; he claims that the net of all concepts which refer to the essence of God as First Cause is within the possibility of our natural reason, assuming man's ability to utilize metaphysical abstraction. Nevertheless, the very fact of combining the concepts' objective contents with one simple being constitutes a rather impassible threshold. Our reason is only able to distinguish and grasp through many concepts and aspects of what in God himself is indeed one and absolutely simple (OKCG, p. 49).

In the Realm of Mystery and Faith

Karol Wojtyła is convinced that philosophy, particularly metaphysics, is helpful but it does not extend to the ultimate depths of God, namely the divine nature itself. Philosophy can grasp God's existence and some of his qualities only from the multiplicity of his creation and from his effects; both of these being an indirect way to the knowledge of God. The Polish thinker points out that in God there is a "sphere" to which nothing can point, indicate, or direct our mind. This is of course the sphere of mystery. To have access to God's mystery, we should turn to other sources, particularly to Revelation. Fundamentally, theology is the investigation of Revelation, but it can also be approached through philosophy. It seems that Wojtyła sticks to the latter approach and acts as a philosopher of religion.

For the human being this move to reveled sources means a change of epistemological attitude. Human reason does not infer the knowledge on God from various analyses of the world, but this knowledge is given to him from on high. In Christian revelation it is contained in the Bible and the heritage of the faith. However, this causes two potential problems; one has

to do with the adaptation of this "knowledge from on high" to the world of human thoughts and concepts. The second concerns a readiness on the side of the human being to accept this knowledge, assuming that what is typical for the human being is, as Wojtyła states, a "sense of self-sufficiency in reason and criticism" (OKCG, p. 54). For Christianity the human being is not a fideist from nature and what is revealed cannot be detached from reason; the Christian faith (in its mature conceptual form) draws from both what can be found within human reason and the content of revelation.

Wojtyła gives an interesting description of the knowledge associated with Christian revelation. He claims that the human being is internally disposed to receive revelation and moreover, he himself goes out toward God. God within revelation communicates himself and at the same time inspires within the human being the right basis for the cognitive grasp of revelation. Revelation itself is "knowledge from on high" and it is an expression of the knowledge that God has about himself and about everything outside of himself. Wojtyła takes seriously the possibility of this knowledge, as far as it is in God. As he claims, it should be objectively identified with the very essence of God. As the Polish thinker puts it, "God is both the knower and the proper subject of cognition and cognition itself, knowledge itself" (resulting from cognition) (OKCG, p. 55). In God there is no such a thing like a cognitive process; what is in place is pure cognition itself. This of course is not accessible to the human individual; he must rely on the cognitive process where judgments and concepts play major roles. In Judeo-Christian revelation God's knowledge was translated into the conceptual content of revelation through prophets and the Church. The figure of the prophet was typical for the Old Testament; in the New Testament, it is reserved to Jesus Christ. The "Church" as Wojtyła observes, "does not bring in new concepts but explains and deepens this 'knowledge from on high' and brings out new hidden aspects of the truth" (OKCG, p. 57).

The Problem of Personal Faith

Karol Wojtyła undertakes an attempt to describe how faith and reason relate to each other in the personal sphere of the human person. This is an interesting attempt aimed at characterizing what constitutes the act of faith in a broadly understood psychological sphere. Wojtyła is aware that the fact of revelation puts a human creature in a new difficult position. A set of revealed notions and truths is clearly directed at human reason but at the same time also has a broader scope. Reason attempts to deal with these elements, but stumbles upon an absolute mystery which is difficult to "break through" (OKCG, p. 58). This is because the elements of the

revelation come from "on high" that is, from a transcendent realm and are not products of reason itself nor do they belong to a "religious subconscious," as modernists would claim. Christian revelation has the character of an objective fact.

The human being facing this revelation is naturally directed to truth and good; he also entertains, as Wojtyła puts it, "the hunger for God" (OKCG, p. 59). These inner dispositions prompt him to look for God in the world because he preliminarily appears as an apex of truth and good. Thus, the human being initially tries to look for a kind of getting closer to God and grasp a deeper knowledge of God by following his natural cognitive drives. Christian revelation contains a number of elements which can satisfy this natural tendency by presenting a set of theoretical concepts as well as "a specific program of good." Wojtyła interestingly points out that this complex character of revelation, namely possessing both theoretical and practical elements, is particularly important. Revelation concerns the whole human being; it "strikes" – as this thinker puts it – all his important centers, specifically those highest ones, namely reason and will (OKCG, p. 60). The Christian God who is manifested as the highest good caters to real expectations of the human being. Wojtyła points out directly that all which is achieved on the level of metaphysics, resulting in the discovery of the First Cause and stemming from these conclusions about the absolute good, are but very general and abstract indicators. However, the Christian God in turn personally comes into contact with life, particularly with human life.

Nevertheless, there is a tension between what "pure" human reason attains and what is offered by the content of revelation. Revealed truths do not provide human reason with an inner obviousness; the latter is not able to permeate these truths let alone understand them fully. However, an act of assent is possible, as Wojtyła admits. He elaborates on it by claiming that "The essence of faith [...] in its psychological structure [...] is not knowledge, that is, a set of self-evident concepts strictly arranged according to the logical laws of implications and results, but it rests on the act of rational assent (*rationabile obsequium*)" (OKCG, p. 62). This act of assent is of course strictly associated with reason and that is why it is guided by a certain criterion, the so-called criterion of reliability – *motiva credibilitatis*. Wojtyła points to two groups of such criteria: inner and subjective, and objective and content-related (OKCG, p. 64-66). The inner and subjective criteria, for example, consists in a feeling of inner peace and happiness, satisfying man's highest spiritual aspirations; the objective and content-related criteria in turn, are focused on the content of the revealed doctrine. They stem from an assessment of its sublimity and excellence, from demands put before the human creature, from profound concepts used to explain the most important issues, and from credibility of the founder of a given religion and its main representatives (in our case Jesus Christ and apostles).

The act of faith in its essence, however, is made up of the content of revelation coming from without, including strict mysteries, where the authority of God plays a fundamental role. To reason remains the role of explaining the act of assent, namely explaining its own conviction of truthfulness in what he believes. Wojtyła observes that the act of assent does not create the act of faith as if all was given through inference from the criterion of reliability. The act of assent comes only into the psychological structure of the act of faith; the act of faith understood as a virtue of faith is ultimately formed and organized in us by a supernatural influence called the grace of faith. At any rate, what we have here is a demonstration (maybe preliminary) of what is deeply human – reason and will – participating in what is in its essence strictly supernatural.

Let us elaborate more on this highly interesting encounter of what is human with what is divine in the act of faith. God communicates to us human beings his wisdom, knowledge and his essence. Although these elements exceed the faculty of reason, God does not carry it out by violating the rational human being but – as Wojtyła stresses – he joins in gently and discreetly in the world of human thinking, desiring, feeling, and imagination respecting our specific sensitivity (OKCG, p. 63). God expects a kind of cooperation with a proper grace of faith from all these human centers by respecting their modes of operation. As he puts it, what we have here is a progressive opening for the influence of the First Act who shows up not only as the First Cause but as the Person.

What about the participation of reason in the very act of faith? Wojtyła contends that the criterion of reliability mostly determines the participation of reason in the act of faith. Faith, as is known from our experience does not lead us to a happy consciousness of the penetration of truth. This is usually typical for reason operations when they have been realized properly in the realm of natural entities. However, a psychological state of faith is rather characterized by a kind of tension ("tension field" – as Wojtyła puts it). We experience within it a kind of inner "weighing"; a kind of a back and forth move between faith and reason. This weighing does not amount to doubts or breakdowns; it is rather a picture of the dynamics of rational faith. As Wojtyła points further, "faith constantly challenges our reason, lifting it from its natural plane. Reason takes the impulses of faith and processes them" (OKCG, p. 64). The Polish thinker considers these steps as constituents of the act of assent.

Thus, the formation of the act of faith is deeply marked by a strictly human involvement as a rational creature. But it would be fruitless if this kind of attempt was not completed by a supernatural grace of faith. As Wojtyła claims, only this supernatural input brings about in our mind a deep assent for the revealed truth; this grace from "on high" puts us human creatures

before the supernatural reality, puts us in a just way before God (OKCG, p. 72). Hence, we cannot fully explain the virtue of faith in the light of natural factors and tendencies. Consequently, on the level of cognition, an impartial observer is not able to explain all this richness which is associated with the supernatural essence of faith. Only when we penetrate a content of faith from a theological standpoint, do we have a deeper insight into that supernatural essence, even if it is not absolute; the latter will be typical for the beatific vision, *visio beatifica*.

Now we can complete our structure of the act of faith by pointing to a deeper correlation between the psychological aspect of faith and its real source. The act of assent – in Wojtyła's conviction – looks for a commensurate justification in the criteria of reliability; but in fact, it is constituted on the deeper level of participation of the human reason in the cognition (and knowledge) of God. This we can call the grace of faith in a strict sense. Because only grace "draws us in" to the live current of the inner life of God (OKCG, p. 79), particularly in the self-cognition of God and his knowledge about everything else (God who knows both his own essence and all other things in himself).

Wojtyła concludes his investigations by pointing out that the reality of faith, including its rational and theological aspects, is a kind of experiencing of the human mind into the truth of God and the knowledge of God himself (OKCG, p. 83). Faith is almost constantly on the brink of mystery but this fact does not mean that the state of the believer's mind must result in a kind of "trembling" or uncertainty. If the believer skillfully cooperates with God's grace, then the faith settles in more thoroughly. If he works on his inner, spiritual life systematically, not only is his assent strengthened and deepened but it is also transformed into a new awareness of his relation with God and participation in the Divine life. Wojtyła is convinced that when this is the case, the believer not only believes in God as a separate reality but enters into and is an active participant in God's life (OKCG, p. 83).

Conclusions

Karol Wojtyła's investigations into the cognition of God seem to belong to philosophy, particularly to metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, as well as to dogmatic theology. He avoids two possible extremes in his approach to this topic, namely rationalism and fideism, and quite clearly subscribes to Thomistic philosophy and Christian (Catholic) theology, although some further traces of Augustinian thinking are also noticeable (e. g. a set of subjective criteria of reliability). He develops his conception where both reason and faith play their important roles and moreover, are strictly connected to each other. This important bond shows us clearly

that the act of faith is equally a result of God's grace coming from on high and of human rational tendencies and quests. Thus, a mature form of religious faith is something that not only gives us an access to divine reality but also helps us to advance our higher faculties and powers; it is something that opens up new transcendent horizons for us and provides us with a new epistemological stance. Wojtyła declares that faith "is not an impairment of reason." He also denies that faith suppresses "the cognitive possibilities of human reason." The opposite is true, faith draws "them into the supernatural orbit of higher divine cognition" given through faith (OKCG, p. 23). If this is the case, then faith is not oppressive to human nature but stimulates it to unfold its potentialities and, in this way, faith contributes significantly to the promotion of our humanity, namely to its fulfilment.

Wojtyła's analyses seem to have paved a way to his encyclical letter which he would publish years later as Pope John Paul II, namely *Fides et Ratio*.[5] In this document, the reader will notice a number of similar points, particularly this interesting interdependence between faith and reason. It even seems that the treatise "On the Knowability and Cognition of God" may well have been a preparatory document for *Fides et ratio* and gave Wojtyła forty more years to refine his thinking on this important problem. Regardless of its later evolution, the text in its original form can serve as a good commentary on the relationship between faith and reason. Thus, we are better prepared to understand the opening declaration of the encyclical: "faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth"[6] and that truth – is God himself.

[5] Marian Jaworski, who was a close collaborator of Karol Wojtyła in the field of philosophy as well as in various church activities, claims that this treatise can serve as an introduction to *Fides et ratio*. See M. Jaworski, "Wprowadzenie," in: *O poznawalności i poznaniu Boga. Zarys zagadnień* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo św. Stanisława BM, 2000), 8.
[6] John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, Introduction.

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The Common Good According to Karol Wojtyła: A Personalist Approach

Juan Manuel Burgos[1]

Abstract

This article analyzes Karol Wojtyła's vision of the common good. In the first place, it presents the central criterion on which Wojtyła bases his vision: the primacy of the person over society. Then it analyzes the concepts of participation and alienation. It then proceeds to analyze the different models of social interaction found in Wojtyła's texts: society, community, neighbor-system and *communio personarum*. Based on this set of premises, the incorrect way to understand the common good in individualistic and collectivist societies is shown. And, afterwards, the way in which Wojtyła understands it. The common good is the good that includes at the same time the good of the individual persons and the good of society and it is achieved through participation. Finally, the article shows several attitudes towards the common good. The authentic ones: solidarity, opposition, and dialogue. And the inauthentic ones: conformism and avoidance.

Keywords

Karol Wojtyła, common good, personalism, participation, alienation, individualism, totalitarianism

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Karol Wojtyła lived most of his life in collectivist and dictatorial societies, first under the Nazis and later under the communists, which forced him to reflect in depth on the status of the common good, that is, the appropriate balance in the relationship between the person and society. The reflection on this point, therefore, did not consist only of a suggestive theoretical investigation for him, but also a way of trying to solve an existential problem, which, in addition, affected the people who were under his intellectual or pastoral influence. How should the necessary and essential collaboration with society be structured when this society was collectivist and ominous? Under these conditions, of what did the common good of society consist? What attitudes should be adopted towards the common good? These are the questions that Wojtyła needed to resolve and which, in accordance with his proverbial interest in unifying theory and action, he sought to answer not only through his collaboration with Solidarność or his support for the religious demands of the workers of Nowa Huta, but through a theoretical response. This response is what we are going to present below, starting with the fundamental premise that structures all Wojtyłian social thought: the primacy of the person.

We also consider that the present study shows the original character of Wojtyła's thought which, starting from Thomistic and phenomenological bases, always went further, developing its own perspective within the framework of a personalism that can be called ontological or integral. We will see, in fact, how his solution to the problem of the common good, although starting from the classical perspective, was reached in a different framework based on the personalist anthropological thought developed in *Person and Action* in which subjectivity plays a decisive role.

The Primacy of the Person

To speak about the common good is to speak of the adequate relationship between the person and society, the way in which both must participate in the construction of a collective project, which requires a determination on the relative value of the person and society. Wojtyła had a clear and determined answer for this question: the primacy of the person over society. As is known, Wojtyła was deeply involved in the destiny of his city (Krakow), his nation (Poland) and, later, once he became John Paul II, in the desinty of the entire world. But this involvement was always founded and structured from a fundamental premise: the primacy of man, based on his absolute dignity and its successful legal translation, as seen in the *Universal Declaration of*

Human Rights promoted by the United Nations in 1949. So, it is not surprising that he considered it to be "a real milestone on the path of the moral progress of humanity—the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. The governments and States of the world have understood that, if they are not to attack and destroy each other, *they must unite*. The real way, the fundamental *way to this is through each human being*, through the definition and recognition of and respect for the inalienable rights of individuals and of the communities of peoples."[2]

This priority of the person over society is theoretically based on *Person and Act*,[3] his *opus magnum*, in which the analysis of the person is carried out, mainly, through an analysis of the individual person and their characteristics: self-determination, self-possession, transcendence, integration, and self-realization. Some relationalist thinkers didn't like this view at the time of the publication of this work because for them the person is constructed mainly through relationship, which would mean that a consistent analysis of the person could only be established by analyzing their relationships with other people. A procedure that Wojtyła had not followed. But Wojtyła explicitly rejects this criticism while maintaining the validity of his analysis.

> In the discussion published in *Analecta Cracoviensia* […] this semantic specifity of "participation" met with both understanding and polemics [by Leszek Kuc] […]. This polemics offered both a substantive and a methodological counterproposal to *Person and Act*. According to this counterproposal, the fundamental cognition of man as a person in one that emerges in his relation to other persons. The author himself appreciates the significance of such cognition. However, after thinking over the counterarguments, he still mmaintains that a through knowledge of the subject in himself (of the person though the act) opens the way to a more through understanding of human intersubjectivity. Without such categories as "self-possession" or "self-governence" we will never be able to properly understand the person in relation to other persons.[4]

[2] John Paul II, *Address to UN Assembly* (1979), no. 7.

[3] K. Wojtyła, *Persona y acción* (Madrid: Palabra, 2013). For this text and the others by Karol Wojtyła we use the Spanish versions published by Ediciones Palabra, which are translated directly from Polish. The most up-to-date English version is *Person and Act and Related Essays*, trans. by G. Ignatik (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021).

[4] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 387. In support of Kuc's position see J.M. Coll, "Karol Wojtyła, entre las filosofías de la persona y el personalismo dialógico," in: J.M. Burgos (ed.), *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła* (Madrid: Palabra, 2011), 217. Our position is supported, among others, by S. Lozano, *La interpersonalidad en Karol Wojtyła* (Valencia: Edicep, 2016).

Wojtyła opposes relationalism because he understands that the person is self-contained, a *suppositum* who can (and should) be analyzed by himself. Furthermore, it is only through this analysis that it will be possible to proceed to the understanding of the interpersonal relationship, which is precisely a relationship between persons. It is not, of course, a one-way relationship that always goes from the person to the relationship. The interpersonal relationship also influences the person, but in a secondary way because the primacy belongs to the subject. A thesis that, in another context, he emphasizes again by affirming the existence of a double priority of man over praxis: metaphysical and praxeological.[5] This priority, naturally, does not eliminate the fact that the person can only become fully a person in collaboration with others, in acting "together with others," giving himself to others and building the common good. The priority or ontological primacy of the person does not lead to or presuppose any type of solipsism or egocentrism. It only provides the fundamental framework in the person-society relationship. The person is the one who has primacy and who possesses dignity, a particularly precious affirmation for those who have lived most of their lives in totalitarian societies.

Once we have set out this key point, it is time to proceed to the concrete analysis of the person-society relationship. And, for this, we must begin by presenting the two fundamental schemes of the I-you relationship: participation and its opposite, alienation.

Participation and alienation

a) Participation

The key concept that Wojtyła uses to thematize the person-society relationship or, in his terminology, the way in which the person acts together with others is participation. This is a complex concept that has two versions or, perhaps more precisely, two faces.[6] In the first meaning it is understood as a property of the person, which, together with transcendence, self-determination, integration, and self-realization, constitutes the complex vision of the person elaborated by Wojtyła in *Person and Act*. From this point of view, participation is a quality of the human person, thanks to which he can interact with others while maintaining the personalistic value of the action. Participation as a property of the person determines the fact

[5] See K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of the constitution of Culture Through Human Person," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, trans. by Th. Sandok (Peter Lang, New-York – San Francisco – Bern – Baltimore – Frankfurt am Main – Berlin – Wien – Paris, 2008), 263-275.

[6] Participation seeks, among other objectives, to replace Husserlian intersubjectivity whose structure is mainly cognitive (see Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, note 1, 377-378).

that by acting "together with others" the person performs the act and fulfills himself in it. Thus, participation determines the personalistic value of all cooperation.[7] But the main perspective that interests us here is the second, according to which participation is a peculiar type of interpersonal relationship in which the person jointly constructs himself and society.[8] Wojtyłian participation, in fact, does not occur in every relationship, but only in those in which the subject, by relating and carrying out a task together with others, grows as a person.

> *Thus participation denotes a property of the person himself, an interior and homogeneous property* that determines the fact that by existing and acting "together with others" the person exists and acts as a person. Concerning action itself, participation as a property of the person determines the fact that by acting "together with others" the person performs the act and fulfills himself in it. Thus, participation determines the personalistic value of all cooperation. Cooperation – or, more specifically, action "together with others" – without participation deprives the acts of the person of their "personalistic" value.[9]

It is easy to understand why Wojtyła makes this very important clarification. It is common to exalt interpersonal relationships, highlighting the importance of communities, mutual help, and coexistence with others. But real life is also full of situations in which these relationships are destructive. It is not enough, therefore, to highlight the centrality of interpersonal relationships in human existence in order to build a valid theory of social relationships. The content, quality and value of these relationships must be specified to facilitate a more precise and accurate analysis. And precisely here is where we must frame the Wojtyłian proposal of a special type of relationship in which the subject constructs himself together with others in participation.

To fully understand this notion, it is important, first of all, to get rid of philosophical reminiscences that could even lead to Plato, one of the first to use this term. These references, in effect, are completely useless. Wojtyła only takes common language into account here. Participation, for him, is nothing more than collaborating with others in some kind of task or objective. He specifies its exact meaning in his philosophical system: there is only participation when the task that is carried out together with others and builds the subject as a person.

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[7] *Ibid.*, 385. See C.S. García, *La participación según Karol Wojtyła, cualidad del ser humano para construir la comunidad en el ámbito postmoderno*, doctoral thesis (Mexico: Universidad Anáhuac, 2015).
[8] The most detailed treatment of this topic so far has been carried out by Lozano, *La interpersonalidad en Karol Wojtyła*.
[9] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 386.

Participation understood in this sense, adds Wojtyła to complete his position, is not something that can simply happen or not happen. It is first, a right that every person possesses. The right to act and put into play the personal value of the action, that is, the right to build oneself as a person by acting together with others. A right that society should not hinder or limit. Since the person self-realizes in participation, he or she consequently has the right to participate, because it is the way in which he or she reaches personal fulfillment. For this reason, any limitation of this right supposes an action against the person and their dignity. And it has consequences:

> the inefficiency of the economic system, which is not to be considered simply as a technical problem, but rather as a consequence of the violation of the human rights to private initiative, to ownership of property and to freedom in the economic sector.[10]

Correlatively, this right is accompanied by the *duty* to participate, that is, the (moral) obligation on the part of the person to act in such a way that self-realization is achieved and the personalistic value of the action is maintained. It is not so much a concrete duty in reference to a specific norm, but rather "…*the norm of its personal subjectivity*, the "interior" norm *whose purpose is to safeguard the person's self-determination* and thus his efficacy, as well as his transcendence and integration in the act,"[11] that is, his personal value. In other words, the person must participate because only then can he build up himself and others. And, therefore, it should not be surprising that the duty of participation can be understood as a modulation of the commandment of love, as long as it is kept in mind that

> what we define as the commandment of love at its elemental, basic level (even, in a certain sense, pre-ethical) is an invitation to experience the human being as "another self," that is, an invitation to participate in that humanity, concretized in his person as my humanity is concretized in my person.[12]

[10] John Paul II, Enc. *Centessimus annus* (1991), no. 24.
[11] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 389.
[12] K. Wojtyła, "¿Participación o alienación?," in: K. Wojtyła, *El hombre y su destino* (Madrid: Palabra, 2009), 121 (trans. by autor; cf. english trans.: "On the basic, elementary, preethical level, so to speak, the commandment of love is simply the call to experience another human being as another *I*, the call to participate in another's humanity, which is concretized in the person of the oterh just as mine is in my person" (K. Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 203)). This connection is consolidated in Wojtyła through his peculiar vision of the personalist norm. See U. Ferrer, "La conversión del imperativo categórico kantiano en norma personalista," in: Burgos, *La filosofía personalista de Karol Wojtyła*, 57-69.

b) Alienation

The antithesis of participation is *alienation*, the relationship that destroys man or depersonalizes him. When participation occurs, man is capable of building a collective project that, at the same time, enables him to realize himself because both society and others consider him and treat him as a human being, with absolute dignity. But this does not always happen. Man can also activate destructive interpersonal relationships such as enmity and violence, hate, jealousy, or envy. Or even social structures such as those of totalitarian regimes where human beings are turned into things or objects to be immolated to obtain collective ends. While participation generates a personal and collective increase in humanity, alienation produces the strictly opposite effects: "the weakening or even annulment of the possibility of experiencing another human being as "another self" and this due to a certain distortion of the scheme "I-other.""[13]

Wojtyła strongly emphasizes, however, that human beings are always in a position to overcome a structurally alienating context. Individual people achieved it, even in situations as extreme as concentration camps (Maximilian Kolbe); and entire societies such as Spain, Ukraine and Poland have also achieved it at different historical moments. But a structurally alienating social configuration turns participation into a heroic action (personal or collective), which is not desirable. Therefore, fundamental respect for the basic relationship or *I-you scheme* is the fundamental social requirement that makes participation possible and becomes the touchstone that men must achieve to affirm their humanity. "Even communities, societies, human groups, programs, or ideologies, in this scheme and through it, ultimately show their value. They are "human" to the extent that they actualize this scheme."[14]

Alienation, in the collective philosophical ideology, is a concept of Marxist origin, so it might be surprising that Wojtyła gives it such relevant weight. But, apart from the fact that Wojtyła never had difficulties in assuming what he considered valuable in other philosophies,

[13] Wojtyła, "¿Participación o alienación?," 125 (trans. by autor; cf. english trans.: "It devastates the *I-other* relationship, weakens the ability to experience another human being as another *I*, and inhibits the posiibility of friendship and the spontaneous power of community (*communio personarum*)" (Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 206)).

[14] Wojtyła, "¿Participación o alienación?," 129 (trans. by autor; cf. english trans.: "The foregoing analysis leads me to conclude that although we may live and act in common with others in various societies, communities, and social groups, and although this life and activity may be accompanied by a basic awareness of each other's humanity, this alone does not actualize participation in that humanity" (Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 202)).

his vision of alienation is different from the Marxist one, which focuses on the economic-productive dimension.[15]

> Marxism criticized capitalist bourgeois societies, blaming them for the commercialization and alienation of human existence. This rebuke is of course based on a mistaken and inadequate idea of alienation, derived solely from the sphere of relationships of production and ownership, that is, giving them a materialistic foundation and moreover denying the legitimacy and positive value of market relationships even in their own sphere. Marxism thus ends up by affirming that only in a collective society can alienation be eliminated. However, the historical experience of socialist countries has sadly demonstrated that collectivism does not do away with alienation but rather increases it, adding to it a lack of basic necessities and economic inefficiency.[16]

Alienation, in short, does not depend mainly on external structures but on the position of the human being in the world, which is what Marxism did not see. Structures derive from people, and not the other way around; and the same thing happens with alienation. Its origin is none other than the reduction of the person to a thing through the non-recognition of his personal character and everything that that character carries with it, such as the possibility of self-determination and transcendence. Therefore, "the transformation of the structures of the social existence of human beings is certainly necessary in the conditions of contemporary civilization. But the participation of every human being in the humanity of others, of other men, is no less necessary."[17]

Society, Community, *Communio personarum*

Once the essential keys of the interpersonal relationship, or, in his terminology, of the I-you scheme, have been established, Wojtyła offers his vision of social organization in two powerful

[15] "When we ask, therefore, what is the essential relationship of work, we ask about the relationship between the worker and production" (K. Marx, *Manuscritos de economía y filosofía* (Madrid: Alianza, 2001), 109)).
[16] John Paul II, *Centessimus annus*, no. 41.
[17] Wojtyła, "¿Participación o alienación?", 131 (trans. by autor; cf. english trans.: "This does not mean that there in no need to transform the structures of the social existence of human beings in the conditions of modern civilisation. It only means that the fundamental issue reamins always the participation of every human being in the humanity of another human being, ther people" (Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation?", in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 206))

perspectives, although with different degrees of development. The first is found in the decisive last chapter of *Person and Act*; the second, in later works.

a) Community-system and Neighbor-system

Wojtyła's first proposal to structure the social world is found in *Person and Act* where he distinguishes, first of all, two types of communities, those of existing and those of acting.[18] The communities of existence are those in which the subject exists and inhabits without this existence depending, to a large extent, on their activity, since they somehow precede it and are already configured as happens with the family and the nation. On the contrary, action communities derive from human action: jobs in which masters and apprentices interact, or other types of professional configurations (like the Tönnies or Maritain societies). But, these communities, although distinct, are not completely independent.

> However, a community of being always conditions a community of acting, and therefore we cannot consider the latter in separation from the former. For a serious problem resides in the fact that *membership in these communities is still not the same as participation*.[19]

The last part of this text is of decisive importance because it concerns what Wojtyła really cares about: the capacity of social systems to generate participation. And, noting that in none of the communities that he has described, participation is assured, he introduces a new type of social structure, which he calls the neighbor-system to resolve this difficulty. Indeed, both the communities of existing and those of acting are powerful sources of identity for the subject and so, every person needs to belong to a town, club, tribe, nation, or social group or to several of these communities simultaneously. But, since Wojtyła is very aware of the value of belonging, he is also aware of the danger that can arise if it is overvalued, that is, if the human being is only considered a person in the full sense when he is a member of a community. Or, put another way, when the subject is only admitted to the community to the extent that he resembles the other members. This is a straight path towards alienation. What happens with those who are different, with strangers or foreigners? Should they be excluded from the community and therefore from participation?

[18] Wojtyła starts from Tönnies' traditional distinction between (artificial) society and (natural) community but ends up modifying it and offering a different proposal. See F. Tönnies, *Community and society* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1947).
[19] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 395.

To solve this difficulty, Wojtyła presents the neighbor-system, an (ideal) type of social structure to which one belongs for the sole reason of being a man, for sharing the same humanity, regardless of the specific characteristics that each human being possesses.

> The concept "neighbor" considers, that is, it *takes into account, humanity itself*, which is possessed by every "other" man just as "I" myself possess it. Thus, the concept "neighbor" creates the broadest plane of community, a plane reaching further than any "otherness," including that which results from membership in various human communities.[20]

This does not imply, however, any rejection of communities, because both systems are necessary. The community generates belonging by introducing the subject into specific societies and contexts, something that every person needs. For this reason, the mission of the neighbor-system is not to oppose the community-system, but, on the contrary, to sustain or purify it, facilitating participation in it, that is, that the community does not consist only in a place where the similar can live but a space in which the person can build himself up as a person.[21] And, precisely for this reason, the neighbor-system is the most basic and fundamental, since it is the only one that recognizes any human being as a neighbor and someone close simply by being a man.

b) Community, Society and *Communio personarum*

The original and powerful distinction between the neighbor-system and the community does not seem, however, to have satisfied Wojtyła completely because he would later affirm in *Person and Act* that there is not a theory of community, an issue that he will try to resolve in his second most important writing on social philosophy, *Person: Subject and Community*. The method that he is going to use, and that he already used successfully in *Person and Act*, consists of trying to introduce subjectivity into theories in which it is not considered. Specifically, he will return again to the traditional distinction between community and society but now introducing the subjective dimension in the community to enable the generation of a collective

[20] *Ibid*., 409.
[21] "*The ability to participate in the very humanity of every man constitutes the core of all participation*" (*ibid.*, 411).

or group consciousness as presented in the "we."[22] Society, then, arises, in a classical way, when a certain group of people are united by an objective characteristic that is common to each and every one of them. But the community – this is the novelty – considers the subjectivity of individuals. Therefore,

> the community is not the society, and the society is not the community. Although for the purposes of one and the other the same elements are largely determining factors, however, we conceive them under different aspects, and this constitutes an important difference.[23]

Wojtyła, however, does not seem to have been very satisfied with this characterization of the community either. Also, over time, he seems to have definitively abandoned the idea of defining the community due to its excessively generic nature, in favor of the expression "*communio personarum*," a terminological creation of his with which he seeks to identify those social relationships that structurally enable participation. And so, when in *Man and Woman He Created Them* he strives to find a term that would allow him to adequately describe the male-female unit, he affirms:

> One could also use the term "community" here, if it were not so generic and did not have so many meanings. "*Communio"* says more and with greater precision, because *it indicates precisely the "help" that derives, in some way from the very fact of existing as a person "beside" a person*.[24]

[22] Another contemporary revision of this traditional distinction can be found in Z. Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World (Themes for the 21st Century)* (Maiden: Polity, 2013). And a comparison between both in C. Sánchez, *Construction of Community in Postmodern Times: Two Poles in Dialogue: Zygmunt Bauman and Karol Wojtyła* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2016).

[23] See K. Wojtyła, *Persona: sujeto y comunidad*, in: Wojtyła, *El hombre y su destino*, 77 (trans. by autor; cf. english trans.: "A community is not simply a society, and a society in not simply a community. Even though the same elements may to a large extent go into the makeup of both realities, we apprehend them in different aspects, and this adds up to an important difference" (K. Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 239)).

[24] K. Wojtyła – John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them. A Theology of the Body* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 136. The same idea in K. Wojtyła, *Sources of Renewal. The Implementation of the Second Vatican Council*, trans. by P.S. Falla (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) 61: "'union in truth and charity' is the ultimate expression of the community of individuals. This union merits the name of communion (*communio*), which signifies more than community (*communitas*). The Latin word *communio* denotes a relationship between persons that is proper to them alone; and it indicates the good that they do to one another, giving and receiving within that mutual relationship."

The *communio personarum,* therefore, is his last and definitive choice to describe human groups structurally configured in such a way that participation is possible.[25]

Two Inadequate Visions of the Common Good: Individualism and Collectivism

We already have the framework that allows us to confront Wojtyła's position on the common good since we have the key elements of his way of understanding the person-society relationship. We will begin by presenting his vision of the common good or a presumed common good in two incorrect types of configurations of the person-society relationship: individualism and collectivism.[26]

"Individualism" can be understood in several ways, but its core, present in any version, consists in affirming the primacy of the isolated individual over society. Consequently, "*individualism* advances the good of the individual as the principal and fundamental good to which every community and society must be subordinated."[27] A statement that could be completed by adding that, actually, this society is a very limited entity, since it is nothing more than an aggregate of individuals who interact occasionally and randomly without a common objective. In any case, the fundamental problem of individualism in any of its modalities, is that it denies participation, since the individual good is achieved not only in an isolated and independent way but in confrontation with the good of the community, which is not seen as the place where the person can grow, but, on the contrary, as an enemy against which it is necessary to defend oneself. In this way, the mere existence of the common good becomes impossible, since in individualistic societies it is not the good of all, but only the arithmetic sum of the goods of each one.

Contemporary individualism is historically linked to capitalism, which is why the latter has been frequently criticized by personalists, especially by Mounier.[28] We do not, however, find in Wojtyła a criticism of capitalism (nor do we in John Paul II), perhaps because his existence in a communist society immunized him against excessively superficial or biased evaluations. There is general agreement among personalists on the need to oppose the wild

[25] This is, for example, the case of the family. See K. Wojtyła, *La familia como* communio personarum. *Ensayo de interpretación teológica,* in: K. Wojtyła, *El don del amor. Escritos sobre la familia* (Madrid: Palabra 2000) 227-271.
[26] Wojtyła positions himself on this point in terms very similar to those of other personalist authors such as Jacques Maritain in *La personne et le bien commun* (Oeuvres complètes, vol. IX), Emmanuel Mounier or Martin Buber.
[27] Wojtyła, *Person and Act,* 390.
[28] See E. Mounier, *Manifesto at the service of personalism,* in *Personalism. Essential Anthology* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 2002) and E. Mounier, *Comunismo, anarquía, personalismo* (Madrid: Zero, 1973).

capitalism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but some of them (including Wojtyła) think that to apply that same critique to the market economy of the mid and late 20th century would be unfair and inappropriate. A nuance perhaps difficult to appreciate for those who live comfortably in a capitalist society, but not for those who have lived for decades in a communist country.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Encyclical *Centessimus Annus*, John Paul II offers a positive assessment of contemporary capitalism or, much more precisely, of the market economy. Actually, to the question about whether capitalism could help solve the social problems that the world was facing in the 1990s, he answers in this way:

> If by "capitalism" is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a "business economy", "market economy" or simply "free economy." But if by "capitalism" is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is certainly negative.[29]

In short, egocentric individualism – no, an economic market system respectful of human dignity and spirituality – yes.

Regarding collectivism or, in his terminology, objective totalitarianism, Wojtyła, as expected, radically rejects it because it does not accept the primacy of the person in society. On the contrary: "*objective totalism* proposes a quite contrary principle—it fully subordinates the individual and his good to the community and society."[30] But, on top of this known and accepted thesis, he adds an original and, at first glance, surprising idea. He affirms that the vision of the human being in individualism and in collectivism is the same to the point that he defines collectivism as anti-individualism or individualism in reverse.

[29] John Paul II, *Centessimus annus*, no. 42. See M. Novak, *The Catholic Ethic, and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1993). As we mentioned at the beginning, we use this magisterial text here because its connection with Wojtyła's thought is certain.
[30] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 390.

The reason, naturally, lies not in the respective characteristic social configurations, which are mutually opposed, but in the anthropology that supports them, which, in his opinion, shares a negative vision of man. In totalitarianism, as in individualism,

> What dominates in it is the need for *protection against the individual*, who is basically considered an enemy of the community and of the common good. Because it is presupposed that in the individual there is only the striving for his own good and no disposition to fulfill himself in acting and existing "together with others"—no property of participation—the common good can be achieved only by limiting the individual. Only this sense of the common good is presumed in advance. This good cannot be one that corresponds to the individual, one that he is capable of choosing on the basis of participation, but can only be one that must hinder and limit the individual.[31]

In conclusion. Both individualism and collectivism or totalitarianism propose limited and partial visions of the common good. The first, in fact, does not have an idea of the common good that goes beyond the mere sum of individual goods. And for the second, the common good consists only of the good of society to which the person must submit. In Maritain's synthetic expression, which Wojtyła would undoubtedly accept:

> The common good of the city, in short, is not the simple collection of private goods, nor the good of a whole (such as the species, for example, with respect to individuals, or the hive with respect to bees) which only looks out for itself and sacrifices the parts. It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in the good life; it is, therefore, common to the whole and to the parts, to which it returns and which it must benefit under penalty of becoming distorted.[32]

[31] *Ibid.*, 391 (our italics).

[32] J. Maritain, *La personne et le bien commun,* 200 (trans. by author ; cf. english trnas.: "The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole which, like the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with respect to its bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it" (J. Maritain, "The Person and the Common Good," *The Review of Politics* Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct. 1946) trans. by J.J. FitzGerald, 437.

The Common Good according to Wojtyła: the Joint Construction of the Person and the Community

Karol Wojtyła's vision of the common good is framed in the context of personalism,[33] and, more specifically, in his own view about personalism that we call Integral Personalism.[34] We'll now only focus, however, on the point that concerns us: his vision of the common good.

The main problem faced by any characterization of the common good in the personalist framework is its problematic and contradictory structure since there seems to be a certain natural opposition between the social good and the personal good. The expropriation of some land, for example, may be good for the community by allowing the construction of a highway, but it leaves the owner without his land that, perhaps, belonged to his ancestors and he has worked on for years; the growing number of traffic rules reduces the number of accidents but increasingly limits and restricts the freedom of drivers even in minimal aspects, etc. Individualism and collectivism would solve this problem by eliminating the balance between person-individual and society. As individualism gives primacy to the self-centered individual the problem would be "solved" giving priority to individuals and thus eliminating as much as possible the collective rules. And the opposite would happen in collectivism. As the common good is that which benefits society, great value should not be placed on the needs or interests of individuals. But, if, as happens in personalism, one wants to maintain the balance between the two terms of the relationship, how is this notable difficulty, which Maritain called the paradox of social life, resolved[35]?

Wojtyła approaches his solution to this issue starting from the traditional scholastic vision that affirms that the common good is the end which is achieved through a common action that produces the good for all, the good of the community. Thus, the common good of a group of workers who excavate consists of carrying out the planned and commissioned excavation; that of a group of students who attend a class, to learn the lesson, etc. This way of thinking is framed in the context of classical teleology and its linear way of establishing the means-end

[33] See J.M. Burgos, *An Introduction to Personalism* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2018); J.O. Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism. Origins and Early Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and J.N. Mortensen, *The Common Good. An Introduction to Personalism* (Wilmington: Vernon Press, 2017).

[34] See J.M. Burgos, "Wojtyła's Personalism as Integral Personalism. The future of an Intellectual Project," *Questionaes Disputatae*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2019), 91-111.

[35] See J.M. Burgos, "La paradoja de la vida social. Un análisis del bien común en Jacques Maritain," in: J.H. Gentile (ed.), *La persona humana y el bien común* (Córdoba: Altera Ediciones, 2012) 51-75.

relationship. There is an objective (end) to achieve and, if this is achieved though the appropriate means, the common good is achieved too. The correct use of the means leads to the effective and efficient achievement of the ends and, through them, the collective good.

Wojtyła sees positive elements in this description, but at the same time points out that it is "too provisional and too superficial."[36] The main problem that it presents is that it does not include the subjective dimension of the action and, when subjectivity is missing, anthropology and ethics suffer because they are working on a limited and poor idea of the person which extends to the concepts that they produce. Wojtyła, on the contrary, considers that "[t]he common good can in no way be defined without also taking into consideration the subjective moment, that is, the moment of action in relation to the *acting persons*."[37] You cannot think of the common good as mere "things"; as the mere production of objects, of any kind, without considering what happens to the people who produce them. Furthermore, based on the priority of the person over things, the common good must and does depend mainly on people and what happens to them, not on the products of their action. This is the appropriate path to harmonize the authentic common good with participation, overcoming a purely instrumental vision of action with others. When this does not happen, when one is not able to capture the subjective dimension of the action, the common good is transformed into pure objectivity, into a mere "something" that can even become anti-personal ceasing to be an authentic common good. If the construction of the excavation or the increase in production in a factory is carried out through the physical or economic exploitation of the workers, the common good has not been carried out, but rather, on the contrary, alienation has been generated.

The true common good, Wojtyła thinks, must be "the truly personalistic structure of human existence in community"[38] that makes it possible, through participation, to produce at the same time a good for the person and for the community. This is the way, brilliant in our opinion, in which Wojtyła resolves the Maritainian "social paradox," that is, the presumed or possible opposition between the common good and the personal good. When the person faces an authentic common good, this does not oppose his personal good. On the contrary, both overlap and enhance each other, because the person, by working for that common good, also works for themself. In short, the common good includes the personal good.

[36] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 397.
[37] *Ibid.*, 397-398 (our italics).
[38] *Ibid.*, 398.

It is now possible to face another classic dilemma that is a new twist on the same problem. Who has primacy in the realm of good: the common good or the individual good? Scholasticism has generally sustained the primacy of the common good over the individual[39] based on the axiom that the good of the whole is greater than the good of the parts. But this statement, if not properly dealt with, could probably lead to an unwanted but real and effective collectivism: the good of the person should be submitted to the social whole, because the whole is greater than the person. This difficulty can be solved in two ways. In the first place, noting that this logical affirmation is not valid for persons, as all the personalists have maintained, because the human being, unlike animals, is not below the species, but above it, since he has an absolute value.[40]

But, in addition, in the terms in which Wojtyła poses the question, this opposition or dispute dissolves intrinsically since the common good must necessarily include the personal good, since the common good is only valid when it is also the good of the person. We can find a confirmation of the validity of this interpretation in its ability to resolve some of the aporias that derive from the social paradox, such as the justification of sacrifice and, especially, of extreme sacrifices. To what extent should man sacrifice himself for the community? The person, answers Wojtyła, can and should be willing to make sacrifices for the common good, even extreme ones, as long as this sacrifice is not understood in organic or "species-ist" terms, such as the part that has to be sacrificed for the whole or the individual that has to sacrifice himself for the species. And, for this reason, the person cannot and should not renounce his dignity for the community.

Now, he continues, this danger lurks in the teleological conception if participation is not taken into account. In this conception, in fact, the common good can end up becoming a purely numerical and quantitative issue. And then, the lesser must give way to the greater, even if it implies giving up its own good because the good of the whole is more important than the good of the part. But, if this situation is faced through participation, the problem disappears, because when the person sacrifices himself for others, he does so without giving himself up as a person. Even if he must give up his own life, this resignation does not diminish him as a person; on the contrary, it magnifies him if the action is appropriate.

[39] See Ch. de Koninck, *De la primacía del bien común contra los personalistas* (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1952).
[40] "In man, every individual is, so to speak, unique in his species" (L. Pareyson, *Esistenza e persona,* (Genova: Il Melangolo, 1985) 176).

> This sacrifice is not "against nature," for it corresponds in every man to the property of participation and, on the basis of this property, opens to him the path toward fulfillment. Therefore, the primacy of the common good, its superiority in relation to partial and particular goods, does not result merely from the quantitative aspect of society—according to which the common good would be that of many or of a greater number, whereas the partial or particular good would be that of an individual or of a smaller number. *It is not number or even quantitative totality but thoroughness* [gruntowność] *that determines the proper character of the common good.*[41]

In short, a primacy of the common good could be affirmed and accepted, as long as it also includes the individual good, the good of the human person. Now, if the common "good" opposes the dignity of the personal being, it automatically ceases to be the common good, since, in the end, the primacy in the person-society relationship is held by the person.[42] An emblematic case of this ethical dilemma is found in the Austrian peasant Franz Jägerstätter (1907-1943), who refused to enlist in the Austrian army because he was required to take a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler. Jägerstätter did not refuse on principle to enlist in the army since it could be understood that the defense of his country was a civic duty that could obligate him morally. His refusal was due to the fact that this enlistment implied an oath of fidelity to a specific human person (Hitler), completely incompatible with personal autonomy and the dignity of his conscience. So, despite all pressure, Jägerstätter stood by his decision and was consequently executed. But that did not mean his annulment as a person, but, on the contrary, his aggrandizement, although through pain and suffering.[43]

When the common good is understood in this way, it constitutes the foundation of the community, since it unites its members by promoting the good of each and every one. While, if there is no common good, the community weakens and dissolves because each person seeks what is best for them alone. In individualism, the individual seeks his or her good in a society seen as an enemy or as a mere external system capable of satisfying needs. There is no room, therefore, for the creation of interpersonal ties. In fact, it may even be advisable to avoid them

[41] Wojtyła, *Person and Act,* 399 – "The Polish adjective *gruntowny* means "encompassing the whole and entering into the details." In other words, the noun *gruntowność* denotes not only breadth but also depth, since the root of the word is *grunt*, that is, "ground"" (*ibid.*, p. 633).
[42] See point: *The Primacy of the Person*.
[43] Terrence Malik has captured this true story in the magnificent film, *A Hidden Life* (2019). The case of the group of young people from the White Rose is similar. See R. Guardini, "Freedom and responsibility. The White Rose," in: R. Guardini, *Escritos políticos* (Madrid: Palabra, 2011) 13-27.

since every link generates dependency. And there is no common good in collectivism either since the individual is included in the collective project like an ant is in the construction of the anthill, that is, as a tool replaceable by any other that fulfills equivalent functions. When there is participation, however, the situation changes entirely, because acting together with others generates personal bonds in which each subject realizes themselves as a person when trying to achieve a joint objective. Once again, the authentic common good simultaneously constructs the subject-person and the community.[44]

Wojtyła points out, finally, that the erroneous construction of the common good does not always have to be caused by erroneous moral attitudes or by an inadequate social configuration. The origin of this failure may simply be its complexity. Starting with marriage, it is not always easy to establish what the common good consists of since the interests of both spouses do not necessarily coincide since they are different. And this complexity increases and magnifies as we ascend the social scale: community of neighbors, city, a nation of millions of inhabitants.... That's why Wojtyła has no qualms in recognizing that "the common good is a difficult thing. And perhaps it is in principle."[45] But that does not mean that it should not be sought despite every difficulty, since it constitutes the central element of social ethics and the key piece for the construction of any adequate configuration of the social order.

Attitudes towards the Common Good

Finally, Wojtyła considers that, in addition to the indication of what constitutes the common good, the attitudes which enable or impede it must be indicated, because the common good is never something given, but rather must be constructed, since every person carries passions, weaknesses, and fear of commitment. Therefore, the reflection on the common good must be completed with a presentation of the main attitudes that people adopt towards it. And he offers a suggestive analysis of five attitudes divided into two groups: authentic attitudes: solidarity, opposition, and dialogue; and inauthentic attitudes: conformism and avoidance.[46]

[44] Wojtyła specifies that depending on the common good pursued – educational, security, productive, leisure – one type or another of community is generated. "…*in the axiological order*, *the common good determines the community*, the society, or the social group. Each of them is defined on the basis of the common good proper to it" (Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 398).

[45] Wojtyła, *La persona: sujeto y comunidad*, 96 (trans. by author; cf. english trans: "The common good is aften a difficult good; perhaps it is even so in principle" (K. Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 250)).

[46] Wojtyła places these attitudes at a pre-ethical level, a not entirely clear appreciation that seems to suggest, however, that the ethical value of these attitudes could be altered by the context. He himself recognizes, in any case, the subtlety of the distinction, highlighting that "we are constantly moving on the boundary of ontology and

a) Authentic Attitudes: Solidarity, Opposition and Dialogue

Solidarity, in the first place, is defined as "a constant readiness to accept and realize the share that falls to each due to the fact that he is a member of a given community."[47] A definition that is completed by indicating that it is not supportive to assume the burdens and responsibilities of others because each one must be responsible for the part that corresponds to himself since only if one does so will he grow as a person. In other words, you should not collaborate with someone who irresponsibly exempts himself from his duties. Hence, solidarity can lead to the non-invasion of the obligations of others so that each one fulfills the part that corresponds to him in the construction of the common good. There may be times, however, when the correct attitude is the opposite; when someone, for valid reasons, cannot perform his obligations. Therefore, solidarity must include a certain predisposition to carry out extraordinary tasks, a behavior, in any case, that should only be activated when this help is truly essential. Solidarity, in short, does not consist in supplying the work that others must and can carry out, but rather in collaborating when these tasks, for justified reasons, cannot be carried out.

Opposition, for Wojtyła, is also an authentic attitude; furthermore, it is an important way of participation, as long as it is conceived as constructive and not as a closed or sectarian obstruction to any opinion or position different from one's own. Those who oppose constructively do so with the intention of achieving not only their own good, but also that of the community. It has already been pointed out that determining the common good is, in many cases, not a simple and easy task. Furthermore, not everyone always seeks the authentic common good. Therefore, opposing opinions or decisions that are considered to harm the common good is not only an acceptable and justified attitude, since it can allow the cancellation of erroneous decisions or the improvement of inaccurate choices, but it is also valuable and even praiseworthy. Opposition, in fact, would probably involve difficulties, setbacks and the abandonment of the comfort zone since whoever opposes does not go unnoticed.

ethics on account of the axiological aspect, that is, the richness of values that cannot be excluded from the ontology of person and act" (Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 400-401).

[47] *Ibid.* Although the importance of solidarity in Wojtyła is known, there is no detailed treatment of this notion in his philosophical work. See W. Płotka, "Phenomenology, Community, Participation: A Critical Analysis of Wojtyła's Early Theory of Solidarity," *Filosofija Sociologija*, 30 (2019), 174–182 and J.C. Carney, "John Paul II: On the Solidarity of Praxis in His Political Philosophy," in: N. Mardas, A. Curry, G.F. McLean (eds.), *Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Legacy* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008) 183-199.

The third authentic attitude that Wojtyła considers is dialogue and discussion, which are understood in a more combative or intense way than one might expect. Dialogue, debate, and discussion are the natural paths of human existence and are found everywhere, from discussions between parents about the education of their children to debates between statesmen or politicians about the measures to be adopted for the nation. And, since each person or group can be deeply convinced of their ideas, the sharing of opinions and the process that leads to decision-making will often be marked by divergences and logical and reasonable confrontations.[48] These debates, Wojtyła believes, do not cancel participation, but rather create it, because the ideal of participation is not a utopian pacifism free of tension or debate, since such pacifism may not be positive for society. On the one hand, both individuals and groups – even well-intentioned ones with strong moral principles – can have very different visions of what should be done at a given moment. Furthermore, negative ethical attitudes cannot be naively dispensed with. People do not always want the good or seek it, but rather the satisfaction of their interests. This is the real framework in which the dialogue must take place. For this reason, Wojtyła is committed to dealing with problems frankly and in depth, without hiding the difficulties under fictitious agreements, inoperative proclamations or empty words that hide ethically unjustifiable decisions (or abstentions). That's why

> [t]he principle of dialogue is fitting because *it does not avoid tensions, conflicts, and struggles,* which are present in the lives of different human communities, *and because it addresses precisely that which is true and right in them, that which can be a source of good for the people*.[49]

b) Inauthentic Attitudes: Conformism and Avoidance

Regarding inauthentic attitudes, Wojtyła focuses on two: conformism and avoidance. Conformism consists of a passive attitude towards events, which occurs when the subject renounces self-determination and self-realization by acting together with others and adapts without any resistance to what the majority establishes. Wojtyła analyzes in great depth this position, indicating, first, that, through conformism, "[t]he man-person in a sense agrees to the fact that the community deprives him of himself."[50] He, in fact, does not make his own

[48] Wojtyła, therefore, places the citizens of a society in a very different position from the veil of ignorance proposed by Rawls. See J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Belknap Press, 2020).
[49] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 403.
[50] *Ibid.*, 405.

decisions, but the community makes them for him. In this way, he renounces one of the essential traits of the person: his capacity for self-determination, the ability to freely determine his own path and destiny. And, in doing so, "he *deprives the community of himself*. *Conformism is a denial of participation* […] True participation is replaced by a pretense of participation, a superficial adjustment to others, without conviction and without authentic commitment."[51] By renouncing his capacity for self-determination, the conformist renounces participating in the community since he is not willing to contribute his personal position due to the risks or discomforts that may come with it: confrontations, accusations, etc. For this reason, he opts for camouflage and a purely external adaptation to the community, with the sole objective of obtaining benefits or avoiding unpleasantness, without, at any time, becoming involved in the effective construction of the common good through solidarity or opposition. In short, the conformist breaks the line of participation since he renounces building himself as a person and, in doing so, eliminates the contribution he can make to the community.

Wojtyła concludes his analysis of attitudes towards the common good with a nuanced assessment of avoidance, which he considers somewhat more authentic than conformism, at least in some contexts. Avoidance consists of a renunciation of community and participation. The subject decides to limit his presence in the community as much as possible, focusing on his own life or that of some restricted groups, such as family or closest acquaintances. It seems clear that avoidance should be considered inauthentic and harmful since it eliminates participation, key to the common good and community building. But Wojtyła qualifies this assessment by making it depend on the reasons why the subject adopts this attitude, a position that refers, once again, to his life experience in totalitarian societies.

If the subject escapes from society out of pure comfort, we would naturally be faced with an inauthentic and, therefore, inadequate, and immoral, attitude (although Wojtyła avoids moral references in his analysis of attitudes). But there could be circumstances in which the person considers that neither participation nor opposition is possible, as happened in the totalitarian communist system in which Wojtyła lived when writing these ideas. Dialogue and sincere debate were impossible, since criticism of the regime, not only public but even private, could lead to severe sanctions. And the consequences of an oppositional attitude could be even more serious (as happened, for instance, with Father Jerzy Popiełuszko who was killed). Under these circumstances, the subject may reasonably consider that there is only one possible attitude left, avoidance, which may include however a silent protest that affirms: the system is unjust

[51] *Ibid.* (our italics in the first sentence).

and oppressive, and that is why I evade to the extent of my possibilities. That's why Wojtyła agrees to grant him a "basic personalistic value," although he adds that such an attitude represents a serious condemnation of the community in which that person lives, since, if participation is impossible, the community is guilty.[52] This kind of society could justify even conformism. The person

> is convinced that *the community deprives him of himself, and therefore he attempts to deprive the community of himself.* In the case of conformism, he tries to do this while keeping up appearances, whereas in the attitude of avoidance, he does not seem concerned with pretense. In both cases, something quite essential is severed from man—it is the dynamic feature of participation as a property of the person, which allows him to perform acts and authentically fulfill himself through these acts in the community of being and acting with others.[53]

Conclusion

The ideas presented in these pages allow us to conclude that Wojtyła has carried out an original and valuable analysis of the common good based both on his personal experience and on his philosophical vision that fits naturally within personalism but has a special philosophical structure which can be called integral personalism. Thanks to his anthropology, Wojtyła manages to build the notion of participation (as well as that of alienation), which helps him determine the appropriate way in which the person should relate to others: a type of action through which the person builds himself as a person while building others. By elaborating this notion, he laid the foundations to resolve the Maritainian social paradox, that is, the opposition that seems to confront the personal good and the common good. Both individualism and collectivism have failed to solve this question because their anthropologies end up dissolving the reality of the common good, in one case transforming it into a mere aggregation of individual goods and in the other into a social good that doesn't care about individual persons. The notion of participation makes it possible to overcome this crossroads because it integrates

[52] Perhaps the theoretical foundation of the "structures of sin" to which he referred in his pontificate can be found here, as in *Reconciliatio et poenitentia.*
[53] Wojtyła, *Person and Act,* 407.

the personal good into the common good. In fact, a common good worthy of its name can only be that which makes persons grow without turning them into mere parts of a system.

The achievement of the common good is, however, not an easy task. Not only because it must face the frailties of human nature but because its very determination can be difficult. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze which attitudes facilitate or harm its achievement. There are authentic attitudes that facilitate this, such as solidarity, opposition, and dialogue. And there are inauthentic attitudes that make it difficult, such as conformism and avoidance. These are attitudes that could sometimes have a certain degree of justification in totalitarian regimes that prevent participation. This rich analysis also provides a theorization about the various modes of social interaction superior to the interpersonal relationship: society, community, the neighbor-system and the *communio personarum.*

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The Place of Lived Experience in Karol Wojtyla's Account of the Person: A Case Study[1]

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Abstract

It is manifestly evident that the category and the language of "subjective personal experience" is the idiom of our era. This modern obsession with personal "subjectivity" has contributed substantially to our public and private quandaries, including subjectivism and its well-known twin, relativism, as well as the elevated status now afforded any individual point of view, no matter how ill informed. All this has resulted in the widespread view that the only "truth" that exists is the "truth" of one's own experience. Claims about the existence of universal truth or an objective moral order often cannot find a foothold when confronted with the argument that such realities do not resonate with a particular individual's personal "experience." It seems clear that, if we have any hope of evangelizing the culture concerning the truths of the faith – or minister to the pastoral or therapeutic needs of those the Church is called to serve – we must find a way to articulate the proper place of lived experience in a fuller account of the person. The thesis of this paper is that the account of the human person proposed by Karol Wojtyla provides the answers we need. I will demonstrate that his approach permits us to acknowledge the experience of actual existing persons without compromising the more properly "ontological" framework that we know reveals the unchanging truth about human personhood. I will show that his account gives us the foothold we are seeking in a culture convinced that subjective personal experience is the criterion of truth. And since, in the contemporary context, such criteria are often invoked on questions concerned with human sexuality, we will concentrate our analysis on that sphere of human action, specifically those experiencing same-sex attraction. Surely a tougher test case would be difficult to find. The

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underlying aim of the paper is to provide a framework for addressing the pastoral needs of those suffering from the epidemic of sexual disorders spreading throughout Western society.

Keywords

Karol Wojtyła, lived experience, metaphysics, phenomenology, pastoral outreach, person, anthropology, same-sex attraction, sexual disorders

Introduction

Since Descartes's "Copernican Revolution" initiated the "turn to the subject" in the mid-17th century, the possibility of preserving the conviction that truth of any kind (other than that supported by scientific proof or empirical evidence) could be discovered by man has vanished bit by bit from both personal and public consciousness. Acknowledgement of the importance of what goes on in the interior of man, itself a legitimate and proper object of philosophical reflection, has morphed into the conviction that objective truth is not only inaccessible but non-existent. The modern obsession with personal "subjectivity" has contributed substantially to our public and private quandaries, including subjectivism and its well-known twin, relativism, as well as the elevated status now afforded any individual point of view, no matter how ill informed. All this has resulted in the widespread view that the only "truth" that exists is the "truth" of one's own experience. Claims about the existence of universal truth or an objective moral order often cannot find a foothold when confronted with the argument that such realities do not resonate with a particular individual's personal "experience." The priority given to subjective personal experience in determining what constitutes right thinking and moral human behavior, assuming that question is even asked, is well documented; sadly, personal preference has taken the place of sound reasoning from self-evident first principles in disputes on moral questions.[3] This is a reality confronted daily by persons in all circumstances, no matter what their philosophical persuasion. It is a position advanced by our culture and encountered in the media, in education, in academia, in our political discourse.

Perhaps these developments in the wider culture were inevitable in light of the relentless attacks on human reason that have served to steadily undermine it since the 14th century.[4] But at least until the latter half of the 20th century, the Catholic Church provided a firm line of defense against that onslaught. Unhappily, it appears we may be unable to count on that protection any longer. For there is evidence that this profound error, itself a feature of our post-modern context, seems poised to enter into the deliberations of the Catholic Church.

[3] A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), especially ch. 1.
[4] R. Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences* (Chicago – London: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

Though the precise meaning of Pope Francis's call in *Veritatis Gaudium* 3 for a "radical paradigm shift" remains a bit elusive, it has been interpreted by some to refer to a particular new approach to pastoral praxis, described as "above all an inversion of factors: doctrine and law must be subordinate to the lived life of contemporary man."[5] It seems that the truths derived from Scripture and Tradition, that is, the deposit of faith and the normative guide that has informed the Church's pastoral practices for centuries, will now be subject to a new criterion of truth: the subjective experience of the human person.

This development is alarming for a couple of reasons. First and perhaps most obviously, such a shift in thinking clearly risks further erosion of any firm commitment to objective moral norms such as those expressed so clearly in Pope St. John Paul's II formidable encyclical, *Veritatis Splendor*. But there is a second and equally troubling reason: this new "paradigm" seems to introduce into the discourse of the Catholic Church – and through that to the world at large – a radically false dichotomy between lived experience and the search for understanding and truth. Indeed, it appears to make rivals of these two elements of the life of man, both essential in the effort to serve the people of God, when in fact, they are allies. And it seems to reveal an outright rejection – albeit perhaps an unconscious one – of the Catholic intellectual tradition and the philosophical realism that grounds the entire edifice of the Church's truth claims.

As anyone familiar with the Church's own methods should know, experience is not a separate category in the search for truth; is the starting place of the search for truth. The Church does not employ the methods of Cartesian rationalism, nor does she reduce knowledge to its twin, the deadly "sensism" of David Hume. Her proposals regarding the path to human happiness are not derived out of thin air, nor do they reflect a radical reduction of the person to merely his material existence. Rather they are derived from both faith and reason, both Scripture and the evidence of the senses, as well as centuries of reflection on their significance for man's life and his actions in the world. The Church subscribes to a particular form of realism – to the conviction that truth is arrived at through contact with reality itself. She upholds the view that it is the direct experience

[5] E. Pentin, "Pope Francis' "Paradigm Shift": https://www.ncregister.com/blog/pope-francis-paradigm-shift-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond-to-it (19.02.2024). See also J.A. Ureta, *Pope Francis's "Paradigm Shift": Continuity or Rupture in the Mission of the Church?"* (Spring Grove, Pennsylvania: The American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property, 2018). This call is found in Pope Francis, *Veritatis Gaudium*, no. 3. Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin describes it as a "new spirit, this new approach." https://www.ncregister.com/blog/cardinal-parolin-amoris-laetitia-represents-new-paradigm-spirit-and-approach (19.02.2024)

of the real that prompts the questions that then drive us all to pursue knowledge of the truth and an understanding of God's word.

In arguing that subjective human experience should take priority over and against "doctrine and law," proponents of this view are rejecting not only the possibility of moral norms – but the very possibility of ever arriving at them. Lived experience is not a separate, distinct realm that operates in isolation from human cognitional acts; it is integral to them. Knowledge begins in the senses, which prompts the intellect to seek the meaning of the world and of our experience of it. Experience might be the launching pad and, when properly integrated into the whole of who one is, may lead one to grasp the truths embedded in the Church's own doctrine. But it cannot be confused with the truth itself. As Father Bernard Lonergan used to say, "insights are a dime a dozen." Their true value is discerned through a deliberate inquiry and the scrutiny of judgment. The same can be said of experience. Sometimes it leads to a dead-end.

Now, having said that, I am nonetheless sympathetic to the deeper concerns reflected in this new paradigm. Surely, we can all acknowledge the kernel of truth at the heart of the shift under consideration in this new approach: the argument that abstract ideas, however carefully reasoned, are not enough to live the Christian life. With this I quite agree. Further, the starting place of any pastoral encounter is not likely to be a reiteration of doctrinal statements, no matter how carefully articulated. Clearly, abstract ideas must be translated, often in real time, into the lexicon of the pastoral minister. The starting place of such interactions – which are, after all, not with man *per se* but with concretely existing persons –will surely not be abstractions – but their personal lived experience.

Surely, we need to acknowledge the manifestly evident reality that the category and the language of "subjective personal experience" is the idiom of our era. Perhaps it is time we learned how to speak it. For unless we do, the souls for whom we are responsible will be denied the hope that comes from finally understanding one's own experience in light of the whole truth.

I would argue that there is no need to pit these two aspects of human reasoning against one another. Because already present within the intellectual legacy of the Catholic tradition is a way of understanding the place that lived experience has in the search for truth. Perhaps if the Church Fathers – whose good intentions cannot be seriously doubted – could be alerted to it, they would find a way to articulate more clearly the meaning of the "paradigm shift" the Holy Father suggests is needed. I refer here to the account of the human person proposed by Pope St. John Paul II,

otherwise known to us all as the philosopher Karol Wojtyla, whose philosophical anthropology offers a clear and coherent way forward. For Wojtyla, the reality of lived experience is central to any comprehensive understanding of the nature of man.

Indeed, Karol Wojtyla argues that at the epicenter of the entire debate about the human person *is* the "problem of the subjectivity of the human being." It is this very problem, he declares, that "imposes itself today as one of the central ideological issues that lie at the very basis of human praxis, morality (and thus also ethics), culture, civilization, and politics."[6] If philosophy is to perform its essential function in the recovery of our culture, he tells us, then we have no choice but to turn our attention to the subjectivity of human persons. And this can only be done by taking up the somewhat risky challenge of studying the reality of lived human experience.[7] It is this claim, that we seek to explore in this paper. Surely it holds at least one of the keys to the recovery of our culture.

The late Holy Father's account is framed by a synthesis of two strands of philosophical thought, one that invokes and affirms the received tradition on the meaning of the human person (the objective, metaphysical account), while simultaneously affirming the person as unique and unrepeatable, a "someone" who is the subject of his own acts and "experiencings" (the phenomenological account). I will show that by integrating these two historically divergent visions of man, John Paul II reaches for the full truth about the human person, while providing us with a starting place in experience. It is an account that is not only grounded in an objective truth; it offers us a map from subjective experience—which can only ever be partial—to the possibility of an integration with the whole of what man is – and then finally, hopefully, to healing. And since pastoral praxis in the contemporary context often involves questions concerned with human sexuality, we will concentrate our analysis on that sphere of human action, specifically those experiencing same-sex attraction. Surely a tougher test case would be difficult to find. The underlying aim of this essay is to provide a framework for addressing the pastoral needs of those suffering from the epidemic of sexual disorders clearly spreading throughout Western society.

[6] K. Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, trans. by Th. Sandok (Peter Lang, New-York – San Francisco – Bern – Baltimore – Frankfurt am Main – Berlin – Wien – Paris, 2008) 219-220. See also D. Savage, "The Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyła's Account of the Person," *Annals of Philosophy* Vol. LXI, No. 4 (2013), 20.
[7] K. Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," in: *Person and Community*, 212.

At t the heart of this paper is the recognition that both the pastoral minister and the psychotherapist must pass through the same territory that, in the final analysis, also gives meaning to the work of the philosopher and metaphysician: the question of the truth about the human person.[8] Indeed, this question stands at the border of two bodies of knowledge: the philosophy of being on the one side, and the positive sciences, in particular the psychological sciences, on the other.[9] Pastoral care, no matter how sensitively exercised, or therapeutic interventions, even when skillfully practiced, must never be divorced from that truth. We owe it to those whom we are called to serve to remain forever grounded in the full vision of the human person and to never waiver in our intention to point them toward it.

Framework and Synthesis

A comprehensive treatment of John Paul's II entire anthropology is beyond the scope of this paper.[10] I am pursuing just two aims in what follows next. The first is to offer an adequate synopsis of his understanding of the human person that is at once accessible and also accurate; we will have to limit ourselves to the elements that bear most directly on our questions here. Second, I hope to persuade the reader that John Paul's II framework provides us with an anthropology that can serve as the foundation for pastoral or therapeutic outreach. We need confidence that starting with the subjective experience of those we serve need not trap us in subjectivism or a relativistic agenda with no way out.

I begin with a brief summary of John Paul's II basic framework, showing how his synthesis is grounded in the metaphysical account found in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition (mediated to him through the existential Thomism of Étienne Gilson), while simultaneously informed by his insights into human subjectivity through the use of phenomenological method.[11] This synthesis

[8] K. Schmitz, *Person and Psyche* (Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Psychological Sciences Press, 2009), 13.
[9] *Ibid*, 18.
[10] For a fuller treatment, please see: D. Savage, "The Centrality of Lived Experience of John Paul's Account of the Person," *Annals of Philosophy John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin* Vol. LXI, No. 4 (Dec. 2013).
[11] It is well understood that Karol Wojtyła was an "existential Thomist" in the school of Étienne Gilson. See G. Weigel, *Witness to Hope* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004), 156. We will return to the significance of this feature of his thought toward the end of the paper. For now, it is sufficient to mention that it resulted in his conviction concerning the primacy of the actual *existence* of the person as opposed to their *essence*. In other words, *that* you exist takes precedence over *who* exactly you are, the state of your soul, your past sins, your disorders. These remain essential aspects of your being and are certainly critical to grasping who you are– but they are secondary to the fact that God created you and holds you in existence at every moment of the day.

leads him to invoke a particular approach, which he refers to as "pausing before the irreducible in the human person,"[12] and to his conviction that human subjectivity is itself an objective reality that can be investigated, analyzed, and understood. He argues that its features are disclosed within the orbit of consciousness and that when examined closely, it reveals itself to be constituted by two fundamental dynamisms, "man-acts" and "something-happens-in-man," and to be ordered toward self-possession, self-governance, and self-determination through acts of both transcendence and integration.[13]

These elements will provide an essential point of departure for our questions here. For John Paul II argues that the sexual urge is itself an aspect of "something-happens-in-man," the psychosomatic dynamism of his given nature, and, as such, at least in a rational animal such as man, is under the governance of the intellect and the will; it is therefore subject to the control of one's free choices.[14] It is this freedom and how it is used, through conscious acts of the will, which will determine the extent to which one's personhood is fully actualized.[15] With John Paul's II help, I will demonstrate that all sexual attraction, including same-sex attraction (SSA), is subject to the guidance of the intellect and the will and therefore governed by the moral order within which human persons exist and act. Every decision, every act is a moment that represents an opportunity for self-governance and self-transcendence—and calls for integration into the whole of what one is.[16]

I will show that the anthropological framework provided by St. John Paul II gives us both a starting place in our encounter with others and an approach that can sustain us in our efforts to serve them. We will see that his method provides us with a way to affirm the whole truth about the person while allowing for an investigation of lived human experience, something which, he points

[12] Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," 213.
[13] K. Wojtyła, "Person and Act," in: *Person and Act and Related Essays: English Critical Edition of the Works of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II*, trans. by G. Ignatik, (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America, 2021), 177.
[14] K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), 45-51.
[15] That is, the extent to which I become most fully who I am meant to be in virtue of the nature and natural capacities I am given at birth.
[16] For a more extensive analysis of these questions and the phenomena of same-sex attraction within the context of western culture and the true meaning of friendship, please see my paper "At the Heart of the Matter: The Centrality of Lived Experience in St. John Paul II's Integral Account of the Person," found in *Living the Truth in Love: Pastoral Approaches to Same-Sex Attraction*, ed. J. Smith and P. Check (San Francisco, California: Ignatius Press, 2015), 88-114.

out, is always an experience of a part in relation to a whole.[17] Here is where the pastoral and therapeutic implications of his account of the person will find practical expression. This will lead us, finally, to a consideration of the ways in which his account might inform the specifically pastoral and therapeutic practices employed in our outreach to those experiencing SSA.

The Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition Provides the Foundations

First, John Paul II affirms the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition with regard to its treatment of the concept of the person. He acknowledges the usefulness of Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal, pointing to the fact that it has spawned much scientific investigation throughout history. He also affirms unequivocally the familiar Boethian definition (relied on by Aquinas) that the human person is "an individual substance of a rational nature;" in fact, he makes this his point of departure. He states that this so-called "*suppositum humanum*" (human substance) provides a necessary foundation in the "metaphysical terrain" of the dimension of being and is an essential reference point for any further discussion of human subjectivity. It represents human nature itself and is attributable to all persons.[18]

But, he points out that the tradition that has defined the human person as a rational animal or individual substance has viewed him primarily as an object, one of the many objects that exist and can be studied as a part of the natural world. Thus, on this account, the person becomes just another *suppositum* (substance), albeit of a rational nature, and in Aristotle's scientific framework, a "cosmological reduction."[19] He argues that such an approach simply is not adequate to the task of understanding concretely existing persons since it ignores the "primordial uniqueness of the human being", which should be the primary subject matter of philosophical and theological reflection: the person is a *someone*, not a something. [20] The reduction of the human person to a substance in the cosmic order does not and cannot capture completely the unique subjectivity of human persons for, he maintains, this *suppositum* is a subject of both existence and action, a person

[17] In this regard, Wojtyła invokes a category from phenomenology known as "categorial limits," a technical term referring to the phenomenon of observing a part in relation to a whole and thus permitting the phenomenologist to make a judgment. This method will be important in our efforts to help the person achieve integration.
[18] Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible," 212.
[19] *Ibid*., 211.
[20] *Ibid.*, 211-214.

who, when the aspect of consciousness is introduced, can be said to "experience himself as a concrete self, a self-experiencing subject."[21]

Nonetheless, though he offers this critique of the traditional account, John Paul II does not intend to relinquish or compromise our hold on the existence of a universal human nature, abstractly conceived (the concept of the *suppositum humanum*); in fact, it is central to his schema. He argues that both the Aristotelian and Boethian definitions are required and that without them we lose our place in the cosmos. However, this starting place provides but the foundation upon which he intends to build; his project is to go more deeply into what this *suppositum humanum* contains and means, through an investigation of the inner experience of human acts, revealed in consciousness.

However, though John Paul II makes every attempt to account for the experience of the person, he is equally concerned to establish that experience is not divorced from or independent of the existence of a hierarchy of goods, an objective order that does not rely on the perception of the person to exist.[22] He states this unequivocally, declaring that "cognition does not in any way create "reality" (cognition does not create its own content) but arises within the context of the different kinds of content that are proper to it."[23] For John Paul II, the human person never operates outside of a moral context; the proper *telos* of all of his impulses, his decisions, and his actions is the good itself.

Without a doubt, John Paul's II formulation of the good, and of the human person and his capacity to know, is grounded in Thomist metaphysics and reflects the ontic structures grasped by Thomism.[24] What differentiates his account from the tradition is his way of reaching them, the way we come to understand and know them.[25] Wojtyla is a realist in the Thomistic sense of that term. The good and the true have an independent existence. These realities are accessible to human

[21] *Ibid.*, 213.
[22] K. Wojtyła, "The Basis of the Moral Norm," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 78-80. Wojtyła argues that Aquinas combined Aristotelian teleology with Platonic-Augustinian participation and that "the basis of this union is the idea of exemplarism." The resemblance of creatures to God and the degree of perfection they exhibit are "cognitively encompassed in the divine mind as their exemplar." For Wojtyła, this constitutes the very heart of the normative order because it presents a "world of goods and models" instead of the "world of goods and ends" that both Kant and Scheler disputed as tending toward utilitarianism. Exemplariness, according to Wojtyła, results in an objective hierarchy of goods in which each good is measured according to how close it approaches the perfection of the exemplar that exists in the mind of God. (*Ibid*., 76-79.) This earlier work shows up in significant ways in his papal corpus, in particular in his 1993 moral encyclical, *Veritatis Splendor.*
[23] K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of Experience in Ethics," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 116.
[24] That is, the categories that comprise his understanding of Being and beings.
[25] J.W. Gałkowski, "The Place of Thomism in the Anthropology of K. Wojtyła," *Angelicum* Vol. 65 (1988), 187.

consciousness and cognition. But he will argue that they are grasped, not only through metaphysical reflection, but first and fundamentally, through the lived experience of the acting person.

The late Holy Father's framework begins with and remains grounded in an objective account of the person as a particular kind of substance that exists at a particular place in the order of creation – at the meeting place of the material and spiritual worlds – whose existence is governed by an objective moral order. He recognizes that these claims are essential, if we are to arrive at an account of human subjectivity without losing our footing in the framework of universal norms, in particular, those governing human sexuality. Indeed, it is the reality of a universal human nature understood against the backdrop of the created order that renders moral norms both coherent and normative.

His argument is that, though this is true in and of itself, it simply does not give us a full account of the human person as a subjective, that is, personal, being. He declares that the *suppositum humanum* is actually "subjectivity in the **metaphysical and fundamental sense**," but states that he is interested in discovering "subjectivity in the sense proper to the human being, namely **subjectivity in the personal sense.**"[26] This discovery will require reference to and an analysis of actual, human experience, that is, lived experience.[27] This category—of lived experience—has a rather precise meaning for John Paul II; it will require the introduction of consciousness into the analysis of human personhood.

Phenomenological Method Enriches the Understanding of the Person

We come now to the second element in the Holy Father's anthropological framework: his efforts to synthesize a Thomistic vision of man with the insights into human subjectivity made possible by modern phenomenological methods. While he recognizes the limitations of phenomenology *per*

[26] Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 224 (my bold).

[27] Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible," 212. Though here I will focus on the philosophical basis of John Paul's claims, it is important to note that his philosophical and theological outlook, especially the interest he has in an account of human experience, is grounded in the work of St. John of the Cross, his first scholarly interest and the subject of his dissertation, *The Doctrine of Faith According to St. John of the Cross.* See D. Savage, *The Subjective Dimension of Human Work: The Conversion of the Acting Person According to Karol John Paul /John Paul II and Bernard Lonergan*, (Peter Lang: New York: 2008), 112. See also, M. Waldstein, *Introduction*, in: John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them*: *A Theology of the Body* (Pauline Books: Boston, 2006), 82-87. Waldstein points out that, though St. John was John Paul's II starting place, his encounter with the philosophy of consciousness "sharpened" his account of personal subjectivity.

se, maintaining that it is not able to replace metaphysical reflection on the question of being,[28] he also argues that its methods may provide a route into the realm of ontology from its starting place in the study of the human person, that is, the data of experience illuminated by consciousness as constituted by the person. As delineated by John Paul II, this "becomes a critical appropriation of the fundamental postulate of modern thought: *the starting point is man.* This means starting from the concrete reality of the person, not from the hypostatization of the notion of the subject."[29]

In fact, John Paul's II entire project reflects his interest in addressing the modern problem introduced by the so-called turn to the subject, without relinquishing the possibility of knowledge of an objective moral order. His method reveals his conviction that both metaphysical and phenomenological reflection are necessary to account adequately for the objective and subjective dimensions of existence. He demands that we recognize that the person experiences himself both as an existing embodiment of human nature and also as the possessor of a unique and unrepeatable subjectivity and as the agent of his own acts. He is absolutely committed to the development of an ethical and moral theory that begins with the reality of a "conscious being," one who is not constituted by consciousness but instead is the one who himself constitutes consciousness.[30] His theory is firmly grounded in the experience of the human person, stating that even the "apprehension" of that which is essential for morality takes place first in experience itself and not only in some subsequent abstraction or reflection.[31] He argues that both man and morality are known through experience because even the origin of the cognitive process is found, not in any kind of abstraction, but in the experience of the human person.[32]

To consider and interpret the human being in the context of his personal subjectivity—without leaving the metaphysical terrain well established by his predecessors—John Paul II

[28] John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio,* especially 82-83 and 97.
[29] R. Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 61.
[30] Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 226. See also K. Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1993), 69.
[31] Wojtyła, "The Problem of Experience in Ethics," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 112. Wojtyła equates "lived experience" with the "irreducible" in the human person. See "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," 21
[32] Wojtyła, "The Problem of Experience in Ethics," 120-122. See also, A. Szostek, "Karol Wojtyła's View of the Human Person in the Light of the Experience of Morality," ACPA, Vol. 60, *Existential Personalism*, 50. This conviction is nothing new. Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that knowledge begins in the senses. There most certainly is an equivalency between "experience" and an adequate understanding of the senses, which Aquinas argues includes both the inner and outer senses.

introduces a method he refers to as "*pausing at the irreducible.*"[33] This methodological operation allows us to recognize the irreducibility of the human person, a someone who is unique, unrepeatable, and ultimately incommunicable—but not thereby unknowable.[34] It both preserves the objectivity of the *suppositum humanum* and the place the human being holds in the cosmic order while freeing us to analyze the human being as a concrete self, a self-experiencing subject. At this point we can introduce the reality of consciousness into the account – and our main concern in this paper begins to come into view. For this "methodological operation" can be understood as an invitation to all of us, including the therapist or the pastoral counselor, to "pause before the irreducible": the unique instantiation of human nature fully embodied by the person we are called serve.

Here is what must be understood: In such encounters, we need not sever the person from his objective nature; we are simply pausing before the totality of who he is and attempting to go more deeply into it by acknowledging the person as a subject who experiences her own acts and inner happenings, and with them his own subjectivity.[35] In John Paul's II account, this subjectivity is itself a manifestation both of human nature and personal being.

This experiential recognition of both aspects of his being is something that John Paul II points out is brought to the fore within the orbit of consciousness. He states: "consciousness interiorizes all that the human being cognizes, including everything that the individual cognizes from within acts of self-knowledge, and makes it all a content of the subject's lived experience."[36] Thus, lived experience as understood by John Paul II is already delimited; it is not merely experience *per se* that interests him, but experience consciously lived and cognized.

The value and the validity of John Paul's II arguments regarding the significance of lived experience for a full account of the person can perhaps be grasped most readily by considering our own: I simply do not experience myself as a *suppositum humanum*, as merely another instantiation of a "human nature," even if I am convinced that I am such in the abstract. I experience myself as a personal subject who both possesses a certain stable identity from moment to moment and also reflects a certain dynamism. I am a someone" who thinks and chooses, senses and acts, feels and

[33] Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible," 213.
[34] Something can be intelligible but impossible to reduce to words or definitions. For example, one "knows" one's spouse, but who they are in their essence cannot be communicated in any ultimate sense. It can only be experienced.
[35] *Ibid*.
[36] Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 227.

desires, loves and hopes. I also know at some level that I am ordered toward happiness and fulfillment and that I am responsible for myself. Though certainly I can affirm that all of these powers and faculties are normative and universal features of human nature itself, this need not lead to a denial of the fact that they are also deeply personal aspects of my own subjectivity and experience.

The great task of each and every human person is to realize the fullness of one's own humanity by bringing one's personal subjectivity into conformance with the objective truth of what it means to be human, that is, who I am now, at this moment in my own process of development, but in light of the fullness of what God had in mind when he created me.[37] As a result of my status as a fallen creature, I will inevitably struggle with sin, with limitations, difficulties, and even disorders. But these foibles do not prevent me in any final way from becoming who I am meant to be: "a subjective being, capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding about myself, with a tendency toward self-realization."[38] My lived experience of myself, when considered in its totality, will always reveal me to be a subject who can determine myself by transcending myself and integrating the various partial aspects of myself into the whole of who I am—a creature who is a unity of soul and body. And, as we will see next, John Paul II maintains that it is this capacity for transcendence and integration that is definitive of human personhood, a creature who is—or should be—always in the process of becoming who God meant him to be.

The Proposal: An Objective Account of Human Subjectivity

We turn now to John Paul's II own proposal. In what follows, I have attempted to synthesize the aspects of his account that will shed light on the important questions we have in this paper. We will begin by considering more completely the fundamental distinction he makes between person and nature and then explore the dynamisms associated with them within the framework of his theory of transcendence and integration. This will call for mention of his understanding of human freedom and consciousness. Here we are continuing our effort to grasp the synthesis John Paul II offers us,

[37] John Paul II is very clear in many places that there is no real conflict between person and nature - that our freedom as persons is found in realizing human nature in its fullness in ourselves. Perhaps the most important place this is found is in *Veritatis Splendor*, especially ch. 2.
[38] John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*, no. 6.

but we are moving closer to grasping the point of departure for pastoral and therapeutic outreach that lies "hidden" within his analysis.

For John Paul II, the personal subjectivity of human persons is itself an objective reality that can be studied, analyzed, and understood. After all, human subjectivity has features that are themselves "transpersonal" and universally recognizable; it is this fact that makes it possible for us to understand each other and have compassion for one another. We have a set of experiences in common – the experience of being human. Though we can fail to investigate and distinguish these experiences by bringing them into the orbit of our consciousness, we do have the capacity to do so, and could thus come to see their place in our own personal development and their impact on us. In making that effort, we arrive at what most truly constitutes "lived experience" in John Paul's II account. We will return to a full consideration of the meaning of consciousness shortly. For now, let us stipulate that John Paul II leverages this category of human existence – that of lived experience – to arrive at a normative account of human subjectivity. In other words, he "implements" his own proposal: against the backdrop of the place man occupies in the created order and all that it implies about his existence as the *suppositum humanum*, he "pauses before the irreducible" in the person to enter into an investigation of the dynamisms proper to the acting person.

We have already seen that John Paul II argues that the Boethian definition of the person does not fully express the dynamism of a being who is "the subject of both existence and acting" and whose existence is not merely individual but also personal.[39] John Paul II states that this dynamism is captured in two distinct ontological structures that "run through the phenomenological field of experience, so as to divide it, whereas they join and unite in the metaphysical field."[40] These are the fundamental experiential phenomena that provide the basis for his analysis of human action: the experience of "*I* act," i.e., of "man-acts," and that of "something-happens-in-man."[41] Both of these phenomena are given in experience; their common root is the being of the person who experiences them.[42] Taken together, they constitute the totality of the concrete manifestations of the dynamism proper to man.[43] This experiential difference is the starting point of his argument.

[39] Wojtyła, *Person and Act,* 177.
[40] *Ibid*.
[41] This distinction is also made by Aquinas, though in different terms. It corresponds to the contrast Aquinas makes between "human acts" and the "acts of a man." *Summa Theologiae II-I,* 6.
[42] That is, the *suppositum humanum* or, in ordinary terms, a stable, perduring identity; John Paul II calls this the "ego".
[43] Wojtyła, *Acting Person,* 65.

> It is thus that in the dynamism of man there appears the essential difference arising from having the experience of efficacy. On the one hand, there is that form of the human dynamism in which man himself is the agent, that is to say, he is the conscious cause of his own causation; this form we grasp by the expression, "*man-acts.*" On the other hand, there is that form of human dynamism in which man is not aware of his efficacy and does not experience it; this we express by "*something-happens-in-man*."[44]

Only in the experience of "man-acts," when the human person experiences himself as the efficient cause of his actions, can it be said that a fully human act, an *actus personae*, has taken place.[45] In this moment, the person experiences his own efficacy, he recognizes himself as "the actor." This experience "discriminates man's acting from everything that merely happens in him."[46]

It is at the juncture of these two dynamisms that consciousness enters the picture and lived experience discloses the subjectivity of the person, as well as his freedom.[47] It reveals that, though both these dynamisms are rooted in the same *suppositum,* what is merely "happening" in the subject is experientially distinguishable from the dynamism associated with the experience of conscious actions. These refer to the conscious "I," that is the person, as their cause.[48] Such experiences are a commonplace event in every person's life. Even when no words accompany it, one knows the difference between something that appears unbidden – a physical or emotional desire, an angry reaction, surprise or shock, a sudden sense of fear or of contentment – and a conscious and intentional decision to act in a certain way. John Paul II argues that

[44] *Ibid.*, 66. See also K. Wojtyła, "Personal Structure," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 189.
[45] Perhaps not surprisingly, John Paul II argues that *actus personae* is more precise and meaningful that the traditional *actus humanae.* He uses this latter term when speaking more globally, but we find more frequent references in his papal writings to *actus personae*.
[46]Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 66.
[47] Importantly, in John Paul's II account, the subjectivity of the person is not constituted by consciousness; rather consciousness is constituted by the subject. Consciousness belongs to the person and is an attribute of the whole person who, after all, is not simply "a consciousness" but a *someone*, who is both physical and spiritual, both subject and object. See K. Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama*, 66,
[48] J. Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*. *The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2000), 106.

> It is the ego that is the agent of actions. When man acts, the ego has the experience of its own efficacy in action. When, on the other hand, there is something happening in man, then the ego does not experience its own efficacy and is not the actor[49].

These two "distinct ontological structures" correspond to the distinction between nature and person that he argues is at the core of human subjectivity. We will begin with something-happens-in-man since it provides the substructure of the ontological unity of the person.

Something-Happens-in-Man

The late Holy Father points out that the movements associated with something-happens-in-man take place in a particular way in the body, in man's somatic constitution. These somatic activations happen purely on the level of nature. The dynamism of the body is fundamentally reactive; it responds to external stimuli and is outside the immediate sphere of consciousness. In their origin, its movements do not exceed the potentiality of the body; they include such instincts as thirst, hunger, and sex.[50] We will return to these elements shortly.

Though such instincts happen without being willed or chosen, they still remain under the purview of the good. As such, these dynamisms possess an internal compass and logic; they are aspects of the personal structure of subjectivity, a part of the whole that the person is. Such "happenings" originate in the person's instinct for self-preservation or the natural desire for love and for happiness; they are ordered toward the good of existence itself and are the underpinning of the psychosomatic unity he seeks.[51]

Even though these somatic dynamisms often operate outside the sphere of consciousness and are not present in the person's experience of his own intentionality, this does not in any way affect the "ontic unity of man."[52] For it is manifestly clear that the person is not entirely alienated from these "happenings" and, though they may be unexpected or their source hidden, he understands that they are a part of him. While they may not have originated in anything consciously

[49] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 182. Also quoted in Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 106.
[50] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), Chapter 1.
[51] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 321. Quoted also in Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 134.
[52] Wojtyła, *Person and Act*, 321. Quoted also in Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 134.

intended by him, even without naming it he somehow knows that he is responsible for them and that his freedom is at stake in what happens next.

It is here that we come to the place of feelings in the experience of the person. While the somatic dynamism is reactive, the dynamism of the psyche is essentially emotive. Both are aspects of "something-happens-in-man"; emotivity does respond to external stimuli (a beautiful landscape, for example). But, in the psychic life of man, the internal effects of those external impulses transcend purely bodily reactions; they result in feelings, an unbidden response to a movement that comes from within. His mostly inchoate awareness that the body is "speaking" to him arises within the orbit of consciousness in particular via his feelings. Indeed, it is through his feelings that man can even experience his own body; they become a bridge between unconscious somatic reactions and consciousness.[53]

With a consideration of the feelings, we begin to move away from the purely sensory manifestations of the body.[54] Feelings have a basis in sensation, but they are more than that; they have a component of immateriality and thus enter into the properly psychic life of man. They lead to a particularly human sensitivity that is characterized by "different intentional directions that are deeply rooted in man's spiritual life."[55] Thus, John Paul II also attributes to feelings a certain intelligence, a cognitive function: they are directed intentionally to values, to what the person has come to see as the good. However, they cannot be said to rise to the level of "truthfulness"; this emotive experience of values is to be subordinated to the objective truth about values as cognized by the person's intellect. Indeed, "*the fusion of sensitivity with truthfulness is the necessary condition of the experience of values.*"[56] Like the instincts of the somatic constitution, they fall under the purview of a higher intelligence, a guide that will enable their integration with the whole of who man is or could become. They serve as the substructure of the highest expression of feeling possible to man, that of genuine, objective love. But objective love is an aspect of "man-acts"; it

[53] Wojtyła, *Persona and Act*, 338. Also quoted in Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 136 (Here quoting *The Acting Person*, 228). John Paul II states that "…instinct does not consist solely of the somatic dynamism in man. This is why its interpretation in somatic terms can never be complete. In fact, instinct as a definite dynamic trait affects also the human psyche, and it is in the psyche that it finds its proper expression… This experience itself of this urge…has a psycho-emotive character while the reaction of the organism only supplies it with the somatic ground." Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 216. Found in a slightly different form in *Person and Act*, 326.

[54] For an astonishingly perceptive and thorough account from the point of view of the therapist that parallels Wojtyła's analysis here, see A. Terruwe and C. Baars, *Psychic Wholeness and Healing: Using All the Powers of the Human Psyche*, (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf Publishers, 1981), ch. I.

[55] Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 137.

[56] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person,* 233. See also Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 137.

requires a conscious act and the dynamism of intellect and the will. We will return to these themes in the next section of the paper.[57]

For now, I will point out that, in contrast to the pervasive assumption at work in our culture – that feelings are all the signal one needs to determine a course of action – John Paul II demonstrates that, as an aspect of "something-happens-in-man," they cannot claim any kind of final authority, for, ultimately, they are subject to the natural law and the objective moral norms that constitute the milieu of all human action and human relationships.

The Holy Father maintains that the person's experience of his body, its sensations and feelings, point him toward "the somatic structure of the whole subject that he is, of the whole ego."[58] This arises out of the holistic experience of himself that John Paul II refers to as "self-feeling" whose object is "the whole somatic ego, which is not isolated from the personal ego but is, on the contrary, intrinsically cohesive with it."[59] It is thus through the appearance of feelings and his awareness of them – this global experience of "self-feeling"- that man emerges from the subjective reactivity of his body and finds in himself the capacity to rise above it.[60]

And this leads us to our investigation of the second ontological structure of human subjectivity: man-acts.

Man-Acts

We now enter into realm of the person, without, however, leaving the realm of nature (the psychosomatic dynamisms) totally behind. The lived experience of the "happenings" that we have been considering so far can be distinguished from the very different experience of the subject's own efficacy, also witnessed within the orbit of his personal consciousness. It is a commonplace experience: the person thinks about the choices before him, compares them to some idea he has of the true or the good, navigates the feelings and desires he has about them, makes decisions, and acts with some measure of intention. He is aware at some level that his freedom is implicated throughout this entire encounter with himself, that he does have the capacity to choose—and

[57] This formulation is part of the received tradition, a description grounded in the Aristotelian Thomistic understanding of human action. See R. McInerny, *Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1992), 53-74.
[58] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 229.
[59] *Ibid.* See also Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 136.
[60] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 228. See also Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 136.

choose freely. Though perhaps only vaguely, he senses that this freedom is compromised if he simply submits to the sometimes arbitrary happenings of his somatic constitution (the bodily appetites, for example); though these impulses are themselves ordered toward a good, they are in need of a guide to insure their expression reaches toward the higher order goods he seeks. He senses his personhood will be affirmed and strengthened if he makes a conscious and free choice consistent with the authentic good, something that, ultimately, is only truly known if conscience has been formed and habituated to helping him to choose well. These are personal acts that come under the purview of consciousness, intentionality, and freedom. However these choices play out, the concrete expressions of intellect, will, and freedom they represent (now clearly revealed as more than mere abstractions) are aspects of experience discernible at the level of the person.

With this as a starting point, John Paul II develops an account of the inner structure of the person within the context of "man-acts," the sphere of human action that has the potential to lead to a fully actualized subject. He speaks here primarily of the natural drive of the person toward acts of self-determination, moments of efficacy in which he experiences himself as an actor—moments when he is aware of himself as responsible for his own becoming. These will require acts of transcendence, defined by John Paul II as the act of going beyond an established boundary in oneself to actualize a pre-existing potency. Acts of self-determination must be preceded by a movement toward states of self-possession and self-governance. These are necessary prerequisites for the act of self-determination, for no one can determine himself unless he is first in possession of himself and able to govern himself. They require that the person both transcend the psychosomatic impulses that emerge from the sphere of something-happens-in-man and, through acts of the intellect and the will, integrate them into the totality of who he is in light of who is meant to be.

John Paul II points out that every moment of choice is one in which both the intellect and the will are jointly faced with a decision; together they are responsible for making one that is consistent with the good. Indeed, each is a moment of truth on the way to the good—or not.[61] Such moments often arise as a result of the psychosomatic dynamism originating in the body, an occurrence of something-happens-in-man. They call for the exercise of authentic freedom. And they illuminate the fact that the person is the agent of in his own becoming, that because he is free to choose, he is responsible for whom he becomes. They call for a movement toward self-

[61] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 135ff.

possession and self-governance. When brought within the orbit of consciousness, these moments can be experienced and understood for what they are—moments in which we determine ourselves in ways that either correspond to our true nature—or not.

We are all familiar with such moments when a choice presents itself and our task as human beings is to choose what is authentically good. There are countless examples: the decision not to eat or drink excessively; opposing the impulse to express anger toward a child, a friend, a spouse; or resisting the urge to engage in what one knows to be illicit sexual conduct. John Paul II is pointing to such moments as steps on the way to becoming whom one is meant to be in the eyes of God – or not.

Though we can only point to its central aspect here, it is important to make explicit the fact that human love can only be correctly understood within the framework provide by "man-acts." By definition, human love can never be purely sexual, though these psychosomatic impulses do serve as its substructure. We saw in the last section that the feelings themselves transcend the merely sensual level of the body, that they respond to the recognition of a value inherent in an object or a person. In John Paul's II account, when it reaches its fullest expression, the experience of feeling as a response to a value extends into the realm of betrothed love itself, something that consists in the integration of all the different spontaneous processes – the sexual attraction and the sexual emotions – into a conscious act of the whole person that also involves his rational faculties.[62] It requires the recognition that the object of love is a person. Human love both requires and is sustained by an affirmation of the other person as a person, a creature who is an end in himself.

The Role of Consciousness

We need to consider one last element in this account: the meaning of consciousness itself. John Paul II distinguishes two aspects or functions of consciousness. The first and more elementary is its mirroring or illuminating function, in which its role is simply to reflect to the subject what happens in him as well as his acting, "of what he does and how he does it." It reflects the person as the dynamic source and subject of her actions and an awareness of all the things that the subject

[62] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 125-130. See also Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 46.

meets externally through her activities, whether cognitive or otherwise. At this level, the subject has an elementary and non-intentional awareness of her actions and of herself as the actor.[63]

But in addition to this illuminating function, consciousness has another, more essential function which is "the ultimate reason for its presence in the specific structure of the acting person." This is the "reflexive" or "subjective" aspect: its function is "to form man's experience and thus to allow him to experience in a special way his own subjectiveness." It is illuminated in the first instance by the mirroring function of consciousness; it permits us "*to experience these actions as actions and as our own.*"[64] The reflexive aspect of consciousness is, in a sense, the realization of another level of awareness in the person. It goes beyond a primordial awareness of my existence, beyond a mere mirroring of objects; it is the experience of one's own personal subjectivity that comes into more prominent view. For example, I have a direct experience of myself in the act of reaching for my spouse, hugging my child, or going for a run. I recognize that *I* am acting and that *I* have freely chosen to do so. Here consciousness "turns back naturally upon the subject,"[65] disclosing it "inwardly" and revealing it "in its specific distinctness and unique concreteness." This "disclosing" is the precise function of the reflexive aspect of consciousness.[66] Through its action, I experience myself as the subject of my actions. It is in recognizing this that I become responsible for taking possession of myself and governing myself, for transcending and integrating those aspects of myself that appear, often without my willing it. When I resist the impulse to give expression to anger in disciplining my child and instead find a way to govern myself, I both transcend *and* integrate the emotional reaction – and in the process take another step toward self-possession and self-determination.

In John Paul's II account, "it is one thing to *be* the subject, another to be *cognized* (that is, objectivized) as the subject, and still a different thing to *experience* one's self as the subject of one's own acts and experiences." (The last distinction we owe to the reflexive function of consciousness.)[67] It is only when the person experiences herself as a subject that she can be said to be fully in act; every person is a subject because every person is a *suppositum.* But this itself possesses a potency that is meant to be manifest through the dynamism proper to it, that is, in the

[63] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 31.
[64] Wojtyła, *Acting Person*, 42.
[65] *Ibid*.
[66] *Ibid.*, 46.
[67] *Ibid.*, 44. Italics and parentheses in original.

act of becoming herself.[68] John Paul II argues that man owes to this aspect of consciousness his capacity to appropriate his own subjectivity, making what are in fact the manifestly objective features of his being—that is, universal and normative for all human persons— personal.[69]

Thus, I am only fully the subject of my own actions when I experience myself as such. And it is within this context that I begin and sustain the process of moving toward self-possession, self-governance, and finally self-determination. It is only then that I can genuinely say that I possess, govern and determine myself. John Paul II does not deny that human subjectivity is the possession of every human person, for each is characterized by the existence of the *suppositum* and the potency that accompanies human action in both its manifestations. But all are in the process of becoming that full human subject that exists in some degree of potency at every moment.[70] Both aspects of consciousness are at play in the human person's efforts to become fully himself, a unity of body and soul; without consciousness, without an awareness of himself at some level, the person is unable consciously and intentionally to make of himself a gift to another.

Spelling Out the Implications

We have already come a long way. But contained within this simple distinction—between things that merely happen and things that are or can be consciously intended—a distinction also immediately accessible to human experience—is the starting place we seek. For in stark contrast to the claims of those attempting to advance the flawed logic of gender ideology, John Paul II points out that the sexual urge itself (no matter toward whom it is oriented) must be seen to originate in something-happens-in-man; that is, it begins in the body and only transcends the somatic constitution when it enters into the realm of conscious and intentional human action. As such, in no case does one's sexual desire (or "orientation") define the person in his totality or form his identity in any substantive sense.

Since every human being is by nature a sexual being, at its root the sexual urge is a normative feature of human nature.[71] The sexual urge is only a partial aspect of the person, and

[68] Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 227.
[69] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 42.
[70] Or, as Father Bernard Lonergan would say, we become subjects "by degrees."
[71] Indeed, he declares that "[t]his sexual urge is a *natural drive born in all human beings, a vector of aspiration* along which their whole existence develops and perfects itself from within." Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 46. Italics in original.

though it is ordered toward more than the merely biological through expressions of feeling, desire, and ultimately, love, it cannot in any instance be thought to constitute the identity of the person. Until it finds its expression in action, it has not yet risen to the level of the personal and cannot be considered an authentically human act.[72] As John Paul II puts it,

> The sexual urge in man is not a source of self-contained actions but it is a particular property of human existence which is reflected and finds its expression in action. That property is something natural and hence something fully developed in man. The consequence of that property is not so much that man behaves in a particular way as that something happens to man, something begins to take place without any initiative on his part, creating a base for definite actions, for considered actions, in which man exercises self-determination, decides for himself about his own actions and takes responsibility for them. This is the point at which human freedom and the sex urge meet."[73]

Here we see how dramatically John Paul's II account reveals the tragically diminished understanding of the person now governing the culture at large, characterized as it is by the assumption that the human person is actually defined by his sexual urges. Indeed, the whole thrust of gender ideology is to argue that, for all intents and purposes, the person is reducible to his sexual "orientation," and yet, at the same time, also free to choose from one of any number of genders now on offer on any given day. Such a view is not only inherently illogical, it results in the fragmentation of the person, tearing his subjectivity in two by denying the evidence of the intimate psychic union he enjoys – or should enjoy - with his body (which is self-evidently only either male or female). Further, it fundamentally rejects the very thing that distinguishes the human person from non-rational animals. Human beings are characterized by our capacity for reason and freedom; the prevailing view of man traps him in a body that knows only instinct and desire unmoored from intelligence and the free pursuit of the authentic good.

John Paul II goes on to declare that though "man is not responsible for what happens to him in the sphere of sex" (since he is not the cause of it), "he is entirely responsible for what he does in this sphere." Man is by nature capable of rising above instinct in any and all of his actions, including

[72] *Ibid.*, 46. And as we will see, human acts fall under the scope of the intellect and the will and, through them, are subject to the objective moral order.
[73] *Ibid.*, 46-47.

in the sexual arena. If this were not the case, morality itself would have no meaning.[74] The mode of action typical of man includes reflection on means and ends; he is (or can be) conscious of his aims and free to choose the means by which he achieves them. Only animals have sex without thinking about it. But human freedom, by definition, cannot be detached "from its essential and constitutive relationship to truth."[75]

Here we come to an important moment in our deliberations. For, according to John Paul II, authentic, objective human love is only possible if its point of departure is an affirmation of the other person as a person. This demands that I recognize him as a creature who is an end in himself, a someone, not a something, and who is pursuing his own ends and happiness. This recognition must be accompanied by the acknowledgement that it is thus always wrong to use the other as a means to an end. [76] Therefore, the use of any person as a sexual object in any sense is absolutely ruled out. Homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered because they obliterate the full meaning of the sexual act: the fullness of the sexual union is intrinsically creative and ordered toward the conception of children. One need not be religious to grasp that our bodies are designed for this purpose. Though the partners may feel genuine affection for one another, and even though some kind of emotional bonding may occur, since, in an objective sense, neither the truly unitive nor the procreative dimension of the sexual act can be present in homosexual acts, they must be said to be first and primarily ordered toward sexual pleasure Such acts are simply incapable of being ordered toward anything else; they can never result in the total gift of self that all human persons are called to make. The physical union called for by such a gift is literally impossible.

Man's acting in the sphere of human relationships is naturally governed by these laws; they cannot be transgressed for long if one's goal is authentic human happiness.[77] John Paul II states that "love cannot take the form of use, even if enjoyment is mutual and simultaneous. Instead, it finds its expression in the union of persons" within its only proper context: marriage.

[74] *Ibid*., 46

[75] John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor*, no. 4. Though I can only invoke this encyclical here, clearly the document is grounded in the Holy Father's anthropology and extends its significance for the moral life in profoundly meaningful ways. *VS* can be understood as an effort to translate the natural law and its moral norms into the language of personalism and human experience. More work needs to be done to illuminate the connections between these two complementary accounts and leverage them for our questions in this paper.

[76] Wojtyła refers to this as the "personalistic norm" throughout his writings.

[77] This is a reference, not to mere preference satisfaction, but to happiness understood as ordered toward the true and the good, and, ultimately, final union with God.

John Paul II has translated the objective account of the person that grounds the Church's teachings on man into the language of human subjectivity and experience. He has not altered that account in any way; he has simply decoded it, as it were, rendering it accessible to anyone willing to consider his experience in light of the whole truth about man. He has transformed it into something that can be leveraged in any encounter. For human experience is itself not a total mystery, detached from any internal unity or regulating feature. Nor is it a phenomenon alienated from the range of human reason or something that occurs outside its limits. It is always the experience of a person and, as such, is subject to analysis and appraisal. It is not a law unto itself but must submit to those laws, both natural and divine, that the evidence of our senses, reason, and conscience tell us govern the entire created order. It calls constantly for individual acts of transcendence and integration as the person moves from potency to act on their way to becoming that most excellent person that God had in mind when he created him.

But our work is not done. The concrete application of this account is still not clear. We will now turn our attention more explicitly to that concern.

When the Starting Place is Lived Experience

We are ready now, finally, to consider the implications of John Paul's II account for our questions in this paper. How can his truly radical interpretation of the human person aid us in our efforts to engage confidently in pastoral or therapeutic encounters?[78] In what way does it help us to begin with experience and still avoid compromising the full truth about the person? Again, what, concretely, is our approach to be if we are to put lived experience at the center of our interpretation of the person – without falling inevitably into subjectivism? In what follows, I will suggest four essential insights derived from John Paul's II account that can guide our encounters with those experiencing SSA and for those who minister to them.

The Moral Context

[78] John Paul's II account is "radical" in the original sense of that term: he has gone to the root of the issue and arrived at a new vision of what constitutes a complete account of the person.

Unquestionably, the first thing to recall (though not necessarily the first thing to invoke in a meeting with others) is John Paul's II conviction that the human person never exists nor acts outside of a moral context, a milieu governed by the natural law and the objective moral norms that follow from it, not to mention the teachings of Christ. With the tradition, John Paul II maintains that the person is naturally ordered toward the true and the good and insists that these natural inclinations are to be followed and governed by an understanding of freedom bound by the truth.[79] What the sainted Holy Father contributes is the insight that the objective nature of this moral context is itself accessible to lived experience. For evidence, we need only to reflect on the discomfort that accompanies our actions when we ignore the dictates of conscience. Or acknowledge the unhappiness that ensues when we embrace a disordered understanding of the good and pursue sensual pleasures or indulge our unhealthy or neurotic tendencies. Or recognize the joy that comes from choosing the truly good. Though they may deny it, persons intuitively know, often through their own experience, that there are certain things that lead to happiness – and certain things that simply do not. Since happiness is the only thing that the human person desires of necessity, all human choices can be understood to be but means to that end. These are the facts of human experience; they are transpersonal feature of human subjectivity. They can be leveraged in any encounter, whether with a client, a child, or a friend. But whether or not this moral order is mentioned at all, we can never lose sight of the fact that pastoral ministry or therapeutic practices unmoored from the context of moral norms will result in a nihilistic outlook; it will be ineffective and hopeless. The person always acts within this context; it provides him with his "true north" and compass. We can be confident that it provides the milieu for the person's experience of himself even when entirely unacknowledged by him.

An Insight from Thomism: The Priority of Existence

The second insight is found in John Paul's II particular brand of Thomism and the priority he places on the reality of existence rather than essence. Though it may be obscured by the metaphysical superstructure within which it resides, this understanding provides us with the existential starting place for any encounter with another. I have argued elsewhere that John Paul's II enormous

[79] That these aspects of human existence are accessible to human experience is a theme developed at length in his encyclical *Veritatis Splendor,* something we can only point to here.

personal appeal can be traced to the fact that he appropriated this idea into his very being – and it is precisely this insight that should inform every human interaction, most especially those of the pastoral minister or therapist.[80]

The Holy Father was what is known as an "existential" Thomist that is, a philosopher who subscribed to the interpretation of the Angelic Doctor proposed by Étienne Gilson. It was from Gilson that he learned that the philosophy of Aquinas should only be interpreted within the framework of his theological works and that this represented, not a systematic result, but an explicitly Christian way of doing philosophy. That is, an approach that remains true to the object and methods of philosophy but is undertaken within the horizon of the revealed truths of the faith. Most importantly for our purposes here, he also was introduced to Gilson's demonstration that Aquinas gives a certain pride of place to existence in his metaphysics and exposition of the doctrine of creation.

According to Gilson, Aquinas had departed from the Aristotelian definition of metaphysics as the study of being *qua* being in which being is reduced to a "substance," the concrete subsisting essence. Gilson points out that, for Aquinas, the doctrine of creation simply had to modify the very notion of metaphysics itself; it became instead "the science of being through its first cause." In this regard, Gilson makes the quite legitimate claim that the context for the metaphysics of being in Aquinas was the passage in Exodus when God reveals his identity to Moses as "I am Who Am." For Thomas, being thus meant the existence of the thing, not merely the thing itself.[81]

What is essential for us here is that, from his study of Aquinas, John Paul II now understood another fundamental truth about human personhood: that every human person, without exception, is held in existence—at every moment of his life—by a God who loves him. This can only mean that he is a good precisely because he exists. In other words, the starting place in grasping the significance of any living person is not who she is per se, but that she is. In his constant effort to come to know the person, John Paul's II first step in every encounter is to affirm the fact of her

[80] See D. Savage, "The Intellectual Conversion of Pope John Paul II: The Philosopher as Christian Witness and Pastor of the Church." Paper presented as "The Secret Life of John Paul II" at a conference at Duquesne University: "The Phenomenology of John Paul II," December 1, 2006.

[81] From this account in Scripture, Aquinas concluded that being was an act, not a form, since its function was to confer actual existence on the essence which receives it. See É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 154-89. This is a reference to Aquinas's distinction between essence and existence and provides an important point of departure for his metaphysics. John Paul II appears to accept Gilson's account of human knowledge though he makes some additional distinctions of his own. See K. Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism," in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 165-175, especially 170-171.

existence. He affirms her, he loves her, because she exists and therefore represents a good, one created and held in existence by God.

It is a familiar caveat—found in Augustine—who tells us that we cannot love that which we do not first know. This has led many of us to conclude that love of another can only follow once we engage in the process of getting to "know" that person. But John Paul II understood that the universal love demanded of us is based on the knowledge that **who you are**, that is, your essence, is secondary to **that you are**, that is, the fact of your existence.[82] There could be no better starting place for our encounter with others than the recognition of the unique good that each person represents in the order of creation.

As a practical matter, this calls us to make, first of all, a particular kind of effort in every interaction. If we are to invite another to consider the whole of who they are, then we must ourselves be aware of the whole of who *we* are. Here, we can admit to the experience we all have of being a sort of "talking-head," or, as C.S. Lewis puts it in *The Abolition of Man,* "men without chests."[83] We are ourselves a unity of body and soul and must bring all of who we are into the conversation if we have any hope of calling others to do so. We must learn to be *present* to others and, as just mentioned, to try not to forget that we are all held in existence at every moment of every day by a God who loves us and wills our good.

Thomas Aquinas defines love as the capacity "to will the good of another." John Paul II echoes this teaching in *Love and Responsibility* when he argues that the only suitable disposition toward another person is love—that love means that we seek the good of the beloved.[84] Love is the only suitable disposition because each person is an end in and of himself, never used as a mere means or discarded because useless. We are to love literally everyone, no matter what their disorder or difficulty. It does not mean we have to hug them, like them personally, or approve of their behavior. But a Catholic therapist or pastoral minister is certainly, in the first instance, called to love, to will the good of the other, because real healing can only take place within that embrace.

[82] In fact, I have argued that this is the basis for the enormous personal appeal of the late Holy Father, a matter of historical record. One had only to attend to the events immediately following his death in April, 2005 to grasp that it was a phenomenon that transcended religious and cultural boundaries, doctrinal differences, age and gender gaps. Many reported that in his presence, whether as part of a large crowd or in a private audience, one felt personally acknowledged, deeply affirmed and, indeed, called to a new level of holiness. My argument is that the source of this sense of "being known" was due to John Paul's II recognition of existence as the first reach of the mind and his embodiment of that principle in his encounter with others.

[83] C.S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (New York: Harper Collins, 1947), 2-3.

[84] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 40-44. See also, R. Spinello, *The Encyclicals of John Paul II* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), 40.

This is the thrust of Pope Francis's entire message to the Catholic faithful[85]; it is the basis for the Christian understanding of pastoral care and the starting place of a radically compassionate posture toward the other. For true compassion is never divorced from a fundamental respect for the true dignity of each and every human person and a recognition of their true potential as a child of God.

From Phenomenology: The Use of Categorial Limits

Finally a more complete answer to our question requires a brief consideration of one particular element in John Paul's II use of phenomenological method: his reference to something called "categorial limits," a technical term in phenomenology which refers to the cognitional act of recognizing a part in relation to a whole [86] Though an extensive treatment of phenomenology as a school of thought is well beyond our purposes here,[87] the term "categorial," is reasonably simple to grasp.[88] It is important here because of the use John Paul II makes of it in his efforts to assure us that we can start with lived experience without fear.

First, let us make it clear that John Paul II clearly grasps the significance of the problem posed for us by subjectivism and its lineage. He understands and affirms this as a legitimate concern.[89] But his response is equally clear: No, he argues, we are not "doomed to subjectivism" provided we maintain a connection to the integral experience of the human being,[90] provided we keep in mind the whole that, in truth, constitutes the person. He invokes this particular category of analysis, stating that we must always recall that all analyses aimed at illuminating human subjectivity have their "categorial limits," limits that cannot be transgressed or ignored. That is, our experience of constituting a specific phenomenon in ourselves must always be referred to the whole of which it is only a part.[91]

[85] Pope Francis, *Evangelii Gaudium*, 2013. See especially no. 169 and no. 171.
[86] See R. Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 7.
[87] For a more complete account of phenomenology in general, see Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 89-93. The text provides an excellent and very sound analysis of phenomenology as a school of thought.
[88] Sokolowski states that "it is especially in its treatment of categorial intending that phenomenology provides resources to escape the egocentric predicament of modern philosophy. Some of phenomenology's most original and valuable contributions to philosophy are found in its doctrines about categorial intentions." (Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 89.)
[89] Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," 213.
[90] *Ibid.*
[91] Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," 221. For a more complete account of this aspect of phenomenology, see Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 89-93.

When John Paul II argues that the analysis of human subjectivity is subject to categorial limits he is pointing out that it is not just an amorphous set of isolated and independent observations or a descriptive cataloging of individual phenomena; at a certain point, one is able to differentiate the part from the whole and make a judgment about it. He is arguing that we can know, through metaphysical reflection, that the person has a nature, a form, that takes shape in a certain body—and that any single experience must be seen as but a part and referred to that whole. No one, single human experience, no matter how profound its impact or meaning for me, defines who I am. It represents but a partial aspect of myself. It is, in fact, a moment of decision, a moment when I can choose, either to succumb to its demands—or recognize my own freedom to say "I may but I will not."

A person's "sexual" identity can never be seen as the totality of what constitutes the person. Clearly, it is only a partial aspect of their personhood and, as such, must be integrated into the whole of who they are. A therapeutic approach that permits the client to view himself or herself through the lens of a sexual identity, especially when this aspect of the person is causing discomfort and anguish, is fundamentally flawed. It is a form of medical malpractice.

A Final Insight: Transcendence and Integration

John Paul II argues that becoming who I am meant to be will require that I engage intentionally in two complementary dynamisms: transcendence and integration. He defines transcendence as the act of going beyond an established threshold or boundary; it is both transitive and intransitive. It begins in intentional acts of cognition and volition and proceeds along two trajectories. Horizontal transcendence (the transitive aspect) refers to the moments in which the person steps out of his limits toward an external object. Vertical transcendence (the intransitive aspect) consists in going beyond an inner threshold in oneself; it is a movement in the direction of self-determination and a greater, more fully realized freedom. Both dimensions are often present together. For example, they are both at work in the act of making a choice or a decision about whether or not to reach for (yet another) piece of cake. That is, they are both implicated in the choice I make when I either give in to—or refuse to allow—the impulses, the "happenings" of the appetites or passions to determine, at least in this instance, who I am or will become. These are acts of the person in which the experience of efficacy and freedom appears within the orbit of consciousness. The way in which

the person chooses in the face of repeated instances of such moments will, in the end, determine who she becomes. One may struggle with disordered desires. In point of fact, all of us do. But in attempting to acquire virtue through habitually choosing the truly good, every single human person has the potential to develop this capacity to the extent that he arrives at a moment when choosing that good is simply natural for him; he chooses it because he knows it will lead to his authentic happiness and, perhaps, ultimately to the fullness of being.

The theory of integration is complementary to transcendence; it is its necessary corollary. It accounts for the role that the human body, human biology, and physiology play in the *actus humanus* (any human act). First found in *Love and Responsibility*, where John Paul II describes how personal acts of love integrate different dimensions and layers of the subject, it is fully developed in *The Acting Person,* where he integrates the body into the theory of self-possession and self-governance mentioned above. He describes integration as the "realization and the manifestation of a whole and a unity emerging on the basis of some complexity." In this case, the psychosomatic complexity of the person integrated into a unity and a whole in every human action.

Thus, we see that transcendence is coupled with the need to incorporate and integrate the psychosomatic complexity of the person into a unity, into the whole of what one is, that is, a someone composed of both body and soul. These aspects of personhood are present in every human action and are features of the movement of the person toward a fuller realization of who he is meant to be.[92] They are bound up in the meaning of freedom and its relation to the efficacy of the will in moments of self-determination, experienced as an awareness of the fact that "I may but I do not have to."[93]

The work of integration calls me to assimilate those aspects of my experience that call me to be most fully who I am meant to be. Such an undertaking cannot leave out the body; in fact, it is the dynamism of the body that demands it. In every moment and in the face of every experience, I am responsible for becoming who I am meant to be, a someone who is, from conception, a unity

[92] For a superb analysis of John Paul's II theory of transcendence and integration, see Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, ch. 5.

[93] Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 115-116. For John Paul II, though the intellect remains the governor in acts of choice, the will is the power to determine oneself because it is the seat of freedom, of deliberate choice and decision. But the freedom under consideration is not the "concept of freedom as such" but something that is "real" in that it is constitutive of the reality of man and the privileged position he holds in the world. Free will cannot be understood apart from its identity as an essential element in the whole structure of the human person; it is a "constitutive element of the personal structure of man." In other words, it is a characteristic of the *person* and is the critical feature of self-determination. Also quoted in Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 113.

of a particular body and a particular soul, the totality of which can manifestly only ever be either male or female.[94]

Here we come, perhaps, to the heart of the matter. For the gender ideologues would have us accept that the body we are given at conception is merely accidental to our identity, that our identity is a matter of "conscious" choice. Let us here acknowledge the inherent contradiction in their claims. On the one hand they wish to maintain that sexual orientation is not a matter of choice since certain persons are "born" with SSA, thus arguing it is a "naturally" occurring phenomenon. On the other hand, they also wish to claim that the "choice" of gender is a decision each is free to make. It is difficult to make sense of this flawed proposition. Whatever its final resolution in the mind of its proponents, the fatal weakness at its heart is the manifestly false notion that our bodies (as either male OR female) and our consciousness have nothing essential in common. Whatever body we have, it is our consciousness that houses our identity – or so they claim.

John Paul's II account reveals the essential unity of the body and the soul (here simply understood as that which makes me a living being and what I am), a theory not imposed by a historical tradition that many deem out of date, but one accessible and demonstrable to human experience itself. We have shown that the occurrence of same-sex attraction should be thought of as merely a partial experience; it simply does not constitute the identity of the person. On the contrary, the identity of the person is constituted by his given nature, including and most especially the body, which is characterized by potencies that, over time, are actualized through intentional acts of self-transcendence and integration.

It is the task of the pastoral minister or therapist to guide the client experiencing same-sex attraction toward this integration. Whatever experience he or she presents, we know that our work is to help them to understand that, no matter how compelling, it is merely a part of the totality of who they are and further—that it needs to be transcended and integrated in order for them to realize more fully who they are meant to be.[95]

The anthropological framework proposed by John Paul II provides us with a comprehensive and authentically Catholic vision of the person that can, indeed should inform both pastoral care

[94] The rare exceptions to this norm notwithstanding.

[95] It is important to point out that the approach I am suggesting is not the equivalent of "praying the gay away." The whole point is that it is ineffective and invalid to treat merely a fragment of the person. The work of the Catholic therapist is to bring the person in his or her entire personhood into a new sense of wholeness and integration and perhaps a newly oriented life in Christ.

and therapeutic practice. It seems ironic that, in contrast to the radical tolerance insisted on by our culture in the name of freedom, it is only this approach that will lead to liberation, healing, and hope. For it permits us to remain grounded in the full truth about the person even as we acknowledge a starting place in the lived experience of those we encounter. We have learned that this starting place is not only possible but essential if we are to recover our culture, one person at a time.

It seems clear that all of us, whether parent, friend, pastoral minister, or therapist, are in need of a set of skills and questions that will permit us to move those we seek from a starting place in experience to an encounter with themselves as a whole person.[96] The right response to someone who claims to be experiencing SSA is not disbelief, but compassion, not refusal but an invitation to further dialogue, not an argument—but an offer of friendship. It will require supernatural patience and love. Above all, it will require firm confidence in the whole truth about the person, a unity of body and soul, who is called in every instance to become a gift for others.

[96] Here I would refer the reader to the notion of "threshold conversations" found in the work of Sherry Weddell. Though Ms. Weddell's focus is evangelization, her insight is applicable to our question here. See S. Weddell, *Forming Intentional Disciples: The Path to Knowing and Following Jesus* (Washington D.C: Our Sunday Visitor, 2012).

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The Meaning of "Witness" in Wojtyła's Works

John Corrigan[1]

Abstract

"Witness" plays an important role in Wojtyła's dissertation: "Faith According to St. John of the Cross" where, it seems to demonstrate a potent but obscure philosophical meaning. In subsequent early works the term seems to recede into the background while maintaining an indirect presence through the Polish words *przeżycie* and *doświadczenie*. The term returns with frequent use in his encyclicals as Pope John Paul II encorporating the philosophical meaning he developed in his use of it for theological themes. Here the attempt is made to unfold the development of the different meanings of the term and to suggest its philological development along the lines of some works of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Adolf Reinach.[2]

Keywords:

Witness, Karol Wojtyła, John Paul II, John of the Cross, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Adolf Reinach, Philosophy, Theology, *Redemptor Hominis*, *przeżycie, doświadczenie, erlebnis*

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[2] Elsewhere on "witness" see: J. Corrigan, *The Problem of the Idea of Culture in John Paul II* (Lanham Maryland: Roman & Littlefield, Lexington Books, 2020), 59-68; J. Corrigan, "The Problem of the Constitution of Culture in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II", *Aporía. International Journal for Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 12(2017), 39-54.

According to Grzegorz Ingnatik, the Polish word for "witness" is *świadek* which is derived from *wiedzieć* – to know. There are other important Polish words used extensively throughout Wojtyła's works that have a bearing on our considerations of "witness." These are: *przeżycie* and *doświadczenie.* When referring to experience broadly Wojtyła uses *doświadczenie* which probably also derives from *wiedzieć*.[3] So, a "witness" is one who knows and is therefore able to give testimony.

In 2015 I visited the library and spoke with the Polish director Andrzej Dobrzyński of the Casa Dom Polski Archives of John Paul II in Rome and found that *przeżycie* should be understood as containing a degree of the German word "*Erlebnis*" together with the English word "endured".[4] So, *przeżycie* refers to something the person has lived through. This is often translated "lived experience" in English. One can "witness" something and thereby have an e*rlebnis* but when one also lives through the event this "witnessing" takes on the dimensions of having lived through the experience with the kind of lived experience knowledge that comes with that. In addition, Polish writers use it to express the Aristotelian concept of a move from potency to act when this includes a personal experience of the same. This makes it an extremely important word in the vocabulary of Wojtyła who sought to put both the tradition of the Aristotelian/Aquinian philosophy of being and realist phenomenology into motion in his works. One can "witness" something and thereby have an *erlebnis* but to actually live through it in the sense of a personal experience is considered the strongest form of "lived experience". This can be captured in *przeżycie.*

It is very important that we recognize the relationship between the words "witness" and "testimony of experience" particularly through *doświadczenie* and *przeżycie* (experience and lived experience) because after his dissertation on John of the Cross Wojtyła's use of the term "witness" seems to fall into the background of his philosophical works though it reappears in abundance in his encyclicals as Pope John Paul II. It survives however, in the background of his methodology of demonstration through experience as is seen in his extensive use of *przeżycie* and *doświadczenie.*

[3] *Ibid*., Ignatik's note.
[4] K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. by G. Ignatik (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2013), 302-303, translators note 22. In this note we see that Ignatik agrees and states as much.

The relationship of the Polish word for "witness" to the root word "to know" explains Wojtyła's use of this term in philosophical demonstrations. A "witness" can lead one to know. In the same way that a "witness" in a trial is meant to illuminate the facts of the case a "witness" in the philosophy of Wojtyła illuminates things and brings us to knowledge. This knowledge is an experience based knowledge which shares intrinsic links to the essential characteristics of the given essence in question. Used in conjunction with *przeżycie* and *doświadczenie* we have an individual who has lived through the experience of illuminating events which convey essential data and insights delivering a degree of verifiable, objective knowledge and capable of being translated into philosophical language.

We can further distinguish the meaning of "witness" in the works of Wojtyła. Some of them do not appear until later in his career as John Paul II and after further development of his use of "witness."

A "witness", in the most general sense, is a kind of evidence or testimony to something. It calls us through the "witness" of personal experience to the exercise of *orthos logos* or *recta ratio* with regard to realities understood and grasped either through intuition or logic.[5]

For our purposes we are concentrating on those kinds of experience that come to us by virtue of being persons. Such a "witness" calls one to consider their own similar "witness" of experience.

We first see "witness" appear in his doctoral theses on "Faith in St. John of The Cross."[6] Here, Wojtyła refers to experience as a constitutive element of that authors work. Wojtyła recognizes and copies a methodology from St. John of the Cross whereby he utilizes both speculative treatises and personal experiences as informative of the human intellect. Referring to the works of John of the Cross he states: "They are not simply speculative treatises on mystical theology; they are witnesses to mystical experience."[7] Here, the meaning of "witness" refers to the

[5] The Greek and Latin for "right reason", respectively. These ancient terms in a certain sense could be called witnesses to such a thing as "right reason". Or we may say they call upon the reader to recognize the reality in itself that there is a "right reason" as opposed to a misuse of reason or the failure of reason to obtain an essence truly.
[6] "For that reason, we take the experiential witness of St. John of the Cross as the material for our investigation." (K. Wojtyła, "Faith According to St. John of the Cross" (Rome: Ignatius Press, 1981)).
[7] *Ibid*., 75.

fact that a given personal experience can serve as a testimony to validate something. It can lead to true knowledge. It bears philosophical importance. It may even bear "witness" to unseen realities.

In that work the "witness of experience" establishes the unitive role of faith in the intellect's desire for God. The experience in question centers on the "dark night of the soul." That experience is described as a situation in which the normal consolations the person receives in their relationship with God in prayer and faith are somehow taken away. Either through external sufferings which compromise the happiness of the individual or through interior trials consisting in the "absence" of God in the soul the individual is deprived of the normal means by which content is supplied to objects of a metaphysical nature. Since the senses cannot perceive metaphysical objects and the senses and emotions are currently being denied the consolation of peace or joy or the other "goods" associated with the spiritual life the individual is in the "dark". Fortunately, John of the Cross noticed, in this situation "faith" is able to supply content to the objects of faith which though not experienced in a sensual manner are nonetheless accessible empirically. This is possible through the knowledge of God as person through faith. The knowledge of God as person through faith evokes the connaturality of the knowledge of being a person with other persons which we possess at all times. In this manner Wojtyła also offers us a distinction between "sense" and "empirical". In Wojtyła for something to be empirical it does not necessarily have to be sensed in the senses. In empirical-inductive analysis such as that which is found in modern scientific analysis the reductive analysis is focused on objects which produce empirical facts and figures discernable in the senses. However, in that analysis not much can be said about - persons as persons - which involves the interior life with its rich subjectivity.

Whereas "empirical" in another use is the result of a subjective-reductive analysis where the subject is simultaneously the object - human person. This type of analysis offers us a great deal in relation to the experience of persons as persons. The results are empiricle while not being the object of sense observation.[8]

An example of this is found in Wojtyła's doctrine on culture where experience with the self as "person" and with others as "persons" witnesses to the transcendent, metaphysical nature of

[8] See: Corrigan, "The Problem of the Constitution of Culture in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II", section 2.1, "The Meaning of Human Experience."

human culture as oriented toward The One, The True and The Beautiful. The person witnesses to the metaphysical sources and aspects of human culture by virtue of their very own metaphysical dimension and by serving as the key source of any human culture. Therefore, it is necessary to see that at least some of the ends of culture in fact the most important end of culture must be metaphysical in nature.

In other words, the purposes of the activities undertaken in culture while they may possess a certain immediate end also possess a certain metaphysical end which corresponds to the nature of the human person so that the human person witnesses not only to metaphysical sources of human culture but also to metaphysical ends of human culture. Further, the ability of the individual and of peoples together to arrive at universal principles is a further "witness" to the metaphysical aspects of human culture.[9]

Wojtyła ties his considerations on "witness" to his discoveries of the person in action by which our author developed his key insights about the human person. This builds on his earlier work on St. John of the Cross in that the connatural experience of being a person together with other persons is employed as the field of investigation. "In a special way the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical inquiry."[10]

The person is a being with both an objective and subjective dimension. For Wojtyła, the subjectivity of the person refers, on the one hand to the *suppositum* of the person as seen in the philosophy of being of Aristotle and Aquinas and to the processes of consciousness and subjectivity as seen in the philosophies of consciousness on the other hand. The experience of the objectivity of the person takes place simultaneously with the experience of the subjectivity of the person. The "witness" value of this experience of objectivity and subjectivity becomes a key element in all Wojtylian analyses particularly with regards to overcoming what he considers the circularity of the philosophies of consciousness and the ensuing skepticism about objective knowledge.

In fact, while it may be the case that "witness" draws our attention to the existence of an actual essence in question sometimes it is sufficient that a "witness" highlight some of the essential characteristics of an essence. It is sufficient to draw our attention to those essential characteristics

[9] John Paul II, *Faith and Reason* (1998), no. 4.
[10] *Ibid*., no. 83.

in an essence, and to thereby call forth recognition that the given essence has certain characteristics as proper to it.

At times "witness" seems to go far beyond treating a given essence in question. It seems to aim not only at highlighting the essence in question but a "witness" may serve as a device in the process of making up for the lacunas of other philosophies. It may require from us a response to being, or an adjustment in our attitude toward certain things.

A "witness" can circumvent the circularity of the philosophies of consciousness which, once you enter you cannot exit, as Husserl experienced in his progression from "Back to Things in Themselves" to transcendental idealism. Lived experiences convey empirical knowledge of the sort that seems to be immune to the deconstruction of knowledge that happens as a result of the circularity of the philosophies of consciousness. Buttiglione says that Wojtyła does this in *The Acting Person*, by an analysis of "self-knowledge". That analysis takes the form of the "witness of personal experience" with self as a being who experiences simultaneously the objectivity of their personhood and the subjectivity of their personhood in the subject's experience.[11]

I think "witness" as introduced by Wojtyła and together with its latent philosophical potency may be a quintessential category of evidence sought by realist phenomenologists but never found or in the case of Wojtyła, found but not developed.

"Witness of personal experience" offers us a category of experience common to the experience of many persons or even all persons. Nonetheless, it is not often accompanied by a detailed description of the distinctive forms of knowledge related to it despite its being employed often and nearly ubiquitously in our daily lives. Take for example the experience of a carpenter who has been handed plans by an architect. On the job the carpenter finds that the plans "work in theory but not in practice" as the saying go. The carpenter makes adjustments and completes the project in a manner he knows from experience will satisfy the architect. When reporting back to the architect he must now work backwards from experience to theory to explain why the earlier plan did not work and why the subsequent modifications accomplished the desired end. "Theory" must be understood correctly here. It is not synonymous with "opinion" as is often the case in

[11] R. Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 180-181.

common speech. A "theory" in scientific terms is more like an inductive argument. Data is arranged in a logical fashion so as to build up a working model of what is believed to be the case. While subject to revision and improvement it is not *ad hoc*.

Something similar seems to be going on in Wojtyła's works. Beginning with experience he works backwards to an explanation as to a theory of morality which though modern in its phenomenological method aligns with the tradition, and the philosophy of being found in Aristotle and Aquinas as seen in some of his works on ethics already referenced.

Theological Use of "Witness" in John Paul II

After leaving the term "witness" largely in the background for many works after his doctoral dissertation he employs it frequently in papal encyclicals. A simple word search for "witness" in the encyclicals and anything in the papal period for that matter generally produces multiple uses of the term. By this time he has already worked out the theological potency of "witness." As a result the term is more amenable to frequent use. Often, in his role as John Paul II, "witness" is used without the qualifiers "of personal experience" or "of experience." This does not mean that the personalist focus in his considerations should be dropped and a merely general meaning of the term witness adopted. In fact, by this point in the life of Wojtyła his personalism has been more developed. It may be that by this time he assumes some knowledge of his personalist thought.

We see "witness" appear in his very first encyclical. Its appearance is striking in the unfolding of his thought because it may provoke a great many considerations not limited to the theological potency of his use of the term. At first glance he seems to employ it in a manner which could be characterized as exclusively religious in nature by virtue of the fact that it appears as a quote from scripture regarding the Holy Spirit. Only a superficial read could allow one to characterize it such.

> When the Counsellor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness to me; and you also are witnesses, because you have been with me from the beginning.[12]

This is a very strange passage for several reasons. On closer inspection it is a wonderful example of continuity and development in the thought of Wojtyła. Why is it strange? Until recently, the community of believers that Jesus says this to did not even know there was a "Holy Spirit." The content of the object "Holy Spirit" is still taking shape in the Apostles. It is, according to Christianity, Jesus who reveals the Trinity. At this point the doctrine of the Trinity is at best sketchy. The Israelites had it drilled into their heads for thousands of years in the Shema that "The Lord our God, The Lord is One"[13] Jesus was in no small amount of trouble for claiming to be one with the Father. Now he is telling his followers there is a third person in the Godhead. This being the case; how is it that this formerly unknown person is going to bear "witness" to Jesus? On the contrary, it was Jesus who just bore witness to the previously unknown existence of the Holy Spirit. Though it is mentioned in Genesis in the inclusive term "Us" such as "Let us make man in our image"[14] and we see the Spirit mentioned as the "Spirit of God" in other places[15] these are hardly conclusive enough to teach the Israelites about the Trinity.

Of course, theologically all these questions will be answered on Pentecost when the disciples receive the Holy Spirit and know what Jesus knew as he promised them. It is not until they come to know the Holy Spirit that any of this really makes sense to them. Once they do know the Holy Spirit in the experience of Pentecost they receive power and knowledge. In other words, the knowledge once again comes by way of a lived experience of another person in this case the third person of the Trinity. This brings us back to Wojtyła's philosophical use of the term "witness." It is already pregnant in the scriptural use of the term and therefore loaded with all that we have

[12] Jn. 15: 26-27 in John Paul II, "Faith and Reason", no. 2.
[13] Deut. 6:4. ESV retrieved: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy+6%3A4&version=ESV (19.02.2024)
[14] Gn. 1:26. ESV. retrieved: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+1%3A26&version=ESV (19.02.2024)
[15] Mk. 1:10. ESV. retrieved: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark+1%3A+10&version=ESV (19.02.2024)

said about the philosophical potency of "witness" as a content driver now applied to Wojtyła's new role as supreme teacher of the Catholic faith. It is the connatural knowledge we share as persons which allows another person to "witness" to us effectively. A "witness" serves as a personal testimony of lived experience. Lived experiences are lived for the most part together with others who while not sharing all the same lived experiences know and have experienced what lived experiences are and the kind of *Sachkontact*[16] they can deliver.

How "witness" contributes to Wojtyła's philosophical project

Kenneth Schmitz characterizes the philosophical project of Wojtyła as a project in ethics "worked out in the larger context of the nature, condition and destiny of the human person." That larger context can be called "philosophical anthropology." To be clear Wojtyła engages in both theological anthropology and philosophical anthropology. Philosophical anthropology takes into consideration the work of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology but its real concentration concerns the nature and structure of the person as such in the person's ontological and metaphysical structure. For Wojtyła, philosophical anthropology must incorporate the role of the *suppositum* of the human person which he regards as the metaphysical basis of the human person.[17]

Theological anthropology would take philosophical anthropology into consideration and focus on the nature and destiny of the human person in light of a relationship to God through grace, revelation and covenants.

Schmitz further characterizes the general ethical question of Wojtyła as "Why be moral?" and goes on to explain that such a question is not properly a question of ethics since ethics presupposes that we are interested in knowing the moral course of action. This is because to do ethics presupposes certain traditions, beliefs and attitudes regarding right conduct. Those may arise from a philosophical tradition such as we see in ancient Greece or from a philosophical/theological

[16] From the German philosophical tradition. It refers to a kind of personal, solid contact with something that makes it really known.
[17] K. Schmitz, *At The Center Of The Human Drama* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 30.

tradition such as we see in the Greco/Roman / Judeo/Christian tradition. Those living in a traditional society still feel connected to the lessons taught by that tradition. In a traditional society the continuity with the past has not been broken. Traditional values, mores, customs reinforce the need to conform to ethical standards. In fact, the reasons for doing so fear of punishment, promise of reward and a conviction that it is the right thing to do and that the right thing to do is good for me as a person exist simultaneously in a kind of hierarchy of maturity of human values. The traditional society encourages new members of the society to advance up through these reasons to the highest one as a matter of personal development.[18]

Those living in a post traditional society have been cut off from or brought to a point of serious doubt concerning the lessons of tradition. This may be the result of a competing set of values. Skepticism which comes out of the philosophies of consciousness regarding knowledge and objectivity also divorce one from a traditional philosophical ethics as does a skepticism toward the tradition which may arise as a result of legitimate criticisms of historical scandals[19] For persons living in a post traditional society questions proper to ethics can be compromised by unanswered pre-ethical questions which touch more on the nature of man, the concept of the person, the ultimate end of the person and the meaning of human existence. "Why be moral?" is such a question.

To ask the question "why be moral?" is to enter the topic of ethics at an earlier stage, one that does not necessarily presuppose a tradition as a valid point of reference. Such a question concerns the very foundations of ethics and morality. Wojtyła was keenly aware of the fact that modern man was somehow removed from a traditional society. In a situation where there is a break from the past it is beneficial not to assume that members of society want to act ethically before finding reasons to do so. In such a scenario it becomes necessary to supply a valid answer to the question, "Why be moral?" It becomes essential to establishing ethics as a constitutive aspect of the meaning of human existence.[20] A witness of personal experience can often supply this needed connection to the "why" of moral values.

[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*

Dietrich von Hildebrand and Adolf Reinach in the philological development of "witness of personal existence" in Wojtyła

We know that Wojtyła had an interest in phenomenology and drew inspiration from certain authors. Unfortunately, aside from Max Scheler and some general comments about Dietrich von Hildebrand it is difficult to find direct references to other authors in Wojtyla's works. For this reason I think it is more accurate to speak of a philological influence rather than a clear cause and effect regarding the roles of Hildebrand and Reinach on Wojtyła. Clearly, Wojtyła was aware of the early phenomenologists. He even played a significant role in the canonization of Edith Stein who was an assistant to Husserl in the days that Hildebrand was studying under Husserl and during which Adolf Reinach was seen as a leading thinker and inspiration to other philosopher's in those circles. I have yet to find direct references to Reinach in Wojtyła's works. However, there are illusions to his themes in curious contexts which suggest it and the similarity between Wojtyła's philosophical project and that of Adolf Reinach should not be missed. For example, in an address to The World Institute of Phenomenology of Hanover Wojtyła described phenomenology along lines that would not be shared by those of the idealist schools but which echo descriptions which combine texts of Reinach from *Über Phänomenologie*[21] and references to a new project on the philosophy of God Reinach outlined briefly in a letter to his wife. Wojtyła writes:

> Phenomenology is primarily a style of thought, a relationship of the mind with reality whose essential and constitutive features it aims to grasp, avoiding prejudice and schematisms. I mean that it is, as it were, an attitude of intellectual charity to the human being and the world, and for the believer, to God, the beginning and end of all things.[22]

[21] A. Reinach, *Samtliche Werke*, reprint by B. Smith, K. Schuman (München, Philosophia Verlag: 1989), 531.

[22] *Address of John Paul II to a Delegation of the World Institute of Phenomenology of Hanover:* https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2003/march/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20030322_hanover.html (19.02.2024)

In *Über Phänomenologie,* Reinach is methodical and precise in his descriptions of both how to describe essences and how not to fall into prejudices, reductionisms and errors by establishing a proper relationship of the mind to reality. In some respect we may say all good philosophy does this but more specifically in the phenomenological tradition, Reinach's *Über Phänomenologie*[23] employs this approach through human experience to overcome reductionist tendencies such as those found in certain postulates of modern math or various forms of idealism.

Further, in a letter from the front lines of WWI to his wife Anna, the early phenomenologist Adolf Reinach mapped out his new direction of philosophical investigation. What Reinach expresses there is a radical shift in his understanding of philosophy and his plan to make future works reflect his newfound grasp of the importance of the philosophy of God.

> I see my plan clearly before me - it is of course very modest. I want to start from the experience of God, the experience of being sheltered in God, and to do nothing more than to show that from the point of view of "objective science" one cannot raise any objection to this. I would like to show what is enclosed in the meaning of these experiences, and to what extent this makes a claim to "objectivity," since it presents itself as authentic knowledge, even if knowledge of a unique kind, and finally to draw the consequences from this. Such an exposition has *nothing at all* to give to the really devout believer. But it can give support to someone who has been shaken, who has been confused by the objections of science, and it may lead on someone whose way to God has been blocked by these objections. I think that to carry out such a work in all humility is the most important thing which can be done today.[24]

He died in WWI before he could ever realize that plan. Considering the development of Wojtyła's thought from St. John of the Cross through the philosophy of human action into the philosophy of

[23] *Ibid*.; A. Reinach, *Samtliche Werke*, 531.
[24] Dietrich von Hildebrand: quoting Reinach's letter, in *Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 3(1983), xxiv, xxv. In this journal the first section is entitled: *Reinach as a Philosophical Personality.* It includes a never published introduction by Hildebrand meant for an edition of Reinach's Collected works "Gesammelte Schriften" wherein this quote from Reinachs letter to his wife Anna appears. In that introduction Hildebrand mentions the high esteem for Reinach held by virtually all of the philosophers in Husserl's direct circle.

human freedom it is striking how easily one could assume that Wojtyła decided to take up this unfinished project and bring it to completion. The above quote of Reinach includes all the major components of Wojtyła's development of "witness of personal experience." Consider how the quote moves from the mystical experience of God through the objectivity of the experience of self as a person as revealed in the experience of God as person. It then moves to the grounding of an objective knowledge of the world through and by means of the simultaneity of the experience of the objectivity and subjectivity of the self confirmed in that experience. In other works, already referenced, I have shown the importance of this line of reasoning in Wojtyła's works. Further, Wojtyła's incorporation of an Augustinian style dialogue between philosophy and theology and faith and reason do much to accomplish this very project of Reinach's.

Reinach is not the only one to make extensive use of human experience as a mode of phenomenological investigation. In a certain sense all good philosophy should to this but specifically, in the phenomenological tradition there is Hildebrand whom John Paul II acknowledged directly. In a 1980 audience with Alice von Hildebrand, Dietrich von Hildebrand's widow, John Paul II said that her husband was "one of the very great ethical thinkers of the twentieth century."[25] According to Thomas Howard, in that private audience, John Paul II also acknowledged his intellectual debt to Hildebrand in several areas.[26]

In his seminal work, *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła writes:

> Nevertheless, as an existential reality morality is always strictly connected with man as a person. Its vital roots grow out of the person. Indeed, it has no existence apart from man's performance of actions and his fulfillment through actions […] [Morality] shows also an ontological status, namely, an existential reality, the reality of fulfillment in an action, that is appropriate solely to the person. In its axiological nature morality is anchored and rooted

[25] A. Hildebrand, "An Audience with John Paul II", *Crises Magazine* (May 1, 2005); retrieved 12/07/23: https://crisismagazine.com/vault/guest-column-an-audience-with-peter (19.02.2024)
[26] T. Howard, "A Portrait of Dietrich Von Hildebrand", *Crisis Magazine* (November 7, 2011); retrieved 12/07/23: https://crisismagazine.com/opinion/a-portrait-of-dietrich-von-hildebrand-2 (19.02.2024)

> in the ontological reality and at the same time conversely it unfolds its ontological reality and helps [us] to understand it.[27]

This passage seems to indicate an intimate familiarity with the conclusions drawn in Hildebrand's doctoral thesis: *Die Idee Der Sittlichen Handlung*.[28] For example:

> In diesem Sinne ist jeder zur Handlung gewordene Wille eine andere Realisation sittlich negativer oder positiver Werte als ein in der blossen Willensantwort verbleibender, der etwa nicht einmal einen Vorsatz fundiert. War es fur die Zentralitat charakteristisch, das das Verhalten dem eigentlichen >>Kern<< der Person zukommt, so ist es hier das >>Durchsetztsein<< der ganzen Person, das >>sie bis in die Fingerspitzen durchdringen<<, was die grössere Bedeutung fur die Person und damit fur die Welt sittlicher Güter ausmacht.[29]

Hildebrand's work sought to illuminate that there are numerous "bearers of moral value" in addition to the solitary one, namely the will, identified by Kant, as he read Kant to be saying. Wojtyła on the other hand sought in his work to uncover sources of interpreting the human person in relation to ethics and moral norms by means of the analysis of the person in action. Even though their respective investigations are quite different there is a striking similarity to the manner in which their considerations concerning the ontological and axiological aspects of the human person contribute to their considerations regarding the person and moral action. They both also seem to perceive a lacuna of philosophical analysis lying in the gap between the traditional philosophies of potency and act in the philosophy of man on the one hand and the modern philosophies of

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[27] K. Wojtyła, "The Acting Person", *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. 10 (1979), A. Potocki (ed.), trans. by A.T. Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Reidel Publ. Company), 152. It should be noted that a new and more accurate translation now exists through Catholic University of America: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, trans. by Grzegorz Ignatik (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021).

[28] D. von Hildebrand, *Die Idee der Sittliche Handlung* (Halle a. d-S, M.: Niemeyer, 1916), 122-126.

[29] *Ibid*, 123. This passage does not permit a literal translation into English. I have translated it in this manner: "In this sense every willing that is put into action is a realization of a disvalue or a value in contradistinction to a mere inclination or position that lacks any intention of being put into action and which therefore cannot even be called a true intention. So that, while it is paramount to say that action arises out of the core of the person, so too here the moment of -putting into action- bears incredible meaning for the person and the world of ethical value."

consciousness and axiology on the other. This gap of analysis provides them both with the opportunity to provide the analysis which may help bring the insights of these two traditions into a viable dialogue.

In a lengthy phenomenological analysis Hildebrand exhibited numerous other bearers of moral value in human action. Among them he identifies the essence of the person itself, wonderment, and astonishment, esteem et al. and identifies them as either direct or indirect bearers of moral value.[30] His refutation of Kant then did not take the form of attacking the arguments of Kant directly but rather of bringing to light evidences which expanded the count of "bearers of moral value" beyond that of the singular one recognized by Kant. The approach Hildebrand used employed the "witness" of common human experience. Drawing upon common human experience Hildebrand was able to bring these other bearers of moral value to light thus overcoming the reductionist error of Kant.

One might say, that this approach counters the attempt at establishing a universally applicable skepticism built on the subjectivist conclusions of some philosophies of consciousness.[31] In a way it halts the deconstruction of the concepts of consciousness by appealing to evidences of experience which have such universal appeal that they seem to establish a more fundamental as well as more profound experience of reality than that which can be described in the treatment of consciousness as an isolated focus of study. The method brings to light new evidences of objective knowledge contained in common human experience and to some extent even in the statements of Rene Descartes, Kant and others Wojtyła would deem "idealists".

In order for this to be effective "common human experience" as an evidence must be approached correctly, established firmly and annunciated clearly with respect to when and why this application of a phenomenological method is not reductive to the phenomena of the mind or to unsubstantiated biased opinion. This is done through the illumination of the objective aspects of

[30] *Ibid*., 124-125.

[31] The description "philosophies of consciousness" is used throughout many of Wojtyła's early works to describe the philosophy of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant and other modern philosophers who per Wojtyła get stuck in a certain circularity of the processes of consciousness and either espouse or become de facto idealists as a result. For more on how Wojtyła deals with the philosophies of consciousness see: Corrigan, "The Problem of the Constitution of Culture in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II"; Corrigan, *The Problem of the Idea of Culture in John Paul II*; Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, ch. 8.

the "personal mode of existence" experienced by human persons as persons. So, the particular experience of the one doing the phenomenological analysis must illuminate something common to the personal mode of existence which is rendered possible by the fact that the personal mode of existence is itself a common experience among human persons. This common mode of existence has an array of evidences and even ways of knowing which are sometimes passed over all too quickly in scientific analyses. The shared human experience replaces the individual experience proper to personal opinion thus rendering human experience as a kind of empirical data capable of scientific analysis. For Wojtyła the areas of objective knowledge which benefit from this include but are not necessarily limited to certain experiences of self-knowledge as well as knowledge through faith, mystical experience and even knowledge through the senses when those are understood correctly.[32]

I believe this is important in understanding Wojtyła's use of the term "witness." It is important to understand the manner in which Wojtyła drew his development of the term "witness" out of Hildebrands use of a "bearer of moral value" within the context of the larger Wojtylian project. A "witness" reveals evidences of something accessible to our experience as persons who share the common experience of "personal existence." The bearers of moral value which Hildebrand illuminates are not merely concepts but also involve life experiences common to us all. Things like honor, wonder, reverence and awe are known to us all in such a general way that they do not require any further explanation. Similarly, an object, event or personal experience can "witness" the reality of certain common realities and the truths contained therein.

Wojtyła's use of "witness" is applied in a more universal way than Hildebrand's use of "bearer". This universality of application gives it certain strengths and weaknesses in comparison to Hildebrand's term "bearer." Whereas, "bearer" in Hildebrand's dissertation is used almost exclusively in reference to a bearer of moral value "witness" seems to have a number of applications in Wojtyła. On the other hand, it's more universal application also tends to make it general in its meaning and lacking the specificity of the term "bearer" in Hildebrand. In "witness"

[32] *Ibid.*

Wojtyła uses the term to indicate that there is a bearer of an underlying value[33] which has been missed in all reductionist analyses. A "witness" calls our attention to something we have either missed or forgotten about, something which demands our attention particularly in light of any reductionist theory which misses an essential characteristic of the experience of thing in question.

In his doctoral dissertation Hildebrand avoids the polemics of either accepting or arguing against the foundations of Kant's philosophy. This is a method Hans-Georg Gadamer would have benefited from. In his search for objectivity Gadamer was continually hindered by his admitted acceptance of Kant's foundations[34] resulting in his expressions reflecting idealism. He found himself having to revise and revise previous statements in search of securely establishing some form of objectivity in his hermeneutics.

Hildebrand avoided both the acceptance of Kant's foundations as well as the hopeless polemics of engaging the philosophies of consciousness in a combative manner where the common ground for such a debate is perpetually allusive. Instead, he completely circumvents the debate by providing tenable evidences from common lived experience for his claim that there are other bearers of moral value besides the will.

The same thing is accomplished in Wojtyła's utilization of "witness." A "witness" is not an argument. It is not a rendition or retelling of history. A "witness" always conveys a lived experience. Lived experiences are things we can all relate to. A lawyer uses a "witness" to validate his claims. The lawyer does not rely on logical arguments alone but calls the "witness" as a testimony of facts and events.

Employing a "witness" as evidence shows us a way of doing philosophy which is rich with other similar vectors of personal experience. These connect us to what is true in the tradition regardless of the integrity or lack thereof of the previous histories of philosophy. It is largely immune to the historical critical method of deconstructing the tradition. For example, by providing

[33] It is not possible in this work to offer a justification of the "*Wertethic*" and its history which, in this case, we trace from Scheler through Wojtyła. There is a rich tradition of this from Scheler through Hildebrand and Seifert which developed somewhat separately of Wojtyła's but with many parallel and complimentary realizations and themes.

[34] Hans-Georg Gadamer says: "I have recorded my acceptance of Kant's conclusions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: I regard statements that proceed by wholly dialectical means from the finite to the infinite, from human experience to what exists in itself, from the temporal to the eternal, as doing no more than setting limits, and am convinced that philosophy can derive no actual knowledge from them." (H.G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York, N.Y.: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1994), xxvi.)

new empirically valid points of reference the hearer is brought into the lived experience of morality as a constitutive aspect of human existence. Rather than being a "theory" about right and wrong morality is experienced as a dimension of the meaning of human action and existence. When ethics and morality become a lived experience those lived experiences are a "witness" to the very reality of ethics as a constitutive aspect of the person. He says, "But the theory of morality, and then ethics, proceeds from a thoroughly original experience. This experience contains a thoroughly original relation of human beings as subjects and authors to values, especially to moral values."[35]

Elsewhere he employs this method to the revitalization of Catholic sexual ethics.[36]

Conclusion

In English, the term "witness" is such a general term that it would be easy to read over it in the works of Karol Wojtyła and in his later works as John Paul II. However, a careful look at his doctoral dissertation and the etymology of "witness" in Polish relating it to the words for experience, knowledge and knowledge that comes from experience yield a term potent with philosophical and theological content as developed by him.

Wojtyła may have found methodological and philological inspiration in Hildebrand's "bearers of moral value" in the development of "witness of personal experience" for his own doctoral dissertation. He may have also found inspiration for his own philosophy of God in Reinach's proposed project regarding the same. More research in Wojtyła's personal correspondences, sermons and lectures may provide evidence for direct influence. At any rate a developed understanding of "personal experience" as simultaneously possessing dimensions of subjective and objective knowledge is employed by all three in their own manner while Wojtyła's

[35] K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of the Theory of Morality," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. by Th. Sandok (New York – Berlin – Bern - Frankfurt/M. – Paris - Wien: Peter Lang, 1993), 160. "original" here should not be understood along the lines of personal as in personal opinion but rather along the lines of the discovery of an empirical evidence which stands in its own right as empirical and evidential.

[36] Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*; K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics: Reflections and Postulates", in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*. In the same work see also: K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of Experience in Ethics", in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 107.

debt to phenomenology as a method of investigation is well established suggesting at least an indirect or general influence from these thinkers in his development of "witness."

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Karol Wojtyła's Method of Objectifying the Experience of Being Human

Piotr S. Mazur[1]

Abstract:

Karol Wojtyła recognizes that the source of reliable knowledge about man is both external and internal experience. Internal experience plays a more important role in the cognition of human existence; however, its cognitive objectification is necessary. Therefore, he proposes his own method of objectification of the experience of being human, the stages of which are stabilization, intersubjectivization and equalization with external experience.

Key words: Karol Wojtyła, experience, experience of human existence, method, method of objectifying experience

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One of the key problems in the philosophy of man is the issue of self and subjectivity. Despite the lack of agreement regarding the basic facts about the subject, the experience of being human is the subject of constant interest both in the exact sciences and in philosophy.[2] When striving to explain such facts as consciousness, self-knowledge, intentionality or reflection, this experience cannot be omitted, even if it is not considered a source of reliable knowledge about man. In turn, recognizing the truth of the content of internal experience requires the cognitive objectification of its results. This is necessary because, as Aristotle emphasized, it is not possible to build knowledge about the individual (*de singulari non est scientia*). Therefore, the claim that the data of internal experience constitute the basis of scientific cognition (at least as much as philosophy makes possible) requires indicating a way (method) of moving from what is subjective to what is intersubjective. And an outline of this type of method is provided by Karol Wojtyła in his study *Person and Act*.[3] The desire to, if not completely eliminate, then at least limit the defects of internal experience is dictated by the fact that it provides insight not only into the subjective self, but also into dynamism, agency, and ultimately into the nature of the human person and his ontic status.

Subjectivism or subjectivity?

Of key importance for Wojtyła's analyzes is the distinction between subjectivity and subjectivism, which is not visible in those concepts that consider the subjective sphere *ex definitione* to be subjective, and therefore devoid of the objectivity necessary to be a source of scientific knowledge.

[2] As Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi emphasize, philosophers and scientists are divided on whether the concept of self is valid at all. There is no consensus on whether it is real or just a theoretical construct, or on the method of examining it. The belief of phenomenologists (Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre) about the existence of the ego as the entity unifying all experiences as being unnecessary is complemented by naturalistic neuroskepticism, according to which the "I" does not fit into the scientific vision of the world. See: *The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science* (Naw York: Routledge, 2008), 197-198. In addition, the attitude towards the human self also varies from accepting it as something real (though sometimes biologically conditioned – John R. Searle), without which man cannot be explained, to something that does not exist and without which, not only can the world be explained but the human being can as well (Thomas Metzinger).

[3] The term "method" may be understood in various ways. Stanisław Kamiński indicates that the scientific method can be: "[...] the very course of operations in posing issues, solving them as well as justifying and systematizing answers, or a set of assumptions adopted as the framework or guidelines of the study […] or finally all the activities and means used to efficiently achieve the research results." S. Kamiński *Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1998), 202. The understanding of the term "method" proposed here includes both general instructions regarding the procedure for examining internal experience, as well as at least the most general outline of the course of cognitive activities.

This approach, however, raises the paradox of striving to explain the fact of being human while omitting the experience of being human. Wojtyła takes the opposite position, claiming that it is impossible to explain man and his agency without this experience. However, being aware of the difficulties associated with this experience, which became visible in the context of the modern philosophy of the subject, he distinguishes subjectivity from subjectivism. Subjectivity as knowing the subject, i.e. the reality of the human "I", is something different than subjectivism, i.e. a specific mental attitude that makes everything dependent on one's own view.

According to Wojtyła, subjectivism cannot be reconciled either with the understanding of real objects or - more importantly - with the knowledge of human subjectivity. Subjectivism does not result from the primacy of subjectivity, but from the absolutization of consciousness. This absolutization consists in pushing out the presence of the real subject from the internal experience and taking its place by consciousness with its contents.

> *However, once consciousness ceases to be understood as an aspect, it also ceases to explain subjectivity, that is, the subjectivity of man and of his acts, and it itself becomes an ersatz subject*. *Subjectivism understands consciousness as an integral and exclusive subject*—the subject of lived-experiences and values [...] Regrettably, under this assumption, with this mental attitude, both lived-experiences and values cease to be something real.[4]

The limit of approaches to subjectivity that maintain an objective and at the same time realistic character is the recognition of self-knowledge.[5] Therefore, only consciousness "integrated" with self-knowledge has an objective dimension, becoming the basis for knowing subjectivity, and not for its construction.

Subjectivity is established through consciousness but is not a product of it. It is the experience of one's own subjectivity given while performing one's acts (deeds). The facts of agency, action and moral responsibility experienced in it are objective in nature, although they have this "objectivity and reality" only in the subjectivity of man.[6] Dietrich von Hildebrand has a similar opinion, pointing to the different meanings of the term "subjective" he writes:

[4] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays,* trans. by G. Ignatik (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021), 158–59.
[5] *Ibid.*, 159.
[6] *Ibid.*, 158.

> […] if the term "objective" indicates the dignity and rank of reality, then such "subjective" realities as personal acts, joy, love, conviction, faith, and knowledge are fully objective realities, and are more "metaphysical" than stones and events in the material cosmos."[7]

Subjectivizing these realities by referring to the secondary meaning of subjectivity, according to the German philosopher, consists in confusing the ontological and epistemological meaning. The existence of something in consciousness is indeed different from its existence in reality. Therefore, a house that exists in reality exists only subjectively in the mind. However, subjective acts and experiences (joy, wanting, knowing) "These realities, when they are accomplished, are real "parts" of the ontological reality, the person."[8] It is therefore a mistake to confuse them with virtual entities.

Taking into account the aspect of subjectivity is crucial to the proper reading of the objective fact of human agency and action. According to Wojtyła, it is not sufficient to recognize human subjectivity in terms of metaphysical cognition and the category of *suppositum* present in it, as a subject existing in itself. Such subjectivity is detached from its source, experiential dimension, to the detriment of human cognition itself. However, if even this classical approach to being as a substance-subject existing within itself is not fully adequate to the cognition of the human "I", then the approaches to the human being that refer only to external experience proposed in the specific sciences and in some philosophical concepts are even less sufficient. What is proper to a human being, and which reveals his humanity is available in the inner experience in the sphere of his experiences. Therefore, objective and truly existing subjective facts available in, and thanks to, consciousness can be grasped and known only by using an appropriate method of cognition which, while avoiding subjectivism, cognitively reaches subjectivity.

The specificity of human experience

Wojtyła emphasizes the importance of experience in human cognition, but at the same time rejects phenomenalism with its reductionist approach to the fact of man. Experience should not be reduced to the system of functions and content provided by the senses. Referring to the findings of

[7] D. von Hildebrand, *What Is Philosophy?* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973), 155.
[8] *Ibid.*, 155.

phenomenology, he proposes that "experience" should be understood as a cognitive act in which one directly reaches the perceived reality, regardless of whether it concerns the external or internal states of the subject. He also emphasizes that the result of such an approach is much richer than what the human senses perceive: "In no way can we grant that, in grasping this fact, experience is limited to the mere "surface"—to a group of sensory contents [...] *Every human experience is at the same time some understanding of what I experience*."[9] This understanding of experience, while it does not negate the presence of a phenomenal layer in it, presupposes a much richer cognitive contact between man and the object than only the one through which he perceives the phenomenal, material side of things. Human reason takes part in experience, enabling, apart from the sensory, also an intellectual view of the fact. Therefore, referring to the human act he analyzes, Wojtyła emphasizes that the experience of performing the act also includes its intellectual view. However, the repeatability of the experience of an act forces us to treat it as "obvious", being a visualization (cognitive self-manifestation) of this fact and, at the same time, its understanding as an "act of the person."

The Polish philosopher agrees with the phenomenalists that experience has the dimension of a singular and unique act, but argues that it cannot be reduced to such a singular act, since it is always part of the human experience as a whole.[10] Therefore, just as it is not justified to isolate the aspect of phenomenal experience from the intellectual aspect, it is also not justified to isolate a single experience from other experiences. The fact of man as an object emerges both from individual experiences and from their totality. The experience of being human, without denying the uniqueness and unrepeatability of individual experiences, is their "sum", "resultant", "totality." Each individual experience, being an experience in itself, influences and thus forms the whole of human experience. The latter is the "unity of many experiences," which, with every individual experience is enriched and objectified. The specificity of human experience understood in this way also includes the fact that it is continuous and - contrary to phenomenalists - it does not end with the reception of impressions. "The experience of man—the man I myself am—lasts as long as does

[9] Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 102. Although Wojtyła does not raise this issue separately, "understanding" as part of experience should not be associated with thought processes that are already an interpretation of this experience. Understanding here would be the spontaneous grasping of what (reality) is indicated to reason by the senses, rather than the creation of various meanings of that experience. The desire to capture and meticulously analyze the states of being indicates the realist orientation of Wojtyła's philosophy, which places the states of being of the human subject before thinking about the subject.
[10] *Ibid.*, 95–96.

the direct cognitive contact in which I am the subject, on the one hand, and the object, on the other."[11]

From Wojtyła's concept emerges a complex concept of the fact of man, encompassing the sphere of his objectivity and subjectivity, and a complex concept of experience which, although in each individual case it is an authentic human experience (being human), is not just an individual act.[12] It is the result of continuous, and at the same time sensory (phenomena) and intellectual (understanding) cognitive contact of man with himself as subject and object, as a result of which a "totality of experience" of himself is produced. Therefore, human experience can also be understood as "contact" or "cognitive contact with oneself." "This contact has an experiential character both continuously, as it were, and every time it is established."[13] In the concept proposed by Wojtyła, the factors that make it possible to objectify human experience are already contained in the experience itself. These may include: 1) continuity and unity of the entire human experience; 2) repeatability of individual experiences (lived experiences) that constitute the whole of human experience; 3) taking into account simultaneously the sensory and intellectual components of both individual experiences and the whole human experience.[14] The method of objectifying this experience must therefore take into account the richness of its content and the relationships occurring within it.

The problem of cognitive objectification of internal experience

The source of human experience is not only the data of inner experience, but also all that is available from the outside. This experience is also complemented by numerous first-person accounts describing various aspects of the experience of being human. Communicating experience at various levels (scientific and colloquial) contributes to broadening human experience. This cognition not only expands understanding, but also becomes a way to influence the experience itself. However, Wojtyła rejects the claim that this knowledge distorts experience itself. Rather, he seems to claim

[11] *Ibid.*, 96.
[12] For more on the topic of internal experience in the thought of Karol Wojtyła see: G. Hołub and P. Mazur, "The Experience of Human Being in the Thought of Karol Wojtyła," *Filosofija Sociologija* 28, no. 1 (2017), 73–83.
[13] Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 95.
[14] Wojtyła is not talking about *a priori* components of understanding experience.

that the knowledge obtained in this way, having its source in experience, allows one to clarify, multiply or complete the understanding of one's own "I".[15]

The dual way of experiencing man is the source of the complexity of the human fact, but it also affects the way of treating the experience itself. Therefore, in addition to the problem of the instability of internal experience, there is also the issue of the non-identity of the content of internal and external experience. Looking for a solution to these difficulties, Wojtyła refers to the presence of an intellectual factor in inner experience. The experience of self is not purely experiential, because it involves understanding. This understanding is the result of the action of human reason, which organizes and stabilizes experience through classifications and distinctions. By including general (species) aspects specific to human experience as humans (aspect of species), it allows for the overlapping of various specific experiences of the subject.[16] As a result of this, the experiences of a person also from outside and inside, despite their complexity and incommensurability, are arranged into a holistic picture of a person. In doing so, Wojtyła rejects the view that reason plays a cognitive role *a priori*. For reason does not so much produce the content of cognition, but precisely because of its mental nature, it captures elements common and characteristic of different experiences and different aspects of experience.[17]

An important factor in the stabilization by reason of inner experience is its repetitive nature, which gives it the characteristics of permanence and continuity. This enables reason to cognitively grasp the essence of a given fact present in internal experience. The multiplicity of internal experiences and their similarity combined with repetition is thus an important factor in the objectification of cognition. Wojtyła supplements the concept of stabilizing the content of internal experience through its repeatability and the understanding of its essential features by reason with the concept of comparing (referring) the contents captured in this way to external experience, without, however, equating their cognitive results. For he recognizes that both experiences (internal and external) are expressions of the truth about being human, however, the scopes of grasping this fact are not identical, but intersect. Therefore, mutual verifiability of the contents of internal and external experience is possible to the extent that these contents are identical. External experience then becomes the reference point for capturing and stabilizing the content of internal experience.

[15] Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, 96–97.
[16] *Ibid.*, 98–99.
[17] In this approach, Wojtyła explicitly refers to the Aristotelian tradition, in which reason is a possible, spiritual power capable of grasping the general (essential) aspects of things.

In turn, the internal experience complements the external experience from the experiential side, highlighting the aspect of dynamism and authenticity, so important for the existential dimension of human existence. As a result, he claims, "these aspects complement and equalize each other; also, experience itself in its two forms, that is, as interior and exterior, works toward this complementing and equalizing, not against it."[18] Wojtyła is aware of the difficulties encountered in the cognition of man due to the fragmentation of his experience. It is no coincidence that Wojtyła's "measure" of stabilization of the content of internal experience is not any external experience, but experience captured in metaphysical cognition.

The importance of inner experience

Wojtyła is aware that inner experience has its own conditions. However, he does not agree that these conditions are sufficient to reject this experience. The rejection of inner experience leads to the denial of human subjectivity. And meanwhile, to be a human being, or more specifically a human person, is precisely to experience being the subject-creator of one's existence, actions, deeds, morality, or freedom. Subjectivity is not an addition to human existence, but its essence. Therefore, "insight" into it and its "viewing," through the analysis of dynamism, makes it possible to unveil its rational nature and ultimately its personal status. Internal experience enables a person to have a phenomenological "insight and viewing" into the reality of his subjectivity and objectivity.

Even if the external experience is some form of human insight, it is not insight. The empirical, experiential, lived character of the inner experience is what highlights and most fully expresses the very subjective and personal mode of human existence. In view of this fact, a secondary question, as it were, is whether it is possible to objectify it in such a way that it forms the basis of scientific cognition, although Wojtyła by no means neglects this aspect. Given the manifestation of the human fact given in internal experience, the possible lack of the possibility to cognitively make it scientific would not constitute a sufficient basis for its rejection. Wojtyła seems to claim just the opposite – that the contents given in internal experience are so important for being human that taking them into account is a necessary condition for scientific cognition, at least as proposed in classical philosophy. To some extent, the presence of internal experience in the

[18] *Ibid.*, 99.

approach to the human fact has a normative character for him, because it becomes a measure of the reliability and universality of the approach to the human fact used for phenomenological description and metaphysical explanation.

While valuing inner experience, Wojtyła does not and has no intention of replacing outer experience with it, but at the same time he believes that inner experience cannot be replaced by outer experience either. By opposing the absolutization of any of these experiences, he points to the need for their "mutual relativization." According to Wojtyła, the overall human experience is "split" into interior and exterior, and this split is the basis of the opposition between the objective and subjective trends in philosophy.[19] Due to the "irreducibility" of both approaches to the fact of man, Wojtyła asks whether they belong to one experience or rather are they two experiences, one of which concerns the human being and the other one concerns person's own "I". However, he sees no point in separating these two approaches due to the unity of the experienced object.[20] Both approaches to the fact of man constitute an integral part of the overall experience of human existence, but at the same time they are irreducible to each other and incommensurable with each other.[21] This incommensurability means that the experience of oneself is given to a person in a more complete and different way than the experience of other people. It is therefore a *sui generis* experience, irreducible to any other experience, including external experience. "Everyone is for himself the object of experience in a unique and unrepeatable way, and no external relation to any other man can be substituted in the place of this experiential relation shared by one's own subject."[22]

The complexity of human experience and the incommensurability of aspects of this experience, on the one hand, manifests the uniqueness of man, who has a privileged way of knowing himself through inner experience, and on the other hand, raises the problem of integrating these different aspects. And as he himself states, the study *Person and Act* is an attempt to combine experience[23] and its interpretation that reveals the acting subject itself – the human person. Wojtyła is convinced that the integration of experience is possible and necessary, while the problem of human cognition, or rather philosophical anthropology, is the search for, and indication of, an

[19] See: *ibid.*, 113.
[20] See: *ibid.*, 97.
[21] See: *ibid.*, 113.
[22] *Idib.*, 97–98.
[23] See: *ibid.*, 113.

effective method or methods, comprehensive, irreducible to the experience of being human, to grasp, interpret and explain the fact of man.

Conclusion

The study *Person and Act* is a multidimensional and multi-problem work. One such problem is the question of the method of objectifying the experience of being human, which Wojtyła considers to be the key to cognition of the human being. Not only does it indicate the foundations of such a method, but it ultimately presents its implications for the analysis of human acts. Thus, it is part of the still lively and fierce dispute over the cognitive value of a person's inner experience and the experience of being human given within it. In the light of the adopted method, internal experience may, in a sense, play a normative role. The rank given to inner experience may indicate the degree of exploration of the human subject.

In Wojtyła's concept of anthropology, the process of objectification of internal experience plays a fundamental role. Although the truthfulness of internal experience data is often questioned, the author of the "Ethical Primer" recognizes it as fact. Moreover, in his opinion, internal experience gives the possibility of cognitive insight into subjective reality that is not available in external experience. At the same time, however, it is necessary to find a way to objectify this experience and integrate it with the data of external experience, according to the analogously understood single object of cognition.

The way of human cognition indicated by Wojtyła, based on phenomenology and human metaphysics, is based on the application of his proposed "method" of the objectification of internal experience. If the contents of phenomenology are the data of internal experience, then what is given in external experience is dealt with by metaphysical cognition. While internal experience is stabilized through a phenomenological view, its final verification is achieved thanks to metaphysics. However, it is not only that this external experience supports the knowledge of what the internal experience contains, but also that metaphysics, through the analysis of internal experience, gains unique access to the human *suppositum*.

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The Origins of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology as Recorded in *Coll.[atio]* and *Corr.[igenda]* Included in the Notes for his Habilitation Thesis

Karol Petryszak[1]

Abstract

The article presents excerpts from new and rich archival material on Karol Wojtyla's habilitation thesis. In addition, its purpose is to present the first strictly philosophical point from which a systematic reconstruction of the evolution of Wojtyla's philosophical views on the question of the person or more broadly on anthropological issues can be made. The thesis of the analysis is that from the beginning of his philosophical inquiries, Wojtyla was critical of phenomenology and read it from a Thomistic point of view. The analysis presented undermines the thesis that Wojtyla, from the beginning of his philosophical inquiries, was fascinated by phenomenology.

Key words

Karol Wojtyła, Thomism, phenomenology, archival materials, anthropology, person

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Introduction

This article aims to present new research material in the studies of Karol Wojtyła, to place it in the appropriate source context and indicate how the analyzes made on the basis of this material fits into the discussion on issues related to the beginnings of Karol Wojtyła's philosophical path, especially certain foundations of his philosophical anthropology. This material is a collection of Wojtyła's comments made "in the margin" of his notes and the working translation of Max Scheler's work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und in die materiale Wertethik*,[2] which was the basis for reference in the future pope's habilitation thesis.[3]

Method and research material

The research method used as the basis for this study is Gilson's historical and philosophical method, which is limited to the processing of archival material, analysis of the content of sources and partial contextual analysis. I have written elsewhere about the benefits of Gilson's historical and philosophical method in working on Wojtyła's works, as well as about the method itself.[4]

Let's move on to present the research material.

[2] M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in Der Ethik Und Die Materiale Wertethik* (Freibrug: Halle a.d.S. Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1921). The entire archival material will be presented in the first volume of the critical edition of Karol Wojtyla's philosophical works, published by the John Paul II Institute for Intercultural Dialogue in cooperation with the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow.

[3] K. Wojtyła, *Próba opracowania etyki chrześcijańskiej według systemu Maksa Schelera*, (Kraków, 1953) – the typescript is located in the resources of the Archives of the Metropolitan Curia in Krakow (hereinafter referred to as the Archive) with the reference number AKKW CII-9/110. The notation AKKW stands for: Archiwum Kardynała Karola Wojtyły (Archives of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla). The notation "CII" is the designation of the collection of philosophical materials written by Wojtyła and is part of AKKW. K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Kraków, 1954), typescript with reference number AKKW CII-9/110a; K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Kraków, 1954), typescript with reference number AKKW CII-9/110b; K. Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1959); K. Wojtyła, "Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera," in: *Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności*, by K. Wojtyła, ed. T. Styczeń et al., Źródła i Monografie, nr. 119 (Człowiek i moralność II) (Lublin: TN KUL, 1991), 11–128.

[4] K. Petryszak, "The Perspective of Archival Discoveries in the Study of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy," *The Person and the Challenges. The Journal of Theology, Education, Canon Law and Social Studies Inspired by Pope John Paul II* Vol. 13, No. 2 (2023), 117-132.

The titles *Coll.[atio]* and *Corr.[igenda]* that interest us are part of a complete archival set discovered by myself and Martha Burghardt.[5] They consist of 639 handwritten "fiches" by Wojtyła, which are translations of Max Scheler's work *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*,[6] and enriched with comments and corrections, namely the title *Collatio and Corrigenda*.

All *Coll.* in the study material are 9, while *Corr.* are 12. In addition, one paragraph is unclear due to Wojtyła's deletion and amendments. It is probably *Corr.*, as indicated by the striking out of the letters *ll* probably in the earlier *Coll*. and the content of this fragment itself, but there is no certainty here. These are paragraphs of varying length and varying thematic content. Additional research material used for the comparative and contextual analysis is the above-mentioned *Der Formalismus*..., or rather its translation by Wojtyła. Due to the possibility of reference specific *Coll*. and *Corr*. to specific places in Scheler's text, it will be marked for the sake of order to which fragments of Scheler's work Wojtyła referred. Such precision is possible thanks to the fact that in the presented research material, Wojtyła marked parts of his own translation, down to the paragraph and line.

The final research material that we will use in the contextual analysis itself is the typescript of Wojtyła's habilitation thesis, located in the Archive resources under the reference number AKKW CII-9/110. As I discovered, the version of the work that Wojtyła submitted to reviewers in 1953 differs from the widely known first edition from 1959. The most important change is a different ten-page ending to the entire work.[7] However, for the sake of a certain clarity of analysis, I will refer to the typescript (reference number AKKW CII-9/110a) from 1954 - which is essentially identical to the first edition - due to the most extensive presentation of Wojtyła's thought in it (it contains a version of before and after amendments).[8]

[5] AKKW CII-24/232.

[6] Specifically, its 1921 edition: M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*. The original copy from which Wojtyła translated is in the Archives' holdings under the reference: BKKW 84 (BKKW means Biblioteka Kardynała Karola Wojtyły – Library of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła).

[7] K. Petryszak, "Evidence of Karol Wojtyła's Thought Formation as Preserved in Archival Materials," *Logos i Ethos* Vol. 61, No. 1 (2023).

[8] For the sake of clarity, let us note that this version already contains the second (changed) ending and Wojtyła's handwritten corrections, which were already included and typed in AKKW CII-9/110b.

The beginnings of Karol Wojtyła's anthropological path in the light of archival sources

Anthropological threads in Wojtyła's thinking can already be found in his early works on theology.[9] It seems, however, that the most extensive comments and studies on this part of Wojtyła's work were his late philosophical works, especially *Person and Act*.[10] However, there is no doubt that this mature, though certainly unfinished, is an anthropological[11] project developed in Wojtyła's thought for at least two decades (from the late 1940s until the publication of *Person and Act*).

In fact, the first positive anthropological theses had already appeared in the mid-1950s[12] and took on a broader dimension with the publication of *Love and Responsibility*.[13] In the 1950s, however, the dominant approach in Wojtyła's philosophical writings is a negative one, which, by pointing out certain errors in anthropological approaches (such as those of Scheler or Immanuel Kant), makes it possible to discover the positive, and not always explicitly expressed, early and still developing anthropological thought of Wojtyła. Its roots in Thomistic philosophy are beyond doubt. However, did Wojtyła follow the anthropological path as indicated by Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy from the very beginning of his philosophical path?[14] On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that St. John was also educated in Salamanca in the spirit of Thomism,

[9] See: K. Wojtyła, *Dzieła teologiczne. Tom I. Początki drogi naukowej. Święty Jan od Krzyża*, ed. J. Machniak (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Papieskiego Jana Pawła II w Krakowie, 2022).

[10] K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne pisma antropologiczne*, ed. T. Styczeń and et. al. (Lublin: Wydawnictwo TN KUL, 2000); English translation: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Act and Related Essays*, trans. by G. Ignatik (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021). On the issue of Wojtyła's personalism itself and the attempt to place it in a broader context, see: J.M. Burgos, "Wojtyła's Personalism Ad Integral Personalism. The Future of an Intellectual Project," *Quaestiones Disputatae* Vol. 9, No. 2 (2019), 91–111. See also: M. Acosta, A.J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła's Personalist Philosophy. Understanding Person & Act* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2016). A.J. Reimers, "Karol Wojtyła's Aims and Methodology," in: *Christian Wisdom Meets Modernity*, ed. K. Oakes (New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2016), 129–147.

[11] See: J. Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 80.

[12] Primarily in the *Elementarz etyczny* and partly in the *Lublin Lectures*. See: K. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures* / *Wykłady lubelskie*, trans. by H. McDonald (Lublin – Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu – Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2020). K. Wojtyła, "Elementarz etyczny," in: *Aby Chrystus Się Nami Posługiwał* (Kraków: Znak, 1979), 129–182.

[13] K. Wojtyła, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo TN KUL, 1960); English translation: K. Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1981).

[14] Some also want to see some glimpse of phenomenology in it, see: R. Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. by P. Guietti and F. Murphy (Grand Rapids: William B. Edwards Publishing Company, 1997), ch. 3. Regarding the borrowing of certain themes in Wojtyla's philosophy from St. Augustine, see: G. Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła* (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2021), 20.

although practiced in an essentialist rather than existentialist manner. it is the important indication due to the fact that Wojtyła was connected with the thought of St Jonh of the Cross from a young age. Moreover, Wojtyła learned the basics of metaphysics from a textbook by Fr. Kazmierz Wais,[15] in which, already in the introduction, the author outlined a lecture on metaphysics proper as Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics.[16]

We are therefore faced with a situation where a wealth of ideas influenced Wojtyła during his philosophical work. While, as we have mentioned, Wojtyła already clearly outlined his anthropological position in the 1960s, the beginnings of the maturation process of his views on this matter have not yet been explored. This article serves to partially fill this gap.

For those familiar with Wojtyła's philosophy, the emphasis that the "later" Wojtyła[17] placed on the issue of the person and the act is clear. We also find similar issues in Wojtyła's initial remarks to Scheler's text. The author of Person and Act indicates here:

> Coll.
>
> Scheler, understanding a person as a concrete unity of acts, assuming that he exists in the

[15] See: K. Wais, *Ontologja czyli metafizyka ogólna* (Lwów: Towarzystwo „Biblioteka Religijna", 1926).

[16] *Ibid.*, 5-6. The very terrain of inquiry into Wojtyla's affiliation with Thomism or phenomenology is not uncharted. Already in 1981, Jerzy Gałkowski pointed out that there was a problem how to classify Wojtyła: as a Thomist, a phenomenologist or as a philosopher combining Thomism with phenomenology. However, he immediately pointed out that Wojtyła was clearly a Thomist in the foundations of his thought - as an important point, let us note that in this judgment Gałkowski referred to Wojtyła's correspondence (J. Gałkowski, "Pozycja Filozoficzna Kard. Karola Wojtyły," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (1981), 75. As a kind of counter-example, one can cite the thesis of Magdalena Mruszczyk, where the author points out that Wojtyla leaned towards Lowian Thomism – more open to additions and the theory of cognition - than towards existential Thomism. However, despite this fascination with the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: *since his studies of the mystical thought of St. John of the Cross, he [Wojtyla] was no longer able to ignore the phenomenological research attitude that had matured in him* (see: M. Mruszczyk, *Człowiek w „antropologii adekwatnej" Karola Wojtyły* (Katowice, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2010), 53.) Jan Galarowicz puts forward even stronger arguments, claiming that Wojtyła was a phenomenologist by nature, but only trained in Thomism (See: J. Galarowicz, *Człowiek jest osobą. Podstawy antropologii filozoficznej Karola Wojtyły* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, 1994), 60.) There has also been discussion on this topic in English-language literature. See: P. Guietti, "Translator's Afterword," in: *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (Grand Rapids, 1997), 307-351; A.J. Reimers, *The Truth about the Good: Moral Norms in the Thought of John Paul II* (Ave Maria: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2011); J.M. Burgos, "The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism and Metaphisics," *Analecta Husserliana* 104 (n.d.), 107-129; Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, ch. 3. In both cases (discussions in Polish and English), the wojtyłological community has not reached a clear consensus.

[17] That is, the one from the 1950s and early 1960s until his election to the See of Peter.

> execution of his act (*im Vollzug ihrer Akte*), and firmly renouncing any substantive way in understanding his essence, outlines a dynamic and axiological concept[18] [s. 24/24-].[19]

The context for this remark is Wojtyła's indication that: "The person is understood by Sch[eler] as a concrete unity of all possible acts… if then it is itself a concrete unity of actions and acts, it stands, as it were, in front of various kinds of objects… The entire sphere of objects lies outside it in the sphere of objects as acts, its action."[20] Wojtyła seems to understand the German phenomenologist's idea of the person as something that is not a thing, does not have an essence (understood within the framework of the philosophy of being), but arises as (possibly from) the union of all acts. One would have to ask here: whose? From Scheler's text, it is clear only that the person exists in the execution of his acts. However, it is not clear whether we can even talk about acts without a person or about a person without the acts having actually been performed. It is also not yet clear to Wojtyła how Scheler's execution of acts should be understood, or more precisely: what is the role of the person in performing these acts? Wojtyła does not consider this yet but adds the remark that a person actually exists in the execution of acts. As we can see, this expression is ambiguous, and Scheler's text is not helpful in clarifying it.[21] Wojtyła also adds that the person exists in action. One should not make simple parallels or a simple corollary between this view of the person and Wojtyła's mature thesis that the act reveals the person, there is insufficient data for this. It cannot be immediately assumed at this point that this action creates a person. The existence of a person in action is not, nor must not necessarily mean, that it is the person who acts. Why does Wojtyła neither in this fragment nor in the context of the preceding fragment clarify these issues? And why doesn't he draw conclusions from the presented characterization that actually result from it?

Taking into account the broader context preceding the commented *Coll.* it is reasonable to point out that Scheler is building an axiological concept. However, this dynamism that Wojtyła

[18] AKKW CII-24/232, k. 31x – these are the card numbers (cards) according to Wojtyła's numbering.
[19] The entry given after the quotations in square brackets is Wojtyła's indication (originally placed in the margins of the "cards") regarding the pages and lines of Scheler's work.
[20] AKKW CII-24/232, k. 31x.
[21] See: Scheler, *Der Formalismus in Der Ethik Und Die Materiale Wertethik*, 24. Another relevant context is also: *Ibid.*, 109-110.

points to, placed in the context of the person, seems unjustified.[22] The fact of some (undefined at this moment) connection of a person (not fully defined) with acts (whose?) and with action (whose?) does not yet result in a dynamic image of both the person and the certain situation in which he is presented.

Considering the above, we can say that in the source material we encounter for the first time in Wojtyła's thought a strictly philosophical reflection on the person.[23] Considering the number of questions that should be asked regarding the ambiguities and shortcomings left for us here by Wojtyła, it can be concluded that we are touching the starting point in the evolution of Wojtyła's anthropological views.[24] They are shaped in the prism that will also accompany the thought of the "later" Wojtyła, i.e. at the junction of the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness, or more broadly, as Grzegorz Hołub aptly pointed out, a post-Cartesian philosophy.[25]

It is important to clearly indicate the context in which Wojtyła reads Scheler's views. A broader analysis of all *Coll.* and *Corr*. clearly indicates that Wojtyła, when dealing with the difficult thought contained in *Der Formalismus*..., tried to read it from the perspective of the Thomistic philosophy of being. His numerous remarks indicate a certain surprise and disappointment at the almost complete lack of not only rooting Scheler's philosophy in the philosophy of being (of any kind), but basically the impossibility for Wojtyła of introducing this fundamental context into it.[26] Thus, it can be said that in trying to fully understand Scheler's philosophy, Wojtyła ended up with phenomena, suspended, as it were, in a metaphysical vacuum, which he tried to fill with his well-known Thomistic philosophy. However, as evidenced by his habilitation thesis, as well as a significant part of his philosophical writings from the 1950s,[27] this supplementation turned out to

[22] The explanation for Wojtyła's remark framed in this way is the fact of his strict reliance on Thomistic anthropology, in which dynamism, both on existential and moral grounds, is a fundamentally important element. See: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I. q. 75-77.

[23] Due to their strictly or definitely theological rather than philosophical nature, Wojtyła's earlier texts on the thought of Saint John of the Cross and the record of the retreat known as *Considerations on the Essence of Man* are omitted. (See: K. Wojtyła, *Rozważania o istocie człowieka* (Kraków: WAM, 1999)).

[24] Grzegorz Hołub drew attention to this evolution seen in a longer perspective, i.e. from Wojtyła's doctoral thesis: Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, 13.

[25] G. Hołub, "Karol Wojtyła and René Descartes. A Comparison of the Anthropological Positions," *Anuario Filosofico* Vol. 48, No. 2 (2015), 341–358.

[26] See especially: AKKW CII-24/232, k. 20x, 24x, 26x, 29, 38x, 43-44, 47, 49, 51, 52«b», 89, 111.

[27] See: K. Wojtyła, "Ewangeliczna zasada naśladowania. Nauka źródeł objawienia a system filozoficzny Maxa Schelera," *Ateneum Kapłańskie*, Vol. 55 (1957), 57–67; K. Wojtyła, "O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej (w oparciu o koncepcję św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz Maksa Schelera)," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* Vol. 6, No. 1–2 (1959), 99-124 (English trans.: K. Wojtyła, "On the metaphisical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral

be impossible, which ultimately confirmed Wojtyła in the belief that his intuitions expressed in the cited research material and partially presented in the conclusions of his habilitation thesis were justified.[28] Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Wojtyła, reading more and more into Scheler's works, increasingly noticed discrepancies between Thomism and phenomenology, which he initially tried to resolve by trying to internalize Scheler's philosophy into Thomism.[29] The well-known conclusion of his habilitation thesis makes it clear that, over the course of probably 1951-1953, Wojtyła lost his conviction that the two philosophies could be combined.[30]

To complete the picture, let us point out that the definition of a person in Scheler's philosophy presented by Wojtyła in his habilitation thesis is limited primarily to three summaries: a. the person is understood actualistically, b. a person is the subject of moral values because he experiences these values, but he is not a efficacious[31] being – however, he has an axiological character, c. a person is a dynamic being not in the sense of agency, but in the sense of experience, i.e. being a passive recipient of values. It can therefore be concluded that the content contained in the archival material, as well as the analyzes presented so far, agree with the material contained in Wojtyła's habilitation thesis.[32]

A strong commitment to both Thomistic metaphysics and the Thomistic anthropology that follows from it is evidenced by Wojtyła's next remark:

> Coll.
>
> Note: Scheler is apparently against overestimating the cognitive moment, esp.[ecially] the intellectual moment, in the structure of our experiences. It proclaims not only separateness, but a certain distant and [xxx][33] self-sufficiency of the sphere of aspirations and desires. It is

Norm," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, trans. by Th. Sandok (New York - San Francisco - Bern - Baltimore - Frankfurt am Main - Berlin - Wien - Paris: Peter Lang, 2008), 73-94; K. Wojtyła, "Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* Vol. 5, No. 1 (1957), 111–35 (English trans.: K. Wojtyła, "The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act,", in: Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 3-22).

[28] See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 152-162.

[29] See: AKKW CII-24/232, cards 20x, 24x, 26x, 29, 38x, 43-44, 47, 49, 51, 52«b», 89, 111.

[30] See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 152-162.

[31] We translate *sprawcza* as "efficacious" (cf. Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures* / *Wykłady lubelskie*, 47). But another possibility is to translate *sprawcza* as "causative".

[32] See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 13, 21, 39, 77-78, 89, 153-155.

[33] This word is not legible.

> the proper objective reference (factor of objectification) of these experiences [p. 28/35-29/8].[34]

This note, in itself, is very clear. However, it is worth relating it to the previous remark and asking: whose aspirations and desires are we talking about? Scheler's text does not indicate that these are the aspirations and desires of a person. Additionally, if a person cannot be understood from the perspective of the philosophy of being, it is difficult to say unambiguously that these would be his or her aspirations and desires. Should these aspirations and desires be understood as belonging to consciousness (following the spirit of phenomenology)? Wojtyła does not raise this problem, which proves that in the early 1950s he most likely did not have any well-thought-out or ready answers to such issues. If we would like to trace the evolution of Wojtyła's views on the person, the issues discussed here seem crucial, as they indicate from which philosophical issues Wojtyła began his anthropological reflection.

In the context of Thomistic philosophy of being, Wojtyła's strong emphasis on what he would later call emotionalism is noteworthy. This emotionalism is not only against overestimating the intellectual moment in the cognitive structure of experiences and in the axiological sphere, but almost completely rejects it. Therefore, this position is radically opposed to the Thomistic approach, which strongly emphasizes the value of intellectual cognition (*animal rationale*).[35] Importantly, and as we have already noted in his comments on Scheler's text, Wojtyła insists on a Thomistic[36] approach and the criticism of Scheler's emotionalism, already at the beginning of the 1950s, takes on the same framework that Wojtyła consistently presented throughout the 1950s.[37]

Wojtyła does not raise the issue of epistemology and the primacy of reason or emotions separately in his habilitation thesis. Nevertheless - apart from the context of emotionalism - it is possible to point out several places in the habilitation where the author of *Person and Act*, at least

[34] AKKW CII-24/232, card 35X
It is worth juxtaposing this remark with Wojtyla's clear declaration of belonging on the grounds of anthropology to Thomism: K. Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism," in: K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community. Selected Essays*, 168.
[35] See: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 79 and Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, 15.
[36] See: AKKW CII-24/232, card 89.
[37] See for example: Wojtyła, "Ewangeliczna zasada naśladowania. Nauka źródeł objawienia a system filozoficzny Maxa Schelera"; Wojtyła, "O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej (w oparciu o koncepcję św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz Maksa Schelera)"; Wojtyła, "Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego."

implicitly, points to the fact that Scheler does not want to overestimate the role of rational cognition and remains grounded in broadly understood feelings.[38]

From the above analyses, Wojtyła drew a conclusion precisely expressed later in the Lublin Lectures: "The purely emotionalistic intuitionism [Scheler's – KP] precludes the person's rational, efficacious and creative role in the formation of the morality of his acts."[39] This is related to the conclusion, repeated many times by Wojtyła, also as an objection, that Scheler's axiology – which translates into his ethics and related anthropology – is, in principle, completely receptive.[40] These reservations are already visible in Wojtyła's comments quoted from the manuscript, as well as in their broader context, which cannot be presented in full here.

In discussing the issue of the earliest established record of the formation of Wojtyła's strictly philosophical anthropological thought, it is still necessary to mention an issue strongly emphasized by the "later" Wojtyła. It is about recognizing that man as a person finds his individuality and uniqueness in his acts, which are often directed towards what the person himself is not.[41] While with regard to the writings of the author of *Person and Act* it is possible to inquire whether or to what extent phenomenology was useful to him in this type of study with regard to the present, earliest period of his philosophical work, it is certain that he presented the issue to himself on the basis of Thomism. In this context, the following *Corr.* deserves attention:

> *Sole clarius*: The cognition of values [according to Scheler - KP] is not only independent of the cognition of things, but often (perhaps even in principle) precedes it [pp. 29/26-30/20].[42]

[38] See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 6-7, 9-10, 81.
[39] Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures / Wykłady lubelskie*, 368.
[40] Whereby receptive is meant the passive attitude and devoid of acts of the will of the subject on moral grounds. As Wojtyła points out very clearly in an unpublished text from 1954 in relation to the foundation of Scheler's ethical views, i.e. in relation to love: "That also is why Scheler, in his conception, completely separates love from the entire sphere of human aspirations and desires, and states that it is purely and emotional act. However, there is a clear conflict with St. Thomas, whose teaching on love is based on the assumptions of ancient thinkers: love comes down to an act of will. The voluntaristic solution is opposed to the emotionalistic solution." (K. Wojtyła, "Nauka św. Tomasza z Akwinu o miłości," 1954. A copy can be found in the Archives under reference no. AKKW CII 3/59.) It should be added that the fact that Scheler calls something an act does not mean that it is an act understood in terms of classical philosophy, i.e. as an action in which the will of the acting entity is involved - or any other sphere of active human activity. The act in Scheler's case is the passive reception of values and their also passive experiencing.
[41] An interesting – albeit much later (1st edition in 1990) - interpretation of this issue was presented by Paul Ricoeur in his famous work *Oneself as Another*, in which he devoted particular attention to the main problem indicated in the text to "study" III and IV.
[42] AKKW CII-24/232, card 37x.

It is not *sole clarius* what intention Wojtyła is hiding behind the writing: *Sole clarius*. Is this an emphasis on the obviousness of the conclusion drawn from Schelerian philosophy or is it a position with which Wojtyła identifies himself and, therefore, with this emphasis marks the confirmation of the conclusion drawn.

There is a clear indication in the context regarding this remark: "Thus, it happens, for example, that we experience the readiness of the sacrifice, but do not yet completely see the object "quod" nor "cui" of this sacrifice."[43] It deserves attention because Wojtyła gives a descriptive presentation of for whom we want to, for example, sacrifice (in the original: *ohne noch die Objekte im Auge zu haben, an denen wir dies tun wollen*)[44] by means of Latin terminology. It seems that a thesis can be put forward here that Wojtyła is still looking for connections between classical philosophy and Scheler's phenomenology.[45] Indeed, there is no reason to explain such a change in translation relative to the original as simply a linguistic mannerism.

With Scheler's metaphysical thesis posed in this way, Wojtyła remains essentially helpless in his attempt to read, in a Thomistic prism, the phenomenology of the author of *Der Formalismus*. If the knowledge of values precedes the knowledge of things, then I can know (receptively) the entire world of values without knowing any particular thing. This results in a rather important difficulty related to the issue of the person. For if the cognition of values is purely emotional and receptive and precedes the cognition of things, and additionally, for Scheler, the person is understood as an actualistic stream of experiences (again, receptive), then a metaphysically grounded problem arises: who experiences and who has cognition? To ask, using Scheler's example: who experiences the readiness to sacrifice? Of course, "I". But is the "I" a person or is it personal? Or is it some kind of phenomenological "I", the "I" that is the core of consciousness? We find neither in Scheler nor, for the time being, in Wojtyła an answer to the question posed in this way.[46] From this, we notice that Wojtyła somehow sensed a certain problem resulting from the

[43] AKKW CII-24/232, card 37x.
[44] BKKW 84, 30.
[45] The validity of such a basic thesis is evidenced by other paragraphs from the manuscript in question, not referenced in this article. See for example: AKKW CII-24/232, card 20x, 24x, 26x, 29, 38x, 43-44, 47, 49, 51, 52«b», 89, 111. Note, however, that these are the opening paragraphs from a multi-hundred-page translation. Later parts of the text, as well as the final conclusion of the habilitation thesis, confirm what we have already indicated, that Wojtyła did not find any possibility of combining Scheler's phenomenology with Thomism and remained with Thomism.
[46] Let us note that this is not a problem that concerns only Scheler's phenomenology. In his famous work on responsibility, in which Roman Ingarden presented the foundations of his phenomenological anthropology, we also encounter the ambiguity of the terms "I", "person", etc., and also the difficulty of determining what relations connect

lack of a clear metaphysics in Scheler's philosophy, and in particular from the lack of a metaphysics of the person and values. He noted this shortcoming from Thomistic positions, but its solution did not come until many years later. Did Wojtyła have even then, in the early 1950s, an outline of the answer to the indicated difficulty? Analysis of archival material does not allow to answer this question in the affirmative. Moreover, a detailed study of the development of Wojtyła's anthropological thought in the 1950s shows that in the manuscript in question he only posed a problem that later found a specific solution in the "later" Wojtyła. In this context, it should also be noted that this issue was clearly indicated by Wojtyła in his habilitation thesis, although it is not of central importance in it.[47]

Conclusion

Of necessity limited and narrowed to anthropological issues, the presentation of a few excerpts from the rich research material of Wojtyła's newly discovered manuscript allows us to grasp the beginning of his strictly philosophical anthropological reflection, which does not coincide with what we know from the "later" Wojtyła. What is visible here is a basically uniform insistence on Thomistic philosophy as a reference point for phenomenological theses, which in the context of works from the 1960s could already be a controversial statement.[48] Next, the way Wojtyła presented the problem of the person in the research material shows that, apart from intuitions and Thomistic anthropology, the later author of *Love and Responsibility* was only just entering into issues developed over the next two decades in his philosophical work. Although many of the themes found a concrete dimension rather quickly, and already in the writings of the 1950s one can see Wojtyła's significant, more mature assertions about the person, certainly in the case of the manuscript in question we are dealing with the capture of the first steps that Wojtyła took on the road to his personalism.

It is also worth noting that thanks to the discovery and the analysis carried out above, it can be concluded that Wojtyła's thought evolved strongly in the 1950s - at least in anthropological

these spheres of human interiority. See: R. Ingarden, "O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych," in: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972), 77–184.

[47] See: AKKW CII-9/110a, 5, 9-10, 11, 47.

[48] See for example: Hołub, *Understanding the Person. Essays on the Personalism of Karol Wojtyła*, 19–20, 23, 27; Burgos, "The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism and Metaphisics," 19–51.

terms. A separate analysis is required to determine whether the origins of Wojtyła's metaphysics and ethics are similarly shaped, i.e. whether there is any evolution in them, or whether there is only a deepening of what Wojtyła assumed to be valid as early as the early 1950s.[49]

The above analysis, in addition to presenting excerpts from the new and rich archival material, was intended to present the first strictly philosophical point from which a systematic reconstruction of the evolution of Wojtyła's philosophical views on the question of the person or more broadly on anthropological issues can be carried out. It should also be added that showing this evolution through the prism of further archival materials from the 1950s that have been discovered and not yet published will allow this evolution to be traced much more closely in the near future.

[49] Such an analysis is especially necessary to verify the theses put forward by some researchers that Wojtyła never developed his own concept of the metaphysics of the person, which, of course, can be extrapolated to the entire metaphysics present in his thought (see: Reimers, "Karol Wojtyła's Aims and Methodology," 133).

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AKKW CII-9/110b

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AKKW CII-24/232

AKKW CII-5/84

AKKW CII-5/96

BKKW 84